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Abstract			The	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	saw	a	great	increase	in	the	use	of	the	printed	word	and	the	press	by	non-European	actors	to	express	and	disseminate	ideas	and	to	participate	in	the	intellectual	life	of	both	their	home	societies	and	a	wider	international	context.	This	thesis	examines	the	French-language	writings	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	between	1890	and	1914.	The	volume	of	engagement	by	these	figures	in	the	French-language	intellectual	and	journalistic	space	is	a	historical	phenomenon	that	reflects	a	particular	mode	of	engagement	with	the	West	in	the	decades	before	the	First	World	War.	Rather	than	analyse	these	writings	through	the	lens	of	their	connection	to	particular	specific	groups,	such	as	Young	Turks	or	Young	Algerians,	this	thesis	aims	to	take	this	body	of	work	as	a	unique	category	of	textual	production	that	performed	a	specific	function.	By	tracing	the	works	of	a	wide	variety	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	across	multiple	platforms	in	this	period,	it	is	possible	to	conclude	that	these	individuals	were	engaged	in	more	than	acts	of	political	opposition.	Rather,	they	were	working	to	situate	themselves	within	a	specific	cultural	and	intellectual	space.	The	thesis	is	organised	around	four	thematic	chapters	that	appear	throughout	these	writings	across	the	timeframe.	They	are:	the	presentation	and	function	of	history,	the	nature	of	Islam,	the	question	of	identity	and	citizenship	and	the	shape	of	reform.	By	analysing	their	commonalities,	differences	and	development,	we	can	draw	conclusions	about	this	type	of	intellectual	activity	that	transcends	political	movements,	religion	and	nationality.				 					
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Notes	on	Transliteration			For	spellings	of	Ottoman	Turkish	names	I	have	opted	to	use	modern	Turkish	usage	and	not	strict	transliteration.	Due	to	the	linguistic	unity	of	the	primary	source	material	and	the	variety	of	names	in	different	languages	I	have	generally	opted	to	maintain	the	spelling	of	proper	names	as	they	appear	in	the	publications	themselves.	 																	
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Introduction	
			Across	the	Ottoman	and	Arab	world	print	journalism	and	the	production	of	texts	for	popular	consumption	experienced	expansive	growth	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.1	These	developments	ran	parallel	and	also	helped	to	create	increasingly	complex	networks	that	stretched	across	the	Islamic	world	to	Europe	and	beyond.	The	accelerating	modernization	programs	of	the	latter	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	in	Egypt,	North	Africa,	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Qajar	Iran	created	an	environment	in	which	travel	and	communication	become	exponentially	easier.	This	allowed	for	the	creation	of	increasingly	large	networks	between	workers,	intellectuals	and	merchants	and	their	European	and	even	North	and	South	American	counterparts.			The	Islamic	world	was	of	course	always	closely	intertwined	with	Europe	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	had	likewise	maintained	close	connections	with	the	West	for	centuries.2	But	in	the	latter	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	the	impact	of	the	world	capitalist	system	and	the	spread	of	transnational	ideologies	and	politics	further	enmeshed	the	Ottoman-Arab	and	wider	Islamic	world	with	the	West.3	Similarly,	activists	and	intellectuals	used	the	advancement	of	communications	and	printing	technology	to	bind	together	large	diaspora	networks	across	vast	distances	and	to	use	the	emerging	international	institutions	to	put	forward	their	ideas	and																																																									1	Ayalon,	Ami.	The	Press	in	the	Arab	Middle	East:	A	History.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995.		2	Inalcık,	Halil.	Turkey	and	Europe	in	History.	Istanbul:	Erek,	2006.		3	Khuri-Makdisi,	Ilham.	The	Eastern	Mediterranean	and	the	Making	of	Global	Radical	Culture,	1860-1914.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2010.		
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concerns.4	These	were	intellectual	as	well	as	political	movements	and	the	balance	depended	on	a	myriad	of	factors,	including	religion,	social	status	and	geography.		Many	of	the	intellectual	developments	within	the	Ottoman-Arab	sphere	in	this	period	and	the	engagement	with	European	ideas	have	been	well	studied	by	scholars	such	as	Albert	Hourani	and	Şerif	Mardin.5	These	works	delved	deeply	into	the	various	ideas	that	were	circulating	in	this	period	and	focused	on	the	central	role	that	mass	print	culture	played	in	facilitating	the	absorption,	refashioning	and	dissemination	of	these	ideas.	Both	also	emphasize	the	diversity	of	sources	and	inspiration	that	drove	the	intellectual	production	of	the	Young	Ottomans	and	their	Levantine	and	Egyptian	Arab	contemporaries.	This	combination	of	transnational	networks	and	intellectual	engagement	and	indeed	conversation	with	the	West	was	a	fundamental	part	of	the	experience	of	modernity	across	the	Ottoman	and	wider	Arab	world	in	the	decades	leading	up	to	the	First	World	War.			
																																																								4	See	for	example	Fahrenthold,	Stacy.	“Transnational	Modes	and	Media:	The	Syrian	Press	in	the	Mahjar	and	Emigrant	Activism	During	World	War	I“,	Mashriq	
&	Mahjar,	1	(2013),	30-54,	Arsan,	Andrew,	“‘This	age	is	the	age	of	associations’:	Committees,	Petitions,	and	the	Roots	of	Interwar	Middle	Eastern	Internationalism”,	Journal	of	Global	History,	7/02	(2012),	166-188.		5	Hourani,	Albert.	Arabic	Thought	in	the	Liberal	Age,	1789-1939.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1962,	Mardin,	Şerif.	The	Genesis	of	Young	Ottoman	Thought.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1962.	See	also	Hanssen,	Jens	and	Max	Weiss	eds.	Arabic	Thought	Beyond	the	Liberal	Age.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017.			
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This	thesis	will	explore	the	relationship	between	intellectuals	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	who	wrote	and	published	in	French	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century.	These	individuals	were	an	important	part	of	the	emerging	networks	that	spread	out	from	the	Islamic	world	throughout	the	nineteenth	century.	But	unlike	many	of	their	counterparts,	these	writers	primarily	strove	to	connect	not	to	wider	diasporic	networks,	but	to	a	European	reading	public	with	whom	they	hoped	to	engage	on	an	intellectual	and	political	level.	They	desired	to	make	their	voices	heard	and	to	bring	to	the	attention	of	a	European	audience	a	variety	of	issues	on	which	they	felt	themselves	to	be	the	authority.			In	studying	these	individuals	and	their	textual	output	this	thesis	will	examine	the	historical	connection	between	intellectual	environment	and	the	production	of	ideas	or,	as	Lloyd	S.	Kramer	refers	to	it,	“the	ambiguous	intersection	of	lived	experiences	and	written	texts…”6	Many	of	the	writings	of	these	groups	and	individuals	have	been	studied	before,	but	generally	as	elements	of	a	larger	nationalist	narrative	or	as	the	study	of	a	particular	political	group	or	organisation.	With	this	work	I	aim	to	bring	an	analysis	of	the	texts	of	these	figures	out	of	the	framework	of	French	anti-colonialism	or	Ottoman	political	and	intellectual	history,	and	instead	see	these	works	as	common	examples	of	a	specific	way	of	negotiating	with	modernity	within	a	Francophone	linguistic	
milieu.	The	main	aim	of	this	project	will	be	to	trace	the	consumption	and	diffusion	of	ideas	within	this	Francophone	environment	and	to	examine	how																																																									6	Kramer,	Lloyd	S.	Threshold	of	a	New	World:	Intellectuals	and	the	Exile	
Experience	in	Paris,	1830-1848.	Ithaca	and	London:	Cornell	University	Press,	1988,	pg.	2.		
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these	ideas	were	presented	back	to	both	a	European	audience	and	to	those	members	of	their	own	communities	who	were	fluent	in	French.	The	overarching	question	under	consideration	in	this	thesis	is:	how	did	the	question	of	audience	impact	the	content	of	these	works?		In	many	ways	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	intellectuals	represented	a	hybrid	group.	They	were	at	once	representatives	of	their	own	states,	empire	or	entho-religious	group,	writing	and	publishing	in	a	city	outside	their	own	homelands,	yet	through	their	French-language	writings	they	engaged	primarily	with	a	European	reading	public.	At	this	point	it	is	important	to	state	that	the	sources	examined	in	this	dissertation	will	be	entirely	in	French	and	not	in	Arabic,	Ottoman	Turkish	or	other	language	commonly	used	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Firstly,	I	maintain	that	the	publications	produced	in	the	French	language	by	these	groups	represented	a	certain	type	of	cultural	production	aimed	at	a	specific	audience.	These	texts	represented	a	particular	way	of	negotiating	with	European	modernity	and	were	meant	to	reflect	the	particular	aims	of	these	intellectuals.	Secondly,	my	primary	interest	is	in	texts	that	were	produced	within	a	specific	and	clearly	bounded	cultural	and	linguistic	space.	It	will	not	be	a	political	history	of	the	Young	Turk	and	Young	Algerian	opposition	movements.	Rather,	it	will	be	a	study	of	ideas	produced	and	consumed	within	a	shared	intellectual	context.	This	thesis	will	examine	a	particular	facet	of	cultural	production	and	engagement	that	took	place	between	two	different,	but	related	groups	and	Europe	within	a	common	intellectual	space	and	a	common	language.			
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This	thesis	examines	the	textual	output	of	a	variety	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers,	across	the	political	and	ethnic	spectrum.	I	will	speak	in	more	detail	about	the	source	material	below.	In	choosing	to	focus	on	both	Ottoman	and	Algerian	figures	I	will	be	able	to	conduct	a	comparative	analysis	of	the	ways	in	which	these	two	groups	participated	in	this	Francophone	print	environment.	These	figures,	such	as	the	Young	Turks	Ahmed	Rıza	and	Murad	Bey	and	Algerians	such	as	Ismael	Hamet	and	Chérif	Benhabilés	were	very	astute	observers	of	the	culture	that	surrounded	them	and	thus	were	able	to	create	a	strong	identity	in	reaction	to	their	surroundings	and	the	increasing	extension	of	European	power	into	the	political,	economic	and	cultural	spheres	of	their	home	countries.	In	tracing	the	relationship	between	experience	and	ideas,	the	social	and	organizational	interactions	of	these	writers	will	be	paired	to	an	analysis	of	the	texts	that	they	were	producing.	An	analysis	of	this	kind	will	provide	the	clearest	and	most	concise	examination	of	the	topic.	This	method	will	also	make	apparent	the	heterogeneity	within	these	groups.	The	cross-section	of	figures	and	journals	will	demonstrate	that	a	variety	of	programs	and	aims	were	expressed	within	the	same	spatial	and	linguistic	framework	and	using	much	of	the	same	vocabulary.	Different	groups	and	individuals	evaluated	their	relationship	with	France,	and	more	generally	with	Europe,	and	emerged	with	different	ideas	about	how	this	relationship	should	progress.	These	sources	will	show	this	and	illustrate	the	borrowing	and	reworking	of	concepts	between	these	groups.		The	source	material	that	will	comprise	this	thesis	includes	a	wide	variety	of	newspapers,	pamphlets,	books	and	other	material	published,	both	by	these	writers	themselves,	and	in	the	pages	of	established	European	publications.	By	moving	outside	the	bounds	of	particular	opposition	groups	such	as	the	Young	
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Turks	or	Young	Algerians,	a	much	broader	cache	of	material	becomes	available	for	analysis.	Ostensibly	pro-palace	figures	such	as	Nicolas	Nicolaides	published	three	newspapers	under	his	own	name	and	a	further	two	under	a	pseudonym	in	order	to	criticize	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	between	1888	and	1912.	Many	figures,	such	as	the	Ottoman	Jew	and	Young	Turk	Albert	Fua,	returned	to	opposition	publishing	following	disillusionment	in	the	wake	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	of	1908.	Other	self-proclaimed	Young	Turks,	like	Yusuf	Fehmi,	never	returned	to	the	Empire	even	after	their	stated	goal	of	the	restoration	of	the	Constitution	of	1876	and	the	return	of	the	parliament	had	been	achieved.	This	thesis	will	show	that	a	source	profile	like	this	can	offer	valuable	insight	into	the	motivations	and	incentives	that	drove	many	of	these	writers	to	continue	publishing	throughout	this	period.	Ottomans	and	Algerians	too	made	use	of	many	of	the	same	sites	of	engagement,	such	as	the	French	journals	L’Islam	and	the	Revue	du	Monde	
Musulman.	Together	they	shared	these	spaces	with	French	journalists	and	academics.	From	the	scholarly	article	to	the	manifesto	and	from	the	printed	interview	to	the	party	program,	these	writers	were	engaged	in	a	specific	type	of	interaction	that	transcended	intent	and	political	affiliation.		
	The	dates,	1890-1914,	have	been	chosen	because	they	encompass	the	period	when	the	individuals	and	groups	that	this	thesis	is	interested	in	began	to	emerge,	define	themselves	as	opposition	figures	with	specific	political	agendas.	It	is	also	when	they	more	regularly	and	frequently	came	to	be	defined	by	members	of	their	home	and	host	societies	as	everything	from	liberals	to	pan-Islamists,	and	they	began	writing	regularly	in	the	French	language.	Following	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	in	1908,	the	Ottoman	opposition	culture	changed	as	formerly	exiled	
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figures	returned	to	Istanbul.	Some	of	those	who	had	been	outside	the	dominant	CUP	opposition	camp,	such	as	Prince	Sabahaddin	and	Yusuf	Fehmi,	remained,	and	they	provide	another	interesting	example	of	continuity	within	this	culture	of	engagement	for	examination.	Similarly,	much	of	the	work	produced	by	the	Young	Algerians	emerged	in	the	second	half	of	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century.	There	is	also	a	marked	shift	in	the	type	of	writing	that	emerged	in	the	post-war	period	among	Algerian	intellectuals	and	activists.7		
	
Literature	Review	The	field	of	Ottoman	history	has	long	been	subject	to	a	rise-decline/stagnation	paradigm	within	Western	scholarship.	Bernard	Lewis	and	others	argued	that	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	inability	to	evolve	and	reform	at	pace	with	its	European	neighbours	was	the	primary	cause	of	its	decline.8	This	view	has	been	persuasively	challenged	by	an	abundance	of	more	recent	works	such	as	Caroline	Finkel	and	Benjamin	Fortna,	who	argue	that	reform	and	modernization	continued	and	even	increased	during	the	reign	of	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	(1876-1909).9			
																																																								7	See	Colonna,	Fanny.	“The	Nation’s	“Unknowing	Other”:	Three	Intellectuals	and	the	Culture	(s)	of	Being	Algerian	or	the	Impossibility	of	Subaltern	Studies	in	Algeria”,	in	Nation,	Society	and	Culture	in	North	Africa.	James	McDougall	ed.	London:	Frank	Cass,	2003	and	Aissaoui,	Rabah.	“Exile	and	the	Politics	of	Return	and	Liberation:	Algerian	Colonial	Workers	and	Anti-Colonialism	in	France	During	the	Interwar	Period”,	French	History,	25/2	(2011),	314-231.			8	Lewis,	Bernard.	The	Emergence	of	Modern	Turkey.	London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1961.		9	See	Fortna,	Benjamin	C.	Learning	to	Read	in	the	Late	Ottoman	Empire	and	Early	
Turkish	Republic.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011	and	Finkel,	Caroline.	
Osman’s	Dream:	The	Story	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	1300-1923.	London:	John	Murray,	2005.		
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In	terms	of	the	intecllectual	production	of	the	late	Ottoman	period	works	by	Şerif	Mardin	and	Albert	Hourani	represent	probably	the	most	wide-ranging	and	influential.10	Both	authors	sought	to	explore	the	background,	inspiriation	and	devlopment	of	the	political	thought	of	a	particular	group	of	thinkers.	Similarly	both	authors	made	the	link	between	the	political	thought	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	later	developments	in	both	Turkish	and	Arab	nationalism.	These	works	focussed	on	the	influence	of	European	thought	on	the	writings	of	these	Ottoman	and	Arab	intellectuals	and	sought	to	trace	networks	of	communication	and	how	certain	ideas	were	absorbed	and	adapted	to	suit	particular	local	and	regional	contexts.			This	approach	has	also	tended	to	inform	the	field	of	the	Young	Turk	history.	This	field	has	historically	been	dominated	by	works	that	describe	the	period	after	the	1908	Revolution,	which	brought	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	(CUP),	the	dominant	Young	Turk	organization,	to	power	in	Istanbul.	Ernest	Ramsaur’s	work	remains	the	first	influential	attempt	in	English	at	a	comprehensive	look	at	the	activities	of	the	Young	Turks	prior	to	the	1908	revolution.	His	work,	however,	suffers	greatly	from	its	nearly	exclusive	reliance	on	European	source	material.11	Bernard	Lewis,	and	Feroz	Ahmad	focus	on	the	Young	Turks	as	a	political	organisation	during	and	after	the	revolution	of	1908	and	the	role	of	western	
																																																								10	Hourani,	Arabic	Thought	in	the	Liberal	Age,	1789-1939.	Mardin,	The	Genesis	of	
Young	Ottoman	Thought.	11	Ramsaur,	Ernest	Edmondson.	The	Young	Turks:	prelude	to	the	revolution	of	
1908.	Beirut:	Khayats,	1965.			
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ideas	in	their	success.12	Other	works	have	looked	at	the	journalistic	output	of	the	post-1908	period,	both	as	a	way	to	trace	the	deveolopment	of	particular	strains	of	thought	and	as	a	space	for	political	opposition.13			It	was	not	really	until	the	works	of	Şükrü	Hanioğlu	that	the	pre-1908	Young	Turk	movement	was	treated	comprehensively	from	both	a	social	and	intellectual-political	perspective.14	Hanioğlu	sought	to	emphasize	the	heterogeneity	of	the	movement	and	situate	it	relations	with	Europe	within	the	larger	context	of	diplomatic	and	political	history,	while	also	exploring	the	evolution	and	impact	of	the	political	ideas	of	the	main	Young	Turk	factions	and	individuals.	He	also	traced	continutities	in	ideology	between	the	earlier	writings	of	the	Young	Turks	in	Paris	and	Cairo	and	the	official	ideology	of	the	CUP	in	the	post-1908	period.15	His	work	suffers,	however,	from	its	scope.	Hanioğlu’s	desire	to	provide	the	most	thorough	and	wide-ranging	analysis	of	the	pre-1908	Young	Turk	movement	leaves	ample	room	for	more	in-depth	treatments	of	specific	modes	of	intellectual	activity	or	comparative	studies.			The	intellectual	production	of	Algeria	and	Tunisia	in	the	two	decades	before	the	First	World	War	has	been	well	studied,	but	is	often	situated	as	a	prelude	to	more	
																																																								12	Lewis,	Bernard.	The	Emergence	of	Modern	Turkey.	London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1961,	Ahmad,	Feroz.	The	Young	Turks:	the	Committee	of	Union	and	
Progress	in	Turkish	Politics,	1908-1914.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1969.		13	See	for	instance	Arai,	Masami.	Turkish	Nationalism	in	the	Young	Turk	Era.	Lieden:	Brill,	1992	and		14	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995,	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	Preparation	for	a	Revolution:	The	Young	Turks,	
1902-1908.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001.		15	See	for	instance	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	“Turkism	and	the	Young	Turks,	1889-1908”,	in	Turkey	Beyond	Nationalism.	Hans-Lukas	Keiser	ed.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2013.		
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in-depth	studies	of	Algerian	and	Tunisian	nationalism	in	the	interwar	and	post-war	periods.		For	my	specific	area	of	focus,	the	elites	of	Algeria	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century,	the	main	concern	is	the	place	of	these	groups	within	the	nationalist	historiography.	Too	often	the	multitude	of	voices	are	homogenized	or	misrepresented	to	fit	within	the	accepted	nationalist	narrative.	This	is	especially	the	case	in	Algeria,	where	the	writing	of	Algerian	history	as	the	inexorable	progression	from	colonial	repression	to	liberation	sidelines	the	contributions	of	a	variety	of	actors.16	James	McDougall	argues	against	adhering	to	the	dominant	narrative	and	seeks	to	bring	out	aspects	of	Algerian	history	that	have	hitherto	been	sidelined.	His	aim	is	to	dismantle	the	foundational	‘master-narrative’	of	Algerian	historiography	and	re-establish	much	needed	plurality.17	This	‘master-narrative’	has	also	impacted	the	way	in	which	the	Young	Algerians	have	been	studied,	as	it	locates	them	within	the	larger	evolution	of	Algerian	nationalist	thought.	In	addition,	McDougall	importantly	emphasizes	the	importance	of	space	and	the	relationship	between	spaces	–	colony	and	metropole,	French	and	Arabic	-	in	the	production	of	texts	and	in	the	engagement	with	Europe.			There	has	been	limited	interest	in	the	Young	Algerians	in	the	years	before	the	First	World	War	as	either	an	independent	subject	of	study	or	as	part	of	a	wider	intellectual	movement	even	within	French	language	scholarship.	Charles-Robert	Ageron’s	work	on	Algerian	history	and	the	thought	of	the	Young	Algerians	
																																																								16	McDougall,	James	ed.	Nation,	Society	and	Culture	in	North	Africa.	London:	Frank	Cass,	2003,	McDougall,	James.	History	and	the	Culture	of	Nationalism	in	Algeria.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006.		17	Ibid.		
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remains	one	of	the	strongest	and	most	thorough	works	on	the	subject	that	focuses	specifically	on	the	period	prior	to	the	First	World	War.	He	sees	these	Young	Algerians	as	representing	a	specific	step	in	the	development	of	the	more	anti-colonial	nationalism	that	would	emerge	in	the	post-war	period.	The	conditions	and	context	of	this	thought,	however,	remain,	by	design,	largely	unexplored	outside	the	context	of	colonial	subjects	caught	between	the	Islamic	and	European	worlds.18			Historians	like	Ali	Merad	have	analysed	the	role	of	the	press	in	helping	to	negotiate	the	debate	between	Islam	and	nationalism	that	was	being	undertaken	at	the	time.19	For	Merad,	the	Muslim	press	in	the	period	prior	to	the	First	World	War	was	extremely	rudimentary	and	was	too	focused	on	a	narrow	elite,	however	he	is	primarily	focused	on	the	ability	of	the	press	to	reach	Muslim	Algerians,	rather	than	a	wider	French	reading	public.20	This	position	is	echoed	by	Phillip	Zessin	who	highlights	the	relatively	conservative	nature	of	these	arly	publications	and	their	focus	on	better	integration	of	the	elite	into	the	colonial	system.21	According	to	Merad,	one	of	the	reasons	for	this	paucity	of	local	press	culture	was	the	lack	of	a	link	between	the	Maghreb	and	the	Ottoman	Empire,	which	left	them	out	of	the	major	politico-religious	debates	of	the	nineteenth	
																																																								18	Ageron,	Charles-Robert.	Les	Algériens	Musulmans	et	la	France	(1871-1919).	Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	de	France,	1968,	Ageron,	Charels-Robert,	“Le	Mouvement	jeune-algerien”,	Etudes	Maghrebines,	(1964),	217-243,	Ageron,	Charles-Robert,	L’Anticoloniamisme	en	France	de	1871a	1914.	Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	Francaise,	1973.	19	Merad,	Ali,	“Islam	et	Nationalisme	Arabe	en	Algerie	a	la	Veille	de	la	Premiere	Guerre	Mondiale”,	Oriento	Moderno	49/4-5	(1969)	213-222.		20	Ibid,	216.		21	Zessin,	Phillip.	“Presse	et	journalistes	<indigenes>	en	Algérie	coloniale	(années	1890-années	1950)”,	Le	Mouvement	social,	236	(2011),	35-46,	37.		
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century,	a	view	that	has	been	challenged	by	works	by	Julia	Clancy-Smith,	who	has	emphasized	the	interconnections	between	writers	and	intellectuals	throughout	the	Mediterranean	region.22			Works	on	the	Young	Algerians,	such	as	those	by	Belkacem	Saadallah	and	Salah	el	Din	el	Zein	el	Tayeb,	study	their	subjects	in	isolation	as	part	of	the	national	history,	leaving	little	room	for	comparative	inquiry.23	These	authors	tend	to	focus	on	the	specific	social	characteristics	of	these	elite	Algerians	and	look	more	at	their	specific	political	demands	rather	than	analyse	them	as	part	of	a	broader	intellectual	strategy	to	engage	with	Europe.	The	relations	between	the	Young	Algerians	and	the	Young	Turks	for	instance,	both	physically	and	intellectually,	are	given	only	the	lightest	treatment	with	both	authors	painting	the	relationship	as	inconsequential	and	imitative.			More	recent	works	like	that	by	Peter	Dunwoodie	have	sought	to	emphasize	the	importance	of	the	linguistic	context	of	Algerian	writers	as	not	simply	indicative	of	their	assimilationist	tendencies,	but	also	of	their	efforts	at	active	participation	in	a	particular	political	and	intellectual	realm	and	its	importance	in	creating	a	
																																																								22	Clancy-Smith,	Julia	Ann.	Mediterraneans:	North	Africa	and	Europe	in	an	Age	of	
Migration,	c.	1800-1900.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2011.			23	Saadallah,	Belkacem.	“The	Rise	of	the	Algerian	Elite,	1900-1914”,	The	Journal	
of	Modern	African	Studies,	5/1	(1967),	69-77,	Salah	el	Din	el	Zein	el	Tayeb.	“The	Europeanized	Algerians	and	the	Emancipation	of	Algeria”,	Middle	Eastern	
Studies,	22/2	(1986),	206-235.			
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group	consciousness.24	This	idea	is	of	central	importance	for	this	work	and	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	at	the	end.			The	treatment	of	the	Young	Tunisians	follows	a	similar	pattern	as	that	of	the	Young	Algerians.	The	activities	of	the	Young	Tunisians	tend	to	sit	more	comfortably	within	the	nationalist	narrative	as	they	were	far	more	uncompromisingly	in	favour	of	independence	than	many	of	their	Algerian	contemporaries.	Works	by	Noureddine	Sraieb	and	Mahmoud	Faroua	situate	the	Young	Tunisians	within	the	narrative	of	Tunisian	nationalism	and	emphasize	the	social	and	cultural	importance	of	educational	institutions	in	creating	bilingual	elite.25	Mahmoud	Faroua	makes	some	attempt	to	fit	the	idea	of	a	specific	linguistic	environment	into	a	study	of	the	French	Left’s	reaction	to	the	colonisation	of	Tunisia,	but	spends	little	time	including	the	voices	of	Young	Tunisians	themselves.	26	These	works	all	attach	importance	to	the	influence	of	the	French	language	and	further	education	in	the	metropole	on	the	political	thought	of	the	Young	Tunisians,	but	by	and	large	don’t	try	and	fit	them	into	a	wider	pattern	of	political	and	intellectual	engagement	outside	of	a	French	North	African	and	colonial	context.	The	relationship	is	entirely	causal	and	does	not	really	go	beyond	this	paradigm.																																																											24Dunwoodie,	Peter.	Francophone	Writing	in	Transition:	Algeria	1900-1945.	Bern:	Peter	Lang,	2005,	Dunwoodie,	Peter.	Writing	French	Algeria.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1998.		25	Sraieb,	Noureddine.	Le	College	Sadiki	de	Tunis,	1875-1965:	enseignement	et	
nationalisme.	Paris:	CNRS,	1995	and	Ayadi	(Taoufik).	Mouvements	Reformiste	et	
Mouvements	Populaires	a	Tunis	(1906-1912).	Tunis:	Publications	de	l’Universite	de	Tunis,	1986.			26	Faroua,	Mahmoud.	La	Gauche	en	France	et	la	Colonisation	de	la	Tunisie	(1881-
1914).	Paris:	L’Harmattan,	2003.	
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Groups	and	Individuals	I	have	elected	to	focus	on	primarily	writers	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	both	because	of	their	similarities	and	their	differences.	Members	of	both	of	these	groups	were	generally	the	product	of	French-style	education	and	possessed	fluency	in	the	French	language.27	An	additional	component	to	this	similarity	is	that	both	these	things	were	likely	to	have	occurred	in	their	country	of	origin.	Thus	these	groups	tended	to	possess	a	familiarity	with	France	and	its	culture	prior	to	arriving	there.	This	was	also	the	case	with	many	Persian	and	Egyptian	intellectuals	and	they	could	also	have	been	included	in	this	study.	Yet,	I	contend	that	the	Ottomans	and	Algerians	can	provide	the	most	illustrative	and	concise	case	for	my	research.	The	relationship	between	Algeria,	France	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	as	former	and	current	colonies	is	highly	relevant	to	how	they	viewed	their	intellectual	counterparts.28	Following	this,	comparing	the	experiences	and	textual	production	of	those	coming	from	a	colonial	environment	and	those	who	were	not	will	also	likely	provide	valuable	insight	into	the	development	and	evolution	of	political	ideas	in	a	Francophone	setting.	Ultimately	though	it	is	the	common	experience	of	an	educated	elite	absorbing	and	re-
																																																								27	See	Ageron,	Charles	Robert.	Les	Etudiants	Algeriens	de	l’Universite	Francaise,	
1880-1962.	Paris:	CNRS,	1984,	Ageron,	Charles	Robert,	“Le	Mouvement	jeune-algerien”,	Etudes	Maghrebines,	(1964),	217-243,	Bousquet,	G.H.	“Les	elites	gouvernantes	en	Afrique	du	Nord	depuis	la	conquete	francaise”,	Die	Welt	des	
Islam,	3/1	(1953),	15-33,	and	Evered,	Emine	Ö.	Empire	and	Education	Under	the	
Ottomans:	Politics,	Reform,	and	the	Resistance	from	the	Tanzimat	to	the	Young	
Turks.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2012.		28	See	for	instance	Çaycı,	Abdurrahman.	La	Question	Tunisienne	et	la	Politique	
Ottomane	(1881-1913).	Paris:	Imrimerie	de	la	Societe	Turque	D’Histoire,	1992,	and	Moreau,	Odile.	“Echoes	of	National	Liberation:	Turkey	Viewed	from	the	Maghrib	in	the	1920’s”,	in	Nation,	Society	and	Culture	in	North	Africa.	James	McDougall	ed.	London:	Frank	Cass,	2003.			
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purposing	the	linguistic	and	intellectual	material	of	Europe	to	create	their	own	intellectual	framework	and	voice	that	binds	these	figures	together.		While	the	fields	profiled	above	are	seemingly	quite	distinct	and	separate	it	is	possible	to	identify	a	couple	of	major	commonalities	between	them.	Firstly	there	has	been	a	growing	emphasis	on	plurality.	In	studying	any	intellectual	or	artistic	community,	whether	in	a	émigré	or	exile	context	or	not,	there	is	a	strong	desire	not	to	let	weaker	voices	get	drowned	out.	Hanioğlu,	McDougall	and	others	all	emphasize	the	need	for	plurality	and	the	necessity	of	exploring	a	variety	of	historical	threads	to	produce	a	work	of	sufficient	depth.	A	second	commonality	is	the	emphasis	on	social	and	cultural	environment	and	the	idea	of	context	to	provide	determining	factors	in	the	development	of	intellectual	or	artistic	thought.	Dunwoodie	and	Hanioğlu	too	reflect	on	context	as	an	important	factor	in	the	development	of	political	thought.	These	figures	sought	to	engage	with	European	ideas,	but	also	directly	with	European	public	opinion.		
	
Chapter	Organization		This	thesis	will	be	comprised	of	four	chapters,	each	exploring	a	different	theme	common	to	the	relevant	publications	of	the	period.	These	themes	were	selected	due	to	their	prevalence	within	the	written	material	produced	by	the	individuals	under	consideration	and	also	for	their	importance	to	both	writer	and	audience	as	a	topic	of	conversation.	Chapter	1	will	look	at	the	ways	in	which	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	addressed	their	own	history.	It	will	look	at	how	they	structured	the	past	and	to	what	extent	it	represented	an	attempt	to	create	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	their	readers.	It	will	argue	that	the	historical	narratives	
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produced	in	this	context	had	a	specific	function	and	were	intended	to	advance	a	particular	agenda.			Chapter	2	looks	at	the	way	religion,	specifically	Islam,	was	addressed	in	the	writings	produced	by	these	individuals.	Building	on	the	first	chapter,	it	explores	how	these	writers	used	the	defense	of	Islam	as	a	means	to	both	legitimate	their	societal	structures	and	their	place	within	the	teleological	progression	of	nations.	It	will	argue	that	a	defense	of	Islam,	even	to	non-Muslims	and	those	who	possessed	largely	materialist	and	rationalist	views,	was	crucial	to	their	autonomy	within	the	French	language	sphere.	Islam	became	a	fundamental	part	of	their	intellectual	identity	within	the	pages	of	their	journals.	Chapter	3	looks	at	how	the	rest	of	this	identity	was	articulated	within	the	press.	It	asks	along	what	lines	society	was	divided	and	what	ethnic	and	linguistic	markers	attached	themselves	to	certain	identities.	Finally	chapter	4	looks	at	a	discussion	of	the	means	through	which	this	cultural,	institutional,	religious,	and	historical	legacy	would	be	sustained,	restored,	created	or	improved.	What	were	the	main	features	of	successful	reform	and	how	were	they	articulated	by	these	writers?													
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Chapter	1	
Repurposing	the	Past:	Historiography	in	Ottoman	and	
Algerian	Texts		
	
Introduction		
J’ai	loué	le	passé	du	peuple	ottoman	non	pas	pour	atténuer	les	lourdes	fautes	du	présent,	mais	avec	
l’intention	de	régulariser	l’avenir	sous	le	poids	croissant	du	passé.29	(I	praised	the	past	of	the	Ottoman	people	not	to	mitigate	the	gross	negligence	of	the	present,	but	with	the	intention	to	regularize	the	future	under	the	growing	weight	of	the	past.)		
Il	est	indispensable	de	donner	à	cette	question	la	précision	que	réclame	son	importance	et,	par	
conséquent,	de	décrire	le	peuplement	indigène	de	l’Algérie,	tel	qu’il	était,	antérieurement	à	
l’occupation	française,	et	avant	que	le	contact	de	la	civilisation	l’ait	modifié.	30	(It	is	essential	to	give	this	question	the	accuracy	demanded	by	its	importance	and,	therefore,	to	describe	the	indigenous	population	of	Algeria,	as	it	was,	before	the	French	occupation,	and	before	the	contact	with	civilization	changed	it.)			The	development	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	intellectual	and	political	thought	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	was	largely	bound	up	with	the	question	of	how	to	negotiate	with	Europe	and	western	culture	in	general.	From	the	overt	colonial	occupation	of	North	Africa	to	the	less	overt,	but	still	highly	influential,	European	presence	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	the	issue	of	western	influence	and	encroachment	weighed	heavily	on	the	minds	of	those	in	the	elite.	One	section	of	the	elite	in	particular	felt	itself	best	positioned	to	address	the	questions	of	imitation,	integration,	synthesis	and	rejection	that	they	believed	
																																																								29	Ahmed	Rıza,	Bey.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient:	ses	causes	et	ses	remèdes.	Paris:	Comité	Ottoman	d’Union	et	de	Progrès,	1907,	6.	30	Hamet,	Ismael.	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique.	Paris:	Librairie	Armand	Colin,	1906,	15.	
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were	central	to	the	Islamic	world’s	relationship	with	Europe	at	this	time.	This	section	was	comprised	of	men	who	were	generally	members	of	one	of	the	liberal	professions,	especially	in	Algeria	and	Tunisia,31	or	employed	in	the	state	bureaucracy	in	the	Ottoman	case.32	In	all	cases	these	figures	had	a	familiarity	with	European	languages	and	had	been	exposed	to	European	thought.33	Many	had	also	undergone	further	education	in	Europe	itself,	mainly	in	Paris.34			Many	members	of	this	elite	soon	became	loosely	grouped	around	the	labels	of	‘Young	Turks’	and	‘Young	Algerians’.	These	groups	combined	intellectual	and	political	activity	and	many	had	clear	agendas	for	reform.	With	many	prominent	Young	Turks	in	exile	in	Europe	and	many	Young	Algerians	spending	formative	years	in	French	universities,	the	opening	up	of	a	dialogue	with	European	societies	was	inevitable.	With	the	desire	to	present	their	ideas	within	a	European	context,	a	large	number	of	journals,	books	and	pamphlets	were	published	in	the	French	language	during	this	period.	These	works	were	clearly	aimed	at	an	interested	European	population	in	addition	to	the	small	percentage	of	French-literate	elite	in	these	countries.35	Writing	about	the	indigène	newspapers	of	the	Young	Algerians	for	instance	Peter	Dunwoodie	claims	that	these	publications	were	an	alternative	way	of	exercising	agency	within	a	colonial	framework.36	Publishing	these	papers	in	French,	often	in	Paris	or	Geneva,	but	also	in	the	active	centres	of	Istanbul,	Cairo,	and	Algiers	or	Bone	allowed	these	elite	Algerians	and																																																									31	Saadallah,	“The	Rise	of	the	Algerian	Elite,	1900-1914,”	70.		32	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	25.	33	Ibid,	71.	34	Saadallah,	69.	35	Dunwoodie,	Peter.	Francophone	Writing	in	Transition:	Algeria	1900-1945.	Bern:	Peter	Lang,	2005,	56	36	Ibid,	49.	
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Ottomans	to	engage	with	European	society	and	to	actively	construct	an	identity	that	could	be	presented	back	to	Europe.37	Dunwoodie	limits	his	analysis	of	textual	engagement	and	participation	with	the	European	intellectual	and	political	milieu	to	the	Algerian	colonial	context,	but	the	Ottomans	in	the	Empire,	France	and	elsewhere	in	Europe	were	certainly	attempting	the	same	thing.	Both	of	these	groups	were	writing	in	French	with	the	aim	of:	“…addressing	a	community	beyond	local,	ethnic	boundaries,	a	community	of	which	they	were,	imaginatively,	part.”38	Those	writers	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	likewise	sought	to	carefully	manage	the	European	perception	of	their	culture	and	their	country.	Their	works	were	in	manys	ways	propaganda,	but	propaganda	aimed	at	a	specific	audience	and	projecting	a	specific	worldview.	The	use	of	the	French	language	in	books	and	journals	was	not	necessarily	evidence	of	a	belief	in	the	superiority	of	European	culture,	but	rather	a	deliberate	tactic	of	engagement	and	a	way	to	situate	themselves	in	the	European	intellectual	conversation.			This	chapter	will	address	the	role	of	the	presentation	and	analysis	of	history	within	the	French-language	writings	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.	It	will	show	that	the	treatment	of	history	by	these	writers,	while	mirroring	many	of	the	developments,	functions	and	patterns	of	histories	produced	in	their	native	languages,	they	served	a	unique	purpose	as	Francophone	texts.	This	chapter	will	focus	primarily	on	standalone	works	of	historical	inquiry	and	long-form	articles	that	appeared	in	French	publications	rather	than	historical	commentary	that	appeared	in	
																																																								37	Ibid.		38	Ibid,	57.		
	 26	
newspaper	columns.	The	reasons	for	this	are	twofold:	first,	these	longer	texts	represented	a	clearer	attempt	at	creating	a	coherent	historical	work	and	second,	they	allow	for	a	more	effective	comparison	and	analysis	across	groups	and	time	periods.			The	advent	of	‘modern’	history	writing,	at	least	in	the	Arab	world,	is	generally	agreed	to	be	a	phenomenon	that	emerged	in	the	nineteenth	century.39	Across	the	Arab	provinces	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	Egypt	and	North	Africa	new	historical	works	were	being	produced	that	took	a	more	clearly	defined	territorial	entity	as	its	subject	of	inquiry	and	began	to	make	clear	distinctions	between	a	‘modern’	and	a	pre-modern	period.40	For	many	this	new	mode	of	history	writing	was	inextricably	bound	up	with	modernity	and	the	idea	of	the	nation-state.	By	adopting	Western	conventions	of	history	writing	these	writers	reacted	to	a	new	type	of	reasoning	and	a	new	way	of	writing	about	the	past.41	This	represented	what	Yoav	Di-Capua	calls	‘historicism’.	In	his	work	on	modern	Egyptian	historiography	he	writes:	“More	than	anything	else,	however,	historicism	sought	to	understand	the	past	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	final	outcome	of	progress:	that	is,	the	future.	As	such,	historicism	accounts	for	many	of	the	above	mentioned	
																																																								39	See	for	instance	Choueiri,	Youssef.	Arab	History	and	the	Nation-State:	A	Study	
in	Modern	Arab	Historiography	1820-1980.	London:	Routledge,	1989.		40	For	the	majority	of	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	the	‘modern’	period	begins	with	the	reign	and	reform	efforts	of	the	Ottoman	Sultan	Selim	III	at	the	end	of	the	18th	century	and	the	beginning	of	the	French	colonial	presence	in	Algeria	in	1830.	A	similar	periodization	can	be	seen	in	Egyptian	historiography	during	this	period	that	sees	‘modern’	Egyptian	history	as	beginning	either	with	the	French	invasion	in	the	18th	century	or	the	start	of	the	reign	of	Mehmet	Ali	in	the	early	19th.	See	Di-Capua,	Yoav.	Gatekeepers	of	the	Arab	Past:	Historians	and	
History	Writing	in	Twentieth-Century	Egypt.	Berkeley	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	2009.				41	Di-Capua,	29.		
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ideologies,	ideas,	and	collective	aspirations,	including,	but	not	limited	to,	nationalism.	It	conditioned	them	and	was	simultaneously	reformulated	by	them	once	they	became	operative.	Evidently,	the	nature	of	this	relationship	was	a	two-way	traffic.”42	This	new	appreciation	among	the	Egyptian	intellectual	elite	of	the	power	of	historical	narrative	as	a	political	act	can	be	applied	just	as	easily	to	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.		The	function	of	the	historian	and	history	writing	in	French,	however,	adds	an	additional	layer	of	complexity	to	this	analysis.	For	the	writing	of	one’s	own	history,	be	it	Algerian	or	Arab,	Ottoman	or	Islamic,	in	the	French	language	represented	a	greater	desire	than	the	legitimation	of	their	own	personal	narratives.	It	also	represented	a	deliberate	act	of	participation	and	contribution	to	the	production	of	European	academic	history.	These	writers	wanted	to	use	history	writing	to	express	their	own	particular	positions,	but	they	also	wanted	to	be	a	part	of	the	conversation	and	production	of	their	own	history	within	this	French-language	intellectual	space.	They	took	themes	common	both	to	Ottoman,	Arab	and	Islamic	history	and	combined	them	with	narrative	structures	and	practices	that	emerged	in	Europe	and	produced	historical	works	that	formed	a	unique	body	of	Francophone	writing.		
Decadence	and	Fanaticism:	Halil	Ganem	and	the	Ottoman	Sultans		In	1901	the	Syrian	Christian	and	member	of	the	Young	Turks,	Halil	Ganem	(1847-1903),	published	his	two-volume	work	on	the	Ottoman	Royal	House	entitled	Les	Sultans	Ottomans.43	Ganem	founded	several	newspapers	during	his	
																																																								42	Ibid,	30.	43	Ganem,	Halil.	Les	Sultans	Ottomans.	Paris:	Librairie	Marescq	Ainé,	1901.		
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lifetime,	including	the	long-running	Mechveret	with	Ahmed	Rıza	in	Paris.44	The	work	was	published	by	the	French	publishing	house,	Librairie	Marescq	Ainé,	and	also	had	a	portion	of	its	preface	reprinted	in	the	pages	of	Mechveret.45			Halil	Ganem	in	many	ways	exemplified	the	multi-lingual	character	of	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	intellectual	community	in	Western	Europe.	He	was	active	across	multiple	linguistic	platforms	with	the	aim	of	engaging	a	diverse	readership.	His	output	in	all	three	languages,	French,	Arabic	and	Ottoman	Turkish,	was	in	aid	of	advancing	his	reform	agenda.	Ottoman	history	for	Ganem	was	a	means	through	which	he	could	articulate	his	positions	on	reform	and	the	Ottoman	state.			Halil	Ganem	had	been	involved	in	both	the	Ottoman	émigré	publishing	scene	in	Paris46	and	the	broader	opposition	movement	against	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	as	early	as	the	1880s.47	One	of	the	main	ways	in	which	we	can	analyse	the	work	Halil	Ganem	is	to	look	at	not	only	the	subjects	of	these	works	but	also	at	how	this	historical	content	was	organised	and	interpreted.	Halil	Ganem	divides	his	work	into	three	sections	on	the	Ottoman	Sultans.	He	divides	the	Sultans	into	three	main	groups	–	the	conquerors	and	founders	of	the	empire,	the	destroyers	of	the	
																																																								44	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	78.		45	See	Mechveret	Supplément	Francais	15	April,	15	May	and	1	June	1901.		46	See	for	instance	Ganem’s	paper	La	France	Internationale	which	ran	between	1889	and	1891	(59	issues)	and	dealt	with	a	variety	of	European	and	international	questions	and	was	focussed	almost	exclusively	on	diplomatic	and	political	issues.	It	included	contributions	from	multiple	European	journalists	and	intellectuals.		47	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	46.		
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empire	or	the	Sultans	of	decadence,	and	the	reformers.48	In	this	work	he	praises	the	early	Sultans	for	their	role	in	creating,	expanding	and	enriching	the	empire	and	then	goes	on	to	condemn	the	middle	sultans	for	allowing	the	empire’s	fortunes	to	fall.	Ganem	writes:		
Dans	l'étude	de	l'histoire	du	Moyen	Age,	comme	dans	celle	de	l'histoire	ancienne,	il	est	nécessaire,	
suivant	l'opinion	émise	par	le	savant	écrivain	Heeren,	de	séparer	les	états	qui,	par	leur	constitution,	
ont	donné	un	grand	développement	a	l'homme	lui-même,	de	ceux	ou	l'homme,	considéré	
uniquement	comme	esclave,	ne	jouit	d'aucun	droit	individuel	et	ne	s'élève	au-dessus	des	autres	que	
par	la	faveur	du	maître.49		(In	the	study	of	the	history	of	the	Middle	Ages,	as	in	that	of	ancient	history,	it	is	necessary,	following	the	opinion	expressed	by	the	learned	writer	Heeren,	to	separate	states	which,	by	their	constitution,	have	given	a	great	development	of	man	himself,	or	of	those	man,	considered	solely	as	a	slave,	does	not	enjoy	any	individual	right	and	rises	above	the	other	by	the	favour	of	the	master.)		Ganem	is	one	of	the	few	authors	who	offers	anything	approaching	a	historical	philosophy.	He	believes	firmly	in	the	importance	of	rulers	in	the	historical	development	of	any	state.	He	seems	deeply	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	Ottoman	Empire	lacks	comparable	figures	to	those	found	in	classical	Greece	and	Rome.50	This	is	an	important	distinction	for,	as	we	shall	see	on	Chapter	2,	links	to	the	classical	past	were	a	key	element	of	these	writer’s	discussions	of	Islam	and	its	place	in	society.	However	Halil	Ganem	did	believe	that	rulers	could	be	shaped	and	that	the	Ottoman	Empire	would	be	able	to	raise	itself	up	to	the	level	of	other	nations.																																																										48	Ganem,	II.	49	Halil	Ganem,	Les	Sultans	Ottomans	Vol	1-2.	Paris:	Librairie	Marescq	Ainé,	1901,	I.	50	Ibid,	II.	
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This	is	echoed	in	his	1895	work,	Education	des	Princes	Ottomans.	In	it	Halil	Ganem	hoped	to	illuminate	the	historical	roots	of	the	despotism	currently	affecting	the	Ottoman	Empire.51	This	work	broadly	fit	with	the	idea	of	the	Ottoman	Sultanate	as	being	corrupt	and	largely	confirmed	European	beliefs	about	Oriental	decadence	and	incompetence	in	government.	However,	for	Gamen	this	is	not	inevitable	or	inrreversible.	He	reaches	back	to	the	pre-Islamic	past	to	demonstrate	a	particular	historical	continuity	between	their	societies	and	the	wider	world:		
La	Turquie	a	connu	tous	les	despotismes.	Elle	a	eu	ses	Attila,	ses	Tamerlane,	ses	Genghis-Khan,	
comme	elle	a	eu	ses	Tibères	et	ses	Constantins.	Le	moment	est	peut-être	venu	pour	elle	de	sortir	de	
l’ornière	pour	marcher	hardiment	dans	la	voie	du	progrès	à	la	suite	de	ses	chefs	transformés	par	
une	éducation	intelligente	et	virile.52		(Turkey	has	experienced	all	despotisms.	She	has	had	her	Attilas,	her	Tamerlanes,	her	Genghis	Khans,	as	she	has	had	her	Tiberius	and	Constantines.	The	time	has	perhaps	come	for	her	to	get	out	of	the	rut	to	walk	boldly	into	the	path	of	progress	as	a	result	of	its	leaders	transformed	by	a	smart	and	manly	education.)		Here	Halil	Ganem	maintained	that	the	development	of	Ottoman	history	was	one	determined	by	its	rulers.	Thus	allowed	him	to	frame	his	opposition	to	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	as	something	that	was	ultimately	historically	justifiable.	This	conception	of	history	was	also,	in	many	ways,	mirrored	by	Ganem’s	Algerian	counterparts.			Chérif	Benhabilés	and	Ismael	Hamet	were	members	of	the	French-educated	Algerian	elite	and	could	both	be	called	‘Young	Algerians’	by	virtue	of	their	French																																																									51	Ganem,	Halil.	Éducation	des	Princes	Ottomans.	Bulle:	Imprimerie	Émile	Lenz,	1895.		52	Ganem,	Halil.	Éducation	des	Princes	Ottomans,	7.		
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education	and	their	firm	belief	that	integration	with	French	society	was	both	desirable	and	inevitable.53	Ismael	Hamet	(1857-1932)	was	born	in	Algiers	and	had	been	an	Officier	interprête	principal	à	l’État	Major	de	l’Armée	and	worked	for	the	French	state	before	becoming	a	member	of	the	Académie	des	sciences	
coloniales	in	1923.	In	many	ways	he	epitomised	the	evoulé	Algerian	and	published	extensively	throughout	his	long	career,	contributing	to	the	type	of	knowledge	production	that	helped	to	sustain	French	colonial	domination	in	Algeria.54	In	1906	he	published	his	work	on	the	history	of	Algeria	and	its	current	political,	social,	and	economic	situation.	His	book	was	published	by	French	academic	publisher,	Librairie	Armand	Colin,	and	was	received	quite	well	with	one	American	reviewer	stating	that	the	author’s:	“…wide	reading	and	familiarity	with	modern	thought	admirably	qualify	him	to	serve	as	interpreter	between	East	and	West.”55	Chérif	Benhabilés	(1885-1954)	was	born	in	Constantine	came	from	a	family	of	notables	that	had	maintained	their	status	through	the	transition	from	Ottoman	to	French	colonial	rule.	He	worked	as	judge	in	the	Islamic	section	of	the	dual	legal	system	of	colonial	Algeria	and	then	went	on	to	obtain	a	doctorate	in	law	at	a	French	university.56	Unlike	Hamet	his	work	was	much	more	overtly	political,	while	at	the	same	time	keeping	the	personal	opinions	of	the	author																																																									53	Ageron,	Robert.	Les	Algériens	Musulmans	et	la	France	(1871-1919).	Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	de	France,	1968.		54	Trumbull,	George	R.	An	Empire	of	Facts:	Colonial	Power,	Cultural	Knowledge	
and	Islam	in	Algeria,	1870-1914.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009,	2.	55	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique	by	Ismael	Hamet.	Journal	of	the	
Royal	African	Society.	6/22	(1907),	220-221.	He	was	also	well	known	enough	to	have	caught	the	attention	of	the	American	Political	Science	Review,	see:	Balch,	Thomas	Willing,	“French	Colonization	in	North	Africa”,	American	Political	Science	
Review	3/4	(1909)	539-551,	546.			56	Ruedy,	John.	“Cherif	Benhabyles	and	the	Young	Algerians”,	in	Franco	Arab	
Encounters.	Carl	L.	Brown	&	Matthew	S.	Gordon	eds.	Beirut:	American	University	of	Beirut	Press,	1996,	353.	
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somewhat	obscure.	He	re-printed	the	manifesto	of	the	Young	Algerians	along	with	the	texts	of	letters	of	petition	to	various	French	political	figures,	but	failed	to	offer	any	clear	or	detailed	opinion	on	the	content	of	these	re-produced	texts.57			For	these	and	many	other	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers,	the	past	becomes	something	that	is	reviled	or	idealised,	but	ultimately	reconstructed	from	a	particular	vantage	point.58	This	was	especially	true	for	those	individuals	writing	for	audiences	within	their	host	societies.	In	his	1847	work	La	Russie	et	les	Russes,	the	Russian	émigré	Turgenev,	writing	from	Paris,	often	used	the	Russian	past	to	provide	context	for	his	reform	proposals.59	Similarly	Chateaubriand	used	his	1797	work,	The	Historical	Essay	on	Ancient	and	Modern	Revolutions,	to	frame	his	discussion	of	the	political	situation	in	France	and	to	help	make	the	case	for	constitutional	monarchy.60	In	all	of	these	cases	how	the	past	was	presented	made	a	statement	on	how	these	writers	both	viewed	themselves	and	wanted	to	be	viewed	by	others.	For	Algerians	and	Ottomans	writing	in	French	thoughts	about	the	past	informed	their	discussions	of	the	future.			The	past	figures	prominently	in	all	of	these	works,	both	as	an	explanation	for	the	current	state	of	the	Muslim	world	and	a	justification	of	its	potential	for	progress,	advancement,	and	overall	equality	with	Western	states.	All	of	the	analysis	of	the	
																																																								57	Ageron,	Charles,	“Le	Mouvement	jeune-algerien”,	Etudes	Maghrebines,	(1964),	217-243,	220.			58	Kramer,	Lloyd	S.	Threshold	of	a	New	World:	Intellectuals	and	the	Exile	
Experience	in	Paris,	1830-1848,	10.			59	Miller,	Martin	A.	The	Russian	Revolutionary	Emigres:	1825-1870.	Baltimore,	MD:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1986,	42-43.		60	Carpenter,	Kristy.	Refugees	of	the	French	Revolution:	Émigrés	in	London,	1789-
1802.	London:	Macmillan	Press,	1999,	xvii.		
	 33	
current	political	and	social	situation	of	both	Algeria	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	is	informed	by	the	past,	more	specifically	the	Islamic	past.	The	dominant	theme	that	underpins	all	analysis	of	the	Islamic	past	in	these	works	is	the	‘Golden	Age-Decline”	paradigm.	This	paradigm	was	a	way	of	looking	at	history	in	the	Islamic	world	that	was	popular	both	among	Western	Orientalists	of	the	time	and	Muslim	scholars	themselves.61	The	“Golden	Age-Decline”	paradigm	looked	at	the	Islamic	world	as	having	experienced	a	Golden	Age	of	development	and	expansion	in	its	early	years	before	beginning	its	inexorable	decline.	In	the	Ottoman	context	the	Golden	Age-Decline	paradigm	is	generally	associated	with	military	decline	and	with	the	loss	of	power	as	a	result	of	this.	Analyses	of	Ottoman	decline	were	often	presented	as	analyses	of	this	military	decline	in	contrast	to	the	concurrent	rise	in	military	power	of	Europe.62	Continued	loss	of	territory	and	a	decline	in	military	prestige	was	presented	as	inevitable	in	the	face	of	superior	Western	technology	by	many	authors.63			Chérif	Benhabilés	provides	a	good	example	of	how	the	“Golden	Age-Decline”	paradigm	emerges	in	his	discussion	of	French	Algeria:		Muslim	civilization…	for	a	few	moments	lighted	this	earth	and,	while	those	who	dwell	in	it	today	are	several	centuries	behind	their	neighbours,	one	must	not	forget	that	they	are	the	descendants	of	a	race	whose	letters,	arts	and	sciences,	and	whole	historic	past	bespeak	finesse	and	taste.64																																																											61	For	a	good	example	of	this	belief	see	H.A.R	Gibb	and	H.	Bowen,	Islamic	Society	
and	the	West,	Vol.	1,	Pt.	1.	London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1950.	62	Grant,	Jonathan.	“Rethinking	the	Ottoman	“Decline”:	Military	Technology	Diffusion	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	Fifteenth	to	Eighteenth	Centuries”,	Journal	of	
World	History,	10/1	(1999),	179-201,	180.		63	See	Bernard	Lewis,	The	Emergence	of	Modern	Turkey	and,	more	recently,	Halil	Inalcık	and	Donald	Quataert	eds,	An	Economic	and	Social	History	of	the	Ottoman	
Empire,	1300-1914,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997.		64	Benhabilés,	Chérif.	L’Algérie	française	vue	par	un	indigène.	Alger,	1914,	138.		
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Benhabilés’	assessment	nicely	captures	the	general	feeling	towards	the	early	Islamic	period	held	by	these	authors.	All	four	took	great	care	to	emphasize	the	achievements	of	the	Islamic	world,	especially	intellectual	and	technological	areas.	The	primary	difference	in	the	way	the	Islamic	past	was	conceptualized	by	these	authors	lies	in	which	elements	are	highlighted	and	how	that	serves	the	political	purposes	of	the	authors.	In	this	way	the	Young	Algerians	strengthened	their	case	for	equality	with	the	French,	while	the	Young	Turks	gathered	support	for	the	restoration	of	the	Ottoman	parliament	and	constitution.	Ismael	Hamet	highlights	very	specific	aspects	of	‘Algerian’	and	‘Islamic’	society.	Rather	than	highlighting	civilizational	or	political	aspects	of	the	Golden	Age,	Hamid	highlights	rather	the	advances	of	early	Islamic	societies	in	science	and	philosophy	and	Algerian	skill	in	trade	and	commerce.65			The	Young	Algerians	had	a	specific	interpretation	of	the	Islamic	Golden	Age	and	it	is	telling	that	Ismael	Hamet’s	main	chapter	on	the	past	is	called	‘Arab	Muslim	Civilization’.	For	Hamet	the	Golden	Age	of	Islamic	history	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	Arabs.	Throughout	his	chapter	he	almost	exclusively	refers	to	the	early	Muslims	solely	as	Arabs.	Hamet	makes	mention	of	the	fact	that	first	philosophical	studies	of	the	Arabs	were	inspired	by	the	works	of	Aristotle	and	devotes	several	pages	to	the	mathematical	and	scientific	achievements	of	the	early	Islamic	period.	To	complement	this	he	also	mentions	the	facility	with	which	the	Arabs	absorbed	and	expanded	upon	the	medical	knowledge	taught	to	them	by	the	Jews	and	the	Greeks.66	When	Hamet	approaches	the	Algerian	past	he	discusses	the	
																																																								65	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	66.		66	Ibid,	68.		
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arrival	of	the	Arabs	and	their	fusion	with	the	Berbers.	He	paints	the	Berbers	as	a	semi-barbaric	race	and	celebrates	the	arrival	of	the	Arabs	and	the	cultural	benefits	that	they	brought	with	them.	He	writes	about	the	how	the	Berbers	assimilated	the	language,	culture,	and	science	of	Islamic	civilization.67	Hamet	is	very	keen	to	demonstrate	the	potential	of	assimilation	to	benefit	a	people	without	having	them	become	subjugated.	He	mentions	that	although	the	Berbers	had	become	Arabized	they	remained	the	dominant	element	following	the	Arab	conquest.68	Here	the	case	for	a	certain	type	of	relationship	between	France	and	Algeria	is	being	made	using	historical	analogy.	By	showing	how	the	Berbers	were	able	to	absorb	the	benefits	of	Arab	civilization	without	losing	their	independence	Hamet	makes	the	case	that	the	Muslim	population	of	Algeria,	or	at	least	a	certain	segment	of	it,	would	be	able	to	effectively	absorb	the	benefits	of	French	civilization	while	maintaining	a	level	of	equality.	Like	the	French	ethnogrpahers	working	to	establish	facts	on	the	ground,	Hamet	was	establishing	his	own,	and	crafted	his	text	to	support	his	own	political	goals	of	equality	for	Muslim	Algerians.69		In	the	Algerian	context	the	focus	on	these	past	achievements	and	practices	served	a	variety	of	purposes:	the	first	is	to	reinforce	the	idea	that	Islamic	civilization,	and	specifically	the	Arab-Islamic	civilization	from	which	the	Algerians	are	descended,	was	and	therefore	is	still	capable	of	a	high	degree	of	intellectual	and	technological	development,	and	secondly	it	provides	justification	for	the	position	that	Islam	is	not	in	and	of	itself	a	barrier	to	progress.	For	Hamet																																																									67	Ibid,	98.		68	Ibid,	102.		69	Trumbull,	33.		
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the	term	‘Arab	civilization’	referred	to	a	linguistic	and	cultural	designation	and	not	to	an	inherent	or	immutable	ethnic	identity.70	Arab	civilization	can	best	be	reflected	in	arts	and	architecture	of	the	region,	which	Hamet	sees	as	one	of	the	defining	features	of	civilization	more	generally.71	The	progress	of	the	Islamic	world	for	Hamet	stops	in	the	fifteenth	century	when	the	discovery	of	printing	allowed	the	Western	nations	to	race	ahead	of	their	Islamic	counterparts.72	This	is	an	important	point	as	it	ties	into	the	larger	belief	in	the	power	of	the	printed	word	to	engender	and	spread	progress.			In	ignoring	the	achievements	of	Ottoman	civilization	Hamet	and	Benhabilés	further	emphasize	the	break	with	a	backward	past	that	French	colonization	represented.	Underlying	this	presentation	of	the	past	is	the	idea	that	Muslim	Algerian	society	would	be	perfectly	capable	of	absorbing	the	cultural	and	technological	advancements	of	the	French,	of	attending	French	schools	and	technical	colleges	and	participating	in	a	meaningful	way	in	the	administration	of	the	country	while	still	maintaining	an	Islamic	identity.	This	is	highlighted	also	in	an	article	Hamet	wrote	for	the	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman	that	looked	at	the	commercial	aptitude	of	the	Muslim	Algerian	populations.	He	uses	the	past	to	trace	continuities	between	contemporary	Algerians	and	the	great	North	African	civilizations	that	came	before	them.73	There	is	conscious	effort	to	de-legitimize	the	Ottoman	state	as	a	commercial	entity	but	it	also	diminishes	the	achievements	of	the	Byzantine	Empire,	to	which	the	Ottomans	felt	themselves	the	natural																																																									70	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	55.	71	Ibid,	69.		72	Ibid,	72.	73	Hamet,	Ismael.	“Le	Commerce	et	les	Indigènes	Algériens”,	Revue	du	Monde	
Musulman	I,	1907,	472.		
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successors.74	Hamet	then	goes	on	to	state	that	during	the	Ottoman	and	Regency	periods	a	focus	on	warfare	at	the	expense	of	trade	diminished	the	capacity	of	the	Algerians	to	flourish	and	cut	them	off	from	their	natural	relationship	with	Europe.75		The	emphasis	on	past	achievements	was	not,	however,	part	of	any	desire	or	program	to	emulate	or	return	to	this	period	of	Islamic	grandeur.	Both	Benhabilés	and	Hamet	were	committed	to	modernization	and	integration	with	the	French	and	saw	the	achievements	of	their	coreligionists	as	proof	of	Islamic	society’s	ability	to	produce,	but	also	to	absorb	and	utilize	the	most	up-to-date	science	and	technology.	Benhabilés	writes	of	the	Algerian	Muslim’s	“genius”	and	his	ability	to	“readily	absorb	the	benefits	of	French	civilization”.76	For	Benhabilés	and	Hamet	the	Golden	Age	of	Islamic	civilization	is	utilized	to	serve	the	assimilationist	agenda.	It	doesn’t	argue	for	the	superiority	of	that	era	or	even	of	the	societal	model,	but	merely	seeks	to	remind	the	reader	that	Islam	had	at	one	time	been	an	intellectual	and	technological	force	in	the	world.	The	contextual	nature	of	Islamic	dominance,	rather	than	its	universal	nature	is	mentioned	by	Hamid.	He	states	that	the	writing	system	and	scientific	methods	of	Islamic	civilization	were	well	suited	for	the	time,	but	that	failure	to	keep	up	with	European	technology,	such	the	printing	press,	contributed	to	its	decline.77	Both	Benhabilés	and	Hamet	take	pains	to	emphasize	the	positive	elements	of	Islamic	history	in	terms	of	personal	
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characteristics,	such	as	intelligence,	which	could	be	effectively	utilized	within	the	colonial	context.		 	
	For	the	Young	Turks	the	Islamic	past	appears	in	their	works	much	as	it	did	in	the	works	of	their	immediate	predecessors	the	Young	Ottomans.	The	Young	Ottomans	were	a	group	of	reformers,	including	Namık	Kemal,	Ziya	Pașa,	and	others	who	were	active	primarily	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century.78	Like	the	Young	Turks	many	of	the	Young	Ottomans	came	from	a	professional	background	in	the	state	bureaucracy,	especially	the	Translation	Bureau.79	They	too	conceived	of	an	Ottoman-Islamic	Golden	Age,	but	unlike	earlier	reformers	did	not	advocate	a	wholesale	return	to	a	semi-mythic	state	of	Ottoman	purity,	but	did	use	this	Golden	Age	to	build	up	their	arguments	for	reform	along	Ottoman	lines.80	The	Young	Ottomans	looked	to	early	Ottoman	practices	to	demonstrate	that	certain	Western	ideas	had	domestic	roots,	such	as	legislative	assemblies.81	Like	the	Young	Turks,	the	Young	Ottomans	also	blamed	the	stifling	of	these	positive	elements	of	early	Ottoman	administration	on	corrupt	officials	and	rulers.82	The	use	of	the	past	to	provide	a	foundation	for	arguments	about	the	present,	especially	in	matters	of	statecraft	and	governmental	structure	pervades	the	work	of	the	Young	Turks	as	well,	both	with	regards	to	the	early	Islamic	past	and	the	Ottoman	era.		
																																																								78	Mardin,	The	Genesis	of	Young	Ottoman	Thought,	10-13.		79	Ibid.		80	Ibid,	133.	81	Ibid,	134.		82	Ibid.		
	 39	
One	of	the	Young	Turks	to	tackle	the	questions	of	Islamic	and	Ottoman	history	in	the	French	language	was	Murad	Bey	(1854-1917).	Murad	Bey	was	an	early	member	of	the	Young	Turk	opposition	movement	in	Paris,	but	reconciled	with	the	Sultan	in	1897	and	returned	to	Istanbul.	While	in	Europe	he	published	two	works	in	French	that	addressed	the	topic	of	Ottoman	and	Islamic	history.83	In	his	1897	work	La	Force	el	Faiblesse	de	la	Turquie:	Les	coupables	et	les	innocents	he	stresses	that	historically	Islamic	societies	had	urged	the	faithful	to	pursue	science	and	the	arts,	and	not	only	that	but	urged	Islamic	rulers	to	support	their	development.84		He	writes:		
Les	sciences	en	Orient	ne	sont	pas	nées	et	ne	sont	pas	développées	dans	les	monastères,	ou	dans	des	
laboratoires	particuliers,	à	l’abri	de	toutes	“ingérences	officielles”.	Avant	d’arriver	à	leur	maturité,	
avant	d’avoir	acquis	leur	indépendance,	les	lettres	sont	transférées	dans	les	palais.85			(The	sciences	in	the	East	were	not	born	and	were	not	developed	in	monasteries,	or	in	private	laboratories,	free	from	all	«	official	interference	».	Before	they	reached	maturity,	before	they	had	acquired	their	independence,	the	letters	were	transferred	to	the	palaces.)	
		For	the	Ottomans	an	analysis	of	the	past	also	served	to	inform	readers	of	Islamic	civilization’s	intellectual	pedigree,	but	in	contrast	to	the	Young	Algerians	the	emphasis	is	shifted	from	intellectual	pursuits	in	isolation	and	to	the	structural	elements	that	allowed	these	developments	to	progress.	This	reflects	the	different	contextual	situations	of	the	Young	Turks,	who	desired	to	precipitate	political	
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changes	within	their	own	independent	state,	and	the	Young	Algerians,	who	were	looking	to	achieve	a	greater	degree	of	equality	within	a	colonial	framework.			Murad	Bey	laments	the	decline	of	the	liberalism	of	the	early	Muslims	and	their	loss	of	civic	pride	and	intellectual	independence.86	For	Murad	the	early	Islamic	ruler	guided	and	supported	the	great	developments	of	the	early	Islamic	period	and	it	was	with	the	corruption	and	decline	of	these	rulers	that	Islamic	civilization	declined.	According	to	Murad	as	long	as	the	rulers	remained	virtuous	then	intellectual	and	scientific	activity	flourished.87	He	emphasized	the	role	of	rulers	in	protecting	scholars,	but	also	pursuing	scholarship	themselves.	He	writes	that:	“The	palaces	were…	the	repository	of	intelligence.”	88	To	emphasize	this	point	he	wrote:		
	
C’est	d’ailleurs	à	cette	époque	de	la	période	abbasside	que	le	Monde	vit	pour	la	première	fois,	régler	
les	contributions	de	guerre,	non	pas	en	argent,	mais	en	ouvrages	manuscrits	des	philosophes	grecs	
et	romains.89			(It	is	also	at	this	time	of	the	Abbasid	period	that	the	world	saw	for	the	first	time,	the	settlment	of	war	contributions	not	in	money,	but	in	manuscript	books	of	Greek	and	Roman	philosophers.)		Here	Murad	was,	like	his	Algerian	counterparts,	tying	the	grand	sweep	of	history	form	the	classical	period,	through	the	early	Islamic	period	and	up	to	the	late	Ottoman	present.	Murad	Bey	divides	Turkey	into	la	Turquie	officielle	and	la	Turquie	nationale,	placing	the	blame	for	Ottoman	decline	on	the	actions	of	
																																																								86	Ibid.		87	Ibid,	11.	88	Ibid.		89	Murad	Bey.	La	Force	et	la	Faiblesse	de	la	Turquie,	12.		
	 41	
official	Turkey.90	It	is	not	the	system	itself	but	certain	negative	elements,	such	as	corrupt	officials	and	practices,	bureaucratic	inefficiency,	and	fiscal	incompetence,	of	it	that	contributed	to	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	decline.			Another	major	Ottoman	figure	to	delve	into	the	question	of	history	was	Ahmed	Rıza	(1859-1930)	was	a	leading	figure	in	the	Young	Turk	movement	in	Paris	and	subsequently	went	on	to	become	president	of	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	in	the	reformed	Ottoman	parliament	after	1908.91	He	had	started	his	career	in	the	translation	bureau	of	the	Ottoman	government	and	settled	permanently	in	Paris	in	1889.92	Ahmed	Rıza	was	a	devoted	follower	of	the	positivist	Auguste	Comte	and	this	materialist	outlook	impacted	how	he	came	to	conceptualise	Ottoman	and	Islamic	history.		Ahmed	Rıza	stresses	that	the	enormous	progress	made	by	Muslims	in	the	Middle	Ages	is	proof	that	the	Islamic	society	was	not	hindered	by	religion,	but	rather	by	incompetent	rulers.	He	also	reminds	his	readers	that	Muslims	of	the	Middle	Ages	were	in	many	ways	more	civilized,	learned	and	more	free	than	other	peoples	of	the	time.93	Ahmed	Rıza’s	engagement	with	French	press	culture	in	Paris	began	in	earnest	in	the	1890s.94	In	addition	to	publishing	the	French-language	newspaper	
Méchveret	Supplément	Français	he	also	published	frequently	in	European	
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publications,	such	as	the	Positivist	organ	La	Revue	Occidentale.95	In	this	publication	Ahmed	Rıza	explored	Islamic	and	Ottoman	history	as	a	way	of	both	educating	his	French	readers	and	advancing	his	political	goals.	In	his	book	he	writes:			
Le	progrès	humain	ressemble	à	un	véhicule	poussé	par	derrière	et	non	trainé	par	devant.	En	cas	
d’un	obstacle	insurmontable,	la	résistance	n’est	possible	qu’à	la	condition	de	s’appuyer	sur	l’âge	d’or	
de	l’Histoire.	C’est	là	que	réside	l’âme	d’une	nation.	Une	des	forces	vives	de	l’Islamisme	a	été	
précisément	la	glorification	des	grandes	œuvres	de	l’antiquité,	quelles	qu’en	fussent	les	origines.96				(Human	progress	resembles	a	vehicle	pushed	from	behind,	not	dragged	from	in	front.	In	the	case	of	an	insurmountable	obstacle,	resistance	is	only	possible	by	standing	on	the	Golden	Age	of	history.	That	is	where	a	nation’s	soul	is	to	be	found.	One	of	the	most	active	forces	of	Islamism	was	precisely	the	glorification	of	the	great	works	of	antiquity,	whatever	their	origins.)		For	Ahmed	Rıza	it	is	precisely	the	achievements	of	the	Islamic	Golden	Age	that	will	ensure	the	ability	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	continue	to	progress	towards	modernity.			For	Benhabilés	and	Hamet	the	advancements	of	Golden	Age	allowed	them	to	demonstrate	their	society’s	willingness	and	ability	to	utilize	modern	technology	and	ideas	based	on	past	accomplishments.	Hamid	makes	clear	that	in	areas	such	as	the	manufacture	of	arms	Europeans	borrowed	many	techniques	from	Muslim	craftsmen	in	the	past.97	Likewise	Murad	Bey	and	Ahmed	Rıza	used	the	Golden	Age	to	demonstrate	that	the	presence	of	an	enlightened	ruler	and	system	of	government	was	responsible	for	the	proliferation	of	intellectual	activity	during																																																									95	Between	1896	and	1906	Ahmed	Rıza	wrote	14	articles	for	this	publication	on	a	variety	of	subjects	including	Islam	and	Islamic	history,	Positivism	and	Ottoman	politics.		96	Ahmed	Rıza.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient,	6.		97	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	67.	
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this	time.	The	Young	Algerians	and	the	Young	Turks	both	used	the	achievements	of	the	past	to	strengthen	their	case	for	reform.	The	Young	Algerians	looked	to	the	intellectual	and	technological	achievements	of	the	Golden	Age	to	demonstrate	the	potential	for	Algerian	Muslims	to	integrate	successfully	into	French	society.	The	Young	Turks	on	the	other	hand	focus	much	more	on	the	qualities	of	the	early	Islamic	and	Ottoman	state	in	order	to	show	that	a	nominally	Islamic	state	like	the	Ottoman	Empire	is	perfectly	capable	of	participating	as	an	equal	within	Europe.				The	second	half	of	the	Golden	Age-Decline	paradigm	sought	to	explain	the	reasons	for	the	apparent	‘stagnation’	of	Islamic	society	relative	to	Western	Europe.	In	the	case	of	Algeria	decline	is	presented	in	the	context	of	their	position	as	a	peripheral	province	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	There	is	a	keen	sense	of	marginalization	in	the	way	that	the	more	recent	Algerian	past	is	presented.	Benhabilés	describes	the	state	of	“disorder”	and	“anarchy”	that	existed	under	the	Ottomans.	98	He	paints	the	state	of	Ottoman	Algeria	in	a	very	primitive	light,	standing	in	stark	contrast	to	the	praise	heaped	on	the	earlier	“Arab”	Islamic	past.	Hamid	as	well	characterizes	the	Muslim	world	of	North	Africa	as	living	“in	a	chaotic	mess	where	a	state	of	war	overshadowed	all	other	forms	of	human	activity.”99	This	portrayal	of	Algerian	society	as	completely	lacking	in	structure	and	order	provides	a	standard	against	which	to	measure	the	French	influence.	For	Benhabilés	and	Hamet	the	discussion	of	decline	takes	on	a	more	personal	character	than	the	discussion	of	the	Golden	Age.	Decline	is	examined	in	a	specifically	Algerian	context.		
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Hamet	uses	the	Ottoman	period	as	a	yardstick	against	which	to	measure	the	achievements	of	the	French.	He	mentions	that	the	Turks	would	employ	armed	force	to	collect	“heavy	taxes”	and	that	the	average	Algerian	was	unable	to	maintain	his	home.100	Later	on	while	outlining	the	achievements	of	the	French	in	the	areas	of	agriculture	and	education	he	makes	sure	to	hold	these	against	their	Ottoman	equivalents.	Benhabilés	too	asks	the	question:	“Can	the	indigènes	justifiably	look	back	regretfully	to	the	‘good	old	days’?”	His	answer	is	an	emphatic	no	and	he	declares	that	anyone	who,	after	a	careful	examination	of	the	situation	before	and	after	1830,	still	wishes	to	return	to	the	former	state	is	an:	“…	Imposter	whose	conclusions	are	unsustainable.”101	For	the	Algerians	the	more	recent	past	is	used	to	reinforce	the	positive	aspects	of	modernization	while	still	allowing	that	further	progress	needs	to	be	made.			The	Young	Turk	view	of	decline	contains	two	parts:	decline	in	the	early	pre-Ottoman	period	and	decline	in	the	Ottoman	period.	For	Murad	Bey	decline	in	the	pre-Ottoman	period	is	linked	explicitly	to	corrupt	and	despotic	rulers.	The	corruption	of	rulers	in	the	Islamic	world	resulted	in	a	resignation	to	fatalism	and	blind	obedience	within	Muslim	societies.102	Islamic	decline	becomes	tied	to	despotism	alone,	not	to	religion.	For	Murad	this	blind	obedience	became:	“…the	marble	cover	which	overlays	the	tomb	of	progress	in	the	East.”103	Ahmed	Rıza	is	less	concerned	with	decline	in	the	pre-Ottoman	era	and	instead	focuses	on	the	decline	in	the	Ottoman	period.	He	places	the	beginnings	of	La	Turquie	actuelle	at	
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the	start	of	the	Russo-Turkish	War	of	1878.104	Like	decline	in	the	pre-Ottoman	period	the	root	of	Ottoman	decline	can	be	found	with	the	state.	Ahmed	Rıza	writes:			
Qu’est-ce	donc	qu’un	demi-siècle	dans	l’histoire	du	progrès	humain	?	Il	y	a	eu	des	époques	où	
l’Europe	chrétienne	est	restée	plusieurs	siècles	en	arrières	sur	le	monde	musulman.	Aux	XIVe	et	XVe	
siècles,	les	Turcs	étaient	supérieurs,	à	tous	égards,	à	plusieurs	peuples	de	l’Occident	devenus	plus	
tard	civilisés.	Aux	XVIe	et	XVIIe	siècles,	l’Allemagne,	et	même	la	France	entrevoyaient	à	peine	les	
réformes	déjà	réalisées	en	Angleterre.		(What,	then,	is	half	a	century	in	the	history	of	human	progress?	There	have	been	times	when	Christian	Europe	has	remained	centuries	behind	the	Muslim	world.	In	the	fourteenth	and	fifteenth	centuries,	the	Turks	were	superior	in	all	respects	to	several	peoples	of	the	West,	later	civilized.	In	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries	Germany,	and	even	France,	barely	foresee	the	reforms	already	carried	out	in	England.)	
	
Je	ne	connais	pas	une	loi	de	nature,	une	règle	de	l’évolution	obligeant	tous	les	habitants	de	la	terre	à	
marcher	côté	à	côté	dans	la	voie	du	progrès.	Au	contraire,	l’histoire	de	la	civilisation	nous	montre	
que	le	progrès	n’est	en	aucune	façon	une	règle	générale	et	que	de	prodigieux	efforts	ont	été	déployés	
pour	y	arriver.105	(I	do	not	know	a	law	of	nature,	a	rule	of	evolution	obliging	all	the	inhabitants	of	the	earth	to	walk	side	by	side	in	the	path	of	progress.	On	the	contrary,	the	history	of	civilization	shows	us	that	progress	is	by	no	means	a	general	rule	and	that	prodigious	efforts	have	been	made	to	achieve	it.)		Ultimately	for	Ahmed	Rıza,	as	for	Ismael	Hamet,	history	is	a	long	process	and	that	reflects	the	particular	conetxts	of	the	dominant	civilizations	of	the	moment.	What	both	of	these	writers	wanted	to	accomplish	was	to	show	to	their	European	audiences	that	Islamic	civilization	was	at	once	both	historically	great	and	also	capable	of	greatness	again.		
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Yoav	Di-Capua	stresses	in	his	discussion	of	the	development	history-writing	in	Egypt	in	the	nineteenth	century	that	one	cannot	simply	divide	the	historical	texts	produced	during	this	period	into	the	categories	of	‘modern’	and	‘traditional’.	Many	works	of	history	incorporated	elements	that	bridged	both	traditions.106		Many	works	of	history	being	produced	in	Arabic	and	Ottoman	Turkish	in	the	mid	and	late	nineteenth	century	incorporated	traditional	elements,	such	as	a	reliance	on	popular	folklore	as	source	material	and	ornate	language	into	what	were	ostensibly	‘modern’	works	of	history.107		On	the	surface	the	history	produced	by	Ismael	Hamet	appears	to	fall	decidedly	into	the	modern	camp.	In	his	1906	book,	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	
l’Afrique,	he	devotes	a	third	of	the	work	to	Le	Passé.	His	approach	to	history	is	a	blend	of	the	religio-cultural	history	of	Islam	from	its	beginnings	and	a	more	geographically	based	history	of	Algeria	itself,	which	stretches	back	to	antiquity.108	This	approach	reflects	Ismael	Hamet’s	position	as	a	member	of	a	specific	Muslim	Algerian	elite	hoping	to	communicate	a	specific	vision	of	Algeria’s	history	to	his	European	audience.			Hamet’s	focus	on	Algeria	as	a	distinct	territorial	entity	with	a	continuous	history	going	back	to	antiquity	also	mirrors	developments	that	had	been	occurring	in	the	Islamic	world	in	the	realm	of	history	writing.	In	places	such	as	Egypt	there	was	a	very	clear	shift	from	earlier	forms	of	Islamic	history	writing	to	dealing	with	the	
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long-term	history	of	Egypt	as	a	“distinct	geographical	unit.”109	However	despite	relying	almost	exclusively	on	European	secondary	source	material	to	construct	his	history	his	history	does	not	come	at	the	expense	of	his	own	people.	Ismael	Hamet	remained	very	clear	about	the	purpose	of	presenting	the	Algerian	and	Islamic	past	to	his	readers:		
Tels	étaient	la	composition	et	l’état	social	des	populations	musulmanes	de	l’Algérie,	au	moment	de	
la	conquête	française.	Ce	qu’ont	été,	dans	le	passé,	les	éléments	composant	de	cette	population,	
l’histoire	nous	le	dira	et	nous	laissera	entrevoir	les	destinées	qui	les	attendent,	au	contact	de	la	
civilisation	moderne.		(Such	were	the	composition	and	the	social	condition	of	the	Muslim	populations	of	Algeria,	at	the	time	of	the	French	conquest.	What	were,	in	the	past,	the	component	elements	of	that	population,	history	will	tell	us	and	let	us	glimpse	the	destiny	awaiting	them	in	contact	with	modern	civilization.110)	
		History	provided	a	template	for	development	for	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers.	They	were	able	to	use	history	to	both	reflect	their	own	pasts	to	a	European	audience	and	to	place	themselves	within	a	more	global	historical	progression	from	antiquity	to	the	present.	Different	combinations	of	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	pasts	were	articulated	within	the	pages	of	these	publications.	A	unique	combination	of	Islamic,	territorial,	Imperial,	dynastic	and	regional	histories	were	offered	in	order	to	ground	the	experience	of	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	in	the	intellectual	currents	of	France.	The	writing	of	history	allowed	these	writers	to	stress	continuity	and	legitimacy	within	their	historical	narratives	and	provided	a	foundation	for	a	defence	of	Islamic	history	and	the	faith	that	underpinned	it.																																																											109	Choueiri,	Youssef	M.	Modern	Arab	Historiography:	Historical	Discourse	and	the	
Nation-State,	25.		110	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	Français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	231.	
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Chapter	2	
	
In	Defense	of	Islam:	Providing	‘Authentic	Perspective’				 En	théorie,	il	n’y	a	rien	dans	l’Islam	qui	soit	contraire	à	l’humanité…	(In	theory	there	is	nothing	in	Islam	that	is	contrary	to	humanity…)111		
Le	Orient	demeure	pour	l’Occident	le	pays	des	mystères.	(The	East	remains	for	the	West	a	country	of	mysteries)112			The	previous	chapter	showed	that	the	Ottoman,	Algerian	and	Islamic	past	helped	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	and	intellectuals	grapple	with	the	task	of	articulating	in	their	writings	the	shape	that	their	societies	should	take	in	the	present	and	the	path	that	they	needed	to	take	to	achieve	these	goals.	However,	in	doing	so	they	were	confronted	by	one	of	the	most	overwhelming	perceptual	differences	that	separated	these	societies	from	their	European	counterparts:	Islam.	For	their	European	audience	it	was	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	identity	as	an	Islamic	Empire	that	most	clearly	set	it	apart	from	the	rest	of	the	continent.	Likewise	the	Muslim	identity	of	the	majority	of	France’s	Algerian	subjects	represented	probably	the	largest	barrier	to	French	citizenship	and	therefore	inclusion	into	French	society.113			
																																																								111	Murad	Bey,	La	Force	et	la	Faiblesse	de	la	Turquie,	9.		112	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Calife	et	ses	devoirs”,	in	La	Revue	Occidentale	Tome	IV,	1896,	94.	113	Ruedy,	John.	Modern	Algeria:	The	Origins	and	Development	of	a	Nation.	Bloomington:	University	of	Indiana	Press,	2005,	42.		
	 49	
In	the	nineteenth	century	European	Orientalists	and	other	writers	sought	to	divide	and	categorize	the	various	peoples	of	the	East	along	racial,	linguistic,	and	religious	lines.	In	both	the	Ottoman	and	the	Algerian	context	Islam	represented	an	overwhelmingly	important	aspect	of	their	identity	by	European	observers.114	Islam	defined	them	as	different	from	Europe	and	by	extension	was	considered	a	barrier	to	certain	values	and	institutions	associated	with	Europe.115	Given	the	centrality	of	Islam,	in	the	eyes	of	Europe,	as	a	fundamental	part	of	the	identity	of	many	of	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	in	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	it	emerged	as	a	frequent	topic	in	their	French	language	writings	during	this	period.	The	prevalence	of	this	theme	was	in	part	due	to	the	specific	function	that	these	French	language	writings	served,	the	audience	at	which	they	were	aimed	and	the	entrenched	beliefs	they	hoped	to	counter.	Among	these	writers	there	was	a	desire,	even	among	those	who	openly	embraced	ideologies	that	were	theoretically	strongly	anti-religious	in	nature	such	as	Positivism	and	other	forms	of	Materialism,	to	provide	a	defense	of	Islam	to	their	primarily	European	audience.	This	defense	was	generally	framed	in	liberal	and	humanistic	terms	and	was	focused	on	refuting	the	commonly	held	belief	in	Europe	that	Islam	was	incompatible	with	liberalism	and	democracy.			
																																																								114	See	Almond,	Philip.	“Western	Images	of	Islam,	1700-1900”,	Australian	Journal	
of	Politics	and	History,	49/3	(2003),	412-424	and	Balch,	Thomas	Willing.	“French	Colonization	in	North	Africa”,	The	American	Political	Science	Review,	3/4	(1909),	539-551	for	a	more	contemporary	viewpoint.		115		See	Islam	in	European	Thought.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991	and	Kharchi,	Djamal.	Colonisation	et	Politique	d’Assimilation	en	Algerie	
1830-1962.	Alger,	Hydra:	Casbah	Editions,	2004.	
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In	the	nineteenth	century	European	perceptions	of	Islam	and	Islamic	civilization	began	to	move	away	from	the	more	Universalist	ideology	of	the	Enlightenment	to	one	rooted	in	the	hierarchical	and	essentialist	realities	of	Eurocentrism	and	Imperialism.	In	this	earlier	Enlightenment	period:	“…the	desire	to	understand	exotic	worlds	was	linked	to	the	classical,	universalist	vision	that	hoped	to	find	in	the	East,	as	elsewhere,	those	human	qualities	that	transcended	time	and	place.”116	As	the	nineteenth	century	progressed,	however,	the	study	of	non-European	cultures	and	civilizations	in	this	period	was	marked	by	an	increased	specialization	in	history	and	philology	and	the	growth	of	new	fields	such	as	anthropology	and	sociology.	These	disciplines	attempted	to	discover	observable	scientific	explanations	for	the	apparent	decline	and	stagnation	of	certain	civilizations	as	well	as	ones	to	explain	Europe’s	current	superiority.				In	France	it	was	the	work	of	scholars	like	Ernest	Renan	and	Gustave	Le	Bon	that	characterized	many	in	French	intellectual’s	changing	view	of	and	relationship	to	Islam	in	the	nineteenth	century.	Elected	to	the	French	Academy	in	1878	the	philologist	and	philosopher	Ernest	Renan	was	a	highly	influential	figure	at	the	time	and	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	were	most	certainly	aware	of	his	writings	on	Islam.117	Renan	believed	that	Islam	was	a	barrier	to	science	and	progress	and	saw	the	religion	as	a	‘spent	force	in	history’.118																																																											116	Rodinson,	Maxime.	La	fascination	de	l’Islam.	Paris:	Librairie	François	Maspero,	1980,	53.			117	See	Ernest	Renan,	L’Islamisme	et	le	science,	Paris:	1882.		118	Quinn,	Frederick.	The	Sum	of	All	Heresies:	The	Image	of	Islam	in	Western	
Thought.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	98.		
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Additionally	he	dismissed	Islam’s	role	in	the	dissemination	of	earlier	Greco-Roman	knowledge	claiming	that	this	was	driven	by	Aryan	Persian	scholars	who	were	only	superficially	Islamic.119	In	fact	Renan	broadly	refused	to	countenance	that	Islam	had	been	anything	but	an	enemy	of	science	and	progress	and	it	was	this	belief	more	broadly	that	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	fought	most	vigorously	against.120	Similarly	the	French	sociologist	and	anthropologist	Gustave	Le	Bon	defined	the	progress	and	development	of	the	early	Islamic	Empire	as	an	Arab	achievement	rather	than	an	Islamic	one.121			Islamic	intellectuals	did	have	their	allies	in	Europe,	such	as	David	Urquhart,	the	Scottish	aristocrat	whose	time	with	the	British	mission	in	Istanbul	in	the	1830s	and	subsequent	visits	to	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	later	decades	imbued	him	with	a	strong	affinity	for	Ottoman	and	Islamic	culture	enhanced	by	an	intense	Russophobia.	Urquhart	was	staunchly	opposed	to	what	he	perceived	as	the	Westernizing	reforms	of	the	Tanzimat	and	he	believed	that	a	revitalization	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	must	be	based	firmly	on	Islamic	principles	and	institutions	rooted	in	the	pure	application	Şer’iat.122			Muslim	intellectual	responses	to	European	perceptions	of	Islam	in	the	nineteenth	century	became	more	common	as	the	spread	of	secular	education,	translation	of	European	works	and	familiarity	with	foreign	languages	increased.																																																									119	Kohn,	Margaret,	“Afghani	on	Empire,	Islam,	and	Civilization”,	Political	Theory	(37/3)	2009,	398-422,	407.			120	Puig,	Josep	Montada,	“Al-Afghani,	a	case	of	religious	unbelief?”,	Studia	
Islamica	(100/101)	2005,	203-220,	220.		121	Quinn,	The	Sum	of	All	Heresies,	100.	See	Gustave	Le	Bon,	La	civilisation	des	
Arabes,	Paris:	1884.		122	Çiçek	,	63.		
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These	developments	increased	the	familiarity	of	European	works	on	Islam	of	a	new	generation	of	Ottoman	and	other	Islamic	intellectuals.	The	overtly	Christian	attacks	on	Islam	coming	from	the	missionaries	and	others	within	the	religious	establishment	were	often	familiar	and	“fortified	as	before	with	arguments	from	the	Middle	Ages,	but	with	modern	embellishments”.123		Yet	many	Muslim	intellectuals	in	the	Islamic	world	largely	directed	their	refutations	towards	those	secular	and	materialist	thinkers	who	represented	the	modern	establishment	of	European	thought.	Among	the	Young	Ottomans,	for	instance,	Namık	Kemal	responded	in	his	Ottoman	language	publications	to	the	French	philologist	and	philosopher	Ernest	Renan	who	saw	in	Islam	the	reason	for	the	lack	of	scientific	progress	in	the	Islamic	world.	This	was	based	on	a	belief	that	the	Islamic	world	suffered	from	the	fact	that	it	did	not	have	a	major	tradition	of	secular	thought	independent	of	religion.124	Like	many	later	writers	Kemal’s	defense	of	Islam	involved	an	appeal	to	the	content	of	the	faith’s	foundational	texts,	pointing	out	that	Islamic	doctrine	in	no	way	forbid	the	study	of	exact	sciences.125	For	Kemal	the	larger	issue	was	that	knowledge	not	be	artificially	divided	into	spiritual	and	material	categories.126	Like	many	of	the	responses	to	criticisms	of	Islam	from	Muslim	intellectuals	at	the	time	Kemal’s	came	from	a	place	of	sincere	belief,	addressed	to	an	overtly	Islamic	audience	in	order	to	reassure	them	of	the	strength	of	their	faith.			
																																																								123	Rodinson,	66.		124	Mardin,	The	Genesis	of	Young	Ottoman	Thought,	324.		125	Ibid.		126	York,	Norman	A.,	“Disputing	the	“Iron	Circle”:	Renan,	Afghani,	and	Kemal	on	Islam,	Science	and	Modernity”,	Journal	of	World	History,	22/4	(2011),	693-714,	699.		
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The	Young	Ottomans	conceived	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	very	much	as	an	Islamic	state,	indeed	Namık	Kemal	rejected	any	basis	for	the	state	other	than	the	Şer’iat,	and	they	responded	to	European	criticisms	from	a	much	more	sincerely	religious	position	than	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	writers.128	By	the	1890s,	however,	many	of	the	Ottoman	writers,	especially	those	who	fell	into	the	rather	fluid	category	of	Young	Turks,	were	coming	from	a	position	that	was	heavily	influenced	by	Materialism	and	Positivism.129				Many	Algerians	and	Ottomans	writing	in	French	faced	a	deeply	entrenched	perception	of	Islam	that	was	potentially	hindering	the	effectiveness	of	their	political	and	intellectual	work.	The	centrality	of	Islam	as	the	perceived	main	factor	impacting	the	development	of	their	societies	is	reflected	in	the	topic’s	importance	in	their	writings.	This	approach	formed	the	basis	of	a	large	number	of	articles	and	pamphlets	by	Ottoman	writers,	both	Young	Turk	and	otherwise,	who	were	highly	conscious	of	their	empire’s	identity	as	an	Islamic	state.	Similarly	a	major	element	of	the	Young	Algerian	platform	was	the	belief	that	the	renouncing	of	their	status	as	Muslims	was	an	unnecessary	condition	to	acquiring	French	citizenship.130	Both	groups	felt	very	strongly	about	their	Islamic	identity	in	the	mind	of	Europe	and	regardless	of	their	actual	beliefs	both	were	hesitant	to	admit	to	an	outright	rejection	of	Islam	within	their	French-language	writings.			In	analyzing	the	output	of	both	groups	it	will	be	possible	to	shed	some	new	light	on	how	these	intellectuals,	both	Muslim	and	non-Muslim,	felt	the	role	of	Islam	in																																																									128	Mardin,	324,	400.		129	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	208.		130	Ruedy,	Modern	Algeria,	45.		
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history	and	contemporary	politics	ought	to	be	viewed	by	their	European	readers.	It	will	show	that	the	intellectual	and	linguistic	context	in	which	these	works	were	produced	had	a	strong	impact	on	their	content	and	aims.	These	writers	engaged	with	Europe	in	the	intellectual	arena	and	language	that	they	had	determined	and	in	that	sense	were	performing	a	very	different	role	in	their	French	language	publications	than	in	those	published	in	non-European	languages.				In	his	works	on	the	Young	Turks	Şükrü	Haniolğu	draws	the	distinction	between	the	“heavy	Islamic	rhetoric”	found	in	the	public	writings	of	the	Young	Turks	and	their	more	honest	opinions	about	religion	that	are	present	in	their	private	papers.131	He	portrays	this	apparent	contradiction	as	reflecting	the	desire	of	the	Young	Turks	not	to	alienate	their	more	religious	allies	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	especially	those	among	the	ulema	who	were	opposed	to	the	Sultan.132	Stefano	Taglia	likewise	suggests	that	it	is	we	must	consider	the	audience	of	these	articles	and	“…the	ways	in	which	they	promoted	a	type	of	secularism	that	developed	the	relationship	between	modernity	and	religion	that	did	not	consider	the	two	as	imcompatible.”133	While	it	is	certainly	true	that	those	Young	Turk	newspapers	being	published	in	Turkish	or	Arabic	in	Cairo	and	elsewhere	were	very	conscious	of	the	need	to	maintain	their	Islamic	credentials	to	avoid	drawing	the	ire	of	religious	supporters	at	home,	it	is	unlikely	that	catering	for	domestic	audiences	can	exclusively	explain	the	religious	rhetoric	in	their	French-language	publications,	especially	if	we	consider	that	the	Young	Turks	intended	their	
																																																								131	Ibid,	200.	132	Ibid,	201.		133	Taglia,	Intellectuals	and	Reform	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	23.		
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writings	in	French	to	be	“a	contribution	to	European	politics.”134	This	assessment	of	Ottoman	engagement	with	European	press	culture	and	the	conception	of	the	press	as	creating	a	particular	reality	provides	us	with	a	more	useful	framework	for	analyzing	the	motivation	and	function	of	articles	that	deal	with	Islam.135	By	‘creating	reality’	I	refer	to	the	belief	held	by	many	of	the	Young	Turks	at	the	time	that	the	mere	publication	and	repetition	of	information	about	the	situation	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	would	translate	into	concrete	action.136			It	is	my	contention	that	this	belief	can	be	extended	to	all	of	the	writers	profiled	in	this	study.	In	their	French	language	publications	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	were	participating	in	a	dialogue	about	Islam	with	the	European	intellectual	community	and	in	doing	so	were	intending	to	change	a	set	of	firmly	held	beliefs	about	Islam.	By	ascribing	the	primary	motivation	for	examples	of	pro-Islamic	writings	to	the	desire	of	the	Young	Turks	to	affirm	their	status	as	committed	believers	in	order	to	appease	their	more	conservative	supporters	Hanioğlu	misses	some	of	the	nuance	of	intent	inherent	in	groups	and	individuals	with	one	foot	in	two	different	intellectual	spheres.			I	argue	that	the	desire	to	defend	Islam’s	compatibility	with	modernization	was	governed	by	the	particular	dynamic	of	the	intellectual	exchange	with	a	European	audience.	David	Fieni	writes	that	responses	to	European	attacks	on	Islam	in	this	
																																																								134	Kaynar,	Erdal.	“The	Almighty	Power	of	the	Written	Word:	Political	Conceptions	of	the	Press	at	the	Turn	of	the	Twentieth	Century”,	in	Penser,	agir	et	
vivre	dans	l’Empire	ottoman	et	en	Turquie.	Nathalie	Clayer	and	François	Georgeon	eds.	Paris:	Peeters,	2013,	162.		135	Ibid,	166.		136	Ibid.	
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period	were	“rooted	in	the	realities	of	colonial	European	and	late	Ottoman	geopolitics.”137	In	this	sense	many	Muslim	writers	who	were	publishing	in	French	felt	constrained	in	terms	how	they	could	engage	with	the	subject	of	Islam	and	Islamic	institutions.	Rather	than	seeing	their	support	for	and	defense	of	Islam	in	their	French-language	writings	as	merely	a	further	example	of	a	reluctance	to	alienate	potential	Muslim	supporters	in	Algeria	and	the	Ottoman	Empire,	it	is	more	useful	to	analyze	it	as	a	reluctance	to	admit	to	an	essentialist	argument	concerning	the	superiority	of	European	civilization.138	These	writings	performed	a	function	similar	to	those	in	the	Arabic	and	Ottoman	Turkish	journals	in	that	both	were	focused	on	maintaining	support	and	legitimacy.	The	French-language	writings	were,	however,	about	securing	the	intellectual	legitimization	of	the	European	intellectual	community	as	these	writers	implicitly	recognized	that	their	intellectual	projects	required	this	legitimacy.	This	is	furthered	justified	by	the	number	of	articles	concerning	Islam	published	in	European	journals	that	were	a	further	step	removed	from	any	potential	supporters	back	home.	In	this	case	a	defense	of	Islam	was	mounted	in	the	French	language	not	to	assuage	indigenous	doubts	about	their	commitment	to	Islam	but	to	defend	the	inherent	fitness	of	their	civilizations	to	become	modern	nations	not	in	spite	of	but	because	of	their	Islamic	identity.			
																																																								137	Fieni,	David,	“French	Decadence,	Arab	Awakenings:	Figures	of	Decay	in	Arab	
Nahda”,	Boundary	2	(39/2)	2012,	143-160,	146.		138	It	is	not	my	intention	to	try	and	address	the	relative	sincerity	of	these	beliefs	or	the	relative	uprightness	of	the	individuals	concerned,	but	rather	to	examine	the	function	of	these	writings	within	a	specific	historical,	intellectual	and	linguistic	context.			
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This	chapter	will	analyze	the	development	of	articles	concerning	Islam	in	this	context	through	two	main	periods:	1890-1902	and	1903-1908.	The	first	period	was	dominated	by	the	early	writings	of	the	Young	Turks,	a	few	other	Ottoman	writers	outside	of	that	movement	as	well	as	French	language	Young	Algerian	papers,	such	as	El	Hack.139	The	second	period	saw	the	emergence	of	further	Young	Turk	and	Ottoman	writing	following	the	First	Congress	of	Ottoman	Opposition	in	Paris	in	1902	and	the	division	of	the	Young	Turk	movement	into	more	clerly	defined	opposing	factions.	It	also	saw	a	growth	in	Muslim	Algerian	and	Tunisian	publications	specifically	aimed	at	educating	a	European	public	about	Algerian	society	and	Muslim	society	more	generally.	The	dividing	lines	between	the	periods	are	of	course	far	from	absolute	and	several	authors,	publications	and	themes	span	across	them.	I	believe,	however,	that	the	emergence	of	new	author-groups	and	the	historical	developments	within	these	periods	are	defined	enough	to	make	them	useful	categories	for	analysis.			
1890-1902:	Early	Writings	in	Defense	of	Islam	Articles	on	the	subject	of	Islam	in	the	French	language	that	are	the	focus	of	this	this	study	began	to	emerge	in	the	1890s.	The	movement	to	Paris	and	Geneva	of	members	of	the	newly	created	Young	Turk	movement	spurred	an	increase	in	newspaper	and	pamphlet	publication,	especially	in	French	as	well	as	contributions	to	French	language	publications.140	There	was	an	awareness	of	the	way	the	press	was	utilized	by	émigré	and	exile	groups	from	Poland,	Russia,	Italy	
																																																								139	El	Hack	was	one	of	the	first	bilingual	papers	produced	by	the	Muslim	community	in	Algeria.	It	provides	an	instructive	template	for	the	increase	in	participation	after	1900.		140	Haniolğu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	78.		
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and	elsewhere	in	addition	to	an	awareness	of	the	power	of	the	press	in	impacting	domestic	politics	and	public	opinion	as	seen	during	the	Dreyfus	affair.141	In	these	publications	many	of	the	authors	sought	to	portray	Islam,	and	Islamic	society,	as	amenable	to	modernization	and	progress.142	Their	books	and	articles	maintained	that	Islam	was	at	its	root	an	inherently	liberal	and	rational	faith	and	sought	to	correct	what	they	believed	were	the	erroneous	perception	of	Islam	as	anti-science	and	anti-progess	held	by	many	Europeans	and	epitomized	in	the	writings	of	men	like	Ernest	Renan,	Gustave	Le	Bon	and	Gabriel	Charmes.	An	early	work	to	address	the	negative	impact	of	European	perceptions	was	by	the	Young	Turk	Ahmed	Rıza	in	an	1891	issue	of	the	journal	of	the	Positivist	Society,	La	Revue	
Occidentale,	in	which	he	questions	ability	of	a	believer	to	write	“avec	sang	froid”	about	religion,	whether	it	be	his	own	or	another.143			Ahmed	Rıza	was	one	of	the	most	influential	and	prolific	members	of	the	Young	Turk	movement	in	Paris.	He	was	also	a	committed	Positivist,	which	makes	his	writings	on	Islam	in	French	all	the	more	relevant	for	this	chapter.	During	this	period	Ahmed	Rıza	would	publish	frequently	in	this	positivist	journal,	contributing	nine	articles	to	La	Revue	Occidentale	between	1891	and	1902.	The	place	of	publication	of	these	articles	alone	should	provide	sufficient	evidence	as	to	its	intended	audience	and	the	motivation	behind	its	pro-Islam	content.	It	is	highly	unlikely	that	Ahmed	Rıza	would	set	out	a	defense	of	Islam	and	to																																																									141	Kaynar,	Erdal.	“The	Almighty	Power	of	the	Written	Word:	Political	Conceptions	of	the	Press	at	the	Turn	of	the	Twentieth	Century”,	160.			142	See	articles	by	Ahmed	Rıza	in	La	Revue	Occidentale	and	La	Revue	Positiviste	as	well	as	his	book	La	Crise	de	l’Orient:	ses	causes	et	ses	remèdes.	Paris:	Comité	Ottoman	d’Union	et	de	Progrès,	1907.	143	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Positivisme	et	l’Islamisme”,	in	La	Revue	Occidentale	Tome	III.	Paris:	Société	Positiviste,	1891,	115.		
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emphasize	its	compatibility	with	the	tenets	of	Positivism,	an	ideology	he	was	openly	supportive	of	in	the	pages	of	this	publication,	to	protect	himself	from	possible	claims	of	anti-Islamic	or	anti-religious	beliefs	from	religious	thinkers	within	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Additionally	he	is	claiming	by	writing	this	article	that	he	then	in	fact	possesses	the	necessary	sang	froid	to	write	about	Islam,	implicitly	revealing	that	he	then	does	not	count	himself	as	a	‘believer’	as	such.			Rather	in	his	introduction	this	Positivist	intellectual	sets	himself	up	as	the	ideal	unbiased	insider	to	present	and	justify	the	merits	of	Islam,	not	necessarily	as	a	totalizing	faith,	but	as	a	set	of	underlying	principles	that	reflect	its	compatibility	with	modern	civilization,	to	his	European	audience.		Ahmed	Rıza’s	aim	in	his	early	writings	was	to	stress	the	value	of	Islam	in	its	idealized	and	abstract	form	and	to	try	and	relate	the	institutions	and	practices	of	this	Islam	to	modern	Western	institutions.		He	begins	his	defense	by	stating	that:	“Islam	created	liberty	and	equality	in	the	East.”144	Like	many	of	the	similar	treatments	of	Islam,	Ahmed	Rıza’s	approach	is	highly	originalist	in	the	sense	that	it	appeals	to	Islam	in	its	ideal	and	original	form,	stripped	of	the	historical	and	outside	embellishments	that	have	resulted	in	its	corruption.	This	fact	has	been	noted	by	Hanioğlu,	among	others,	and	who	note	some	similarities	between	the	writings	of	the	Young	Turks	and	those	of	the	followers	of	‘Abduh	and	al-Afghānī.145		There	is	a	strong	belief	that	stripped	of	centuries	of	decadent	developments	the	basic	intellectual	framework	of	Islam	would	provide	a	more	
																																																								144	Ibid,	116.		145	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	202.		
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than	adequate	foundation	for	modernization.	This	is	supported	further	on	in	the	article	where	Ahmed	Rıza	states	that:		
L’Islamisme	n’est	nullement	hostile	à	la	République;	au	contraire,	il	ne	connaît,	en	principe,	comme	
chef	que	celui	qui	est	élu	par	la	décision	de	l’assemblée	nationale	(idjma-i-ummet);	c’est	la	dictature	
la	mieux	organisée	et	la	plus	rapprochée	de	la	République.		(Islam	is	by	no	means	hostile	to	the	Republic;	on	the	contrary,	it	recognizes,	in	principle,	as	leader	only	he	who	is	elected	by	the	decision	of	the	National	Assembly	(ijma-i	Ummet);	it	is	the	best-organized	form	of	government	and	the	one	most	similar	to	the	Republic.)146		
	It	is	quite	striking	that	Ahmed	Rıza	here	reinterprets	a	thoroughly	classical	Islamic	principle	of	jurisprudence	in	a	way	that	speaks	to	a	European	audience.	For	this	is	not	about	stitching	modern	reforms	into	an	Islamic	jacket	in	order	that	they	are	accepted	by	religious	conservatives	and	the	ulema	at	home147,	but	rather	to	try	and	reinforce	the	legitimacy	of	his	civilization	and	culture	in	the	eyes	of	Europe.					Although	Ahmed	Rıza	and	the	majority	of	Young	Turks	in	Paris	at	this	time	saw	their	vision	for	the	future	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	European	liberal-democratic	terms	and	in	no	way	sought	to	return	to	an	early	or	idealized	form	of	Islamic	governance	it	was	vital	to	stress	a	connection	to	an	earlier	version	of	these	concepts.	This	early	ideal	Islam	was	to	remain	at	a	safe	chronological	distance	so	that	its	symbolic	power	could	be	effectively	drawn	upon	without	being	held	responsible	for	any	negative	aspects	of	Ottoman	society.	In	doing	this,	the	Young	Turks	and	their	fellow	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	were	attempting	to	create	a	justifiable	historical	and	intellectual	link	to	a	form	of	democratic	politics,	not																																																									146	Ahmed	Rıza,	Le	Positivisme	et	l’Islamisme,	116.		147	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	201.		
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unlike	Europe’s	attachment	to	the	political	traditions	of	Greece	and	Rome.	This	was	extremely	important	given	both	the	classical	tradition’s	centrality	as	a	model	for	European	political	thought	at	the	time,	but	also	the	role	that	classical	thought	played	in	contemporary	conceptions	of	the	Orient	as	backwards	and	degenerate.		As	early	as	the	eighteenth	century	the	works	of	classical	Greece	and	Rome	were	held	up	against	their	Eastern	counterparts	to	emphasize	the	superiority	of	the	Greco-Roman	tradition.	By	the	nineteenth	century	the	influence	of	a	classical	education	allowed	the	European	colonial	powers	to	categorize	the	Orient	as	something	inherently	different	and	approach	it	with	the	confidence	that	a	supposed	unbroken	ideological	and	cultural	link	back	to	the	classical	period.148			It	is	certain	that	Ahmed	Rıza	would	have	been	aware	of	the	power	and	importance	that	the	link	to	classical	Greece	and	Rome	held	for	Europe.		Therefore	in	the	article	he	draws	on	the	power	of	the	early	Islamic	ijma	al-
ummah,	or	community	consensus,	in	the	same	way	that	European	intellectuals	drew	on	the	power	of	the	Roman	senate	or	Greek	agora.	This	perceived	link	was	very	important	and	Ahmed	Rıza	uses	it	to	explain	the	failure	of	Catholic	missionaries	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	make	any	significant	progress	with	the	Muslim	population.149	For	Ahmed	Rıza	Islam	the	work	of	Christian	missionaries	in	Ottoman	territory	was	unnecessary	and	indeed	counterproductive	as	Islam	already	contained	within	it	the	fundamental	principles	of	modern	civilization.	In																																																									148	Toner,	Jerry.	Homer’s	Turk:	How	Classics	Shaped	Ideas	of	the	East.	Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2013,	164.	See	also	Peter	E.	Pormann,	“Classics	and	Islam:	From	Homer	to	al-Qa’ida”	in	Journal	of	the	Classical	Tradition	(6/2)	2009,	197-233.				149	Ibid,	117.		
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his	mind	a	strong	Western	and	secular	education	program	would	blend	effectively	with	the	fundamental	tenants	of	Islam.	The	combination	of	these	elements	would	then	lead	to	a	change	in	the	behaviour	and	outlook	of	Muslim	Ottomans.	As	he	wrote:	
	
	Avec	la	liberté	et	une	solide	instruction	laïque	dans	le	monde	musulman,	on	arrivera	avec	le	temps	
à	faire	des	déistes	ou	des	positivistes,	suivant	le	degré	d'intelligence	des	esprits	auxquels	on	
s'adressera,	et	ces	élèves	seront	tout	portés	à	joindre	à	leur	culture	nouvelle	la	sévère	dignité,	le	
respect	mutuel	et	la	douceur	de	mœurs	qui	caractérisent	l'Islam.		(With	freedom	and	a	strong	secular	education	in	the	Muslim	world,	we	will	manage	with	time	to	make	them	deists	or	positivists,	according	to	the	degree	of	intelligence	of	the	minds	which	we	will	address,	and	these	students	will	be	inclined	to	join	to	their	new	culture	the	serious	dignity,	mutual	respect	and	gentleness	of	manners	that	characterize	Islam.)150		This	was	characteristic	of	Ahmed	Rıza’s	desire	to	demonstrate	through	his	writings	on	Islam	that	it	contained	the	original	elements	necessary	to	facilitate	modernization	along	Western	democratic	lines.	Like	many	Muslim	reformers	of	the	time	he	believed	firmly	in	the	power	of	education	to	shape	the	character	of	a	nation.			The	method	of	dealing	with	Islam	in	the	French-language	writings	of	these	individuals	conformed	to	certain	structures	and	tactics.	Thus	we	can	see	that	even	writers	who	were	in	opposition	to	each	other	dealt	with	Islam	in	similar	ways	despite	ostensibly	holding	very	different	ideas	about	the	road	to	reform.		After	a	falling	out	with	the	Sultan	Mizancı	Murad	Bey	left	the	Ottoman	Empire	for	Europe	in	1895.	Murad	Bey	initially	refused	to	join	the	CUP,	the	main	Young	Turk	organization,	but	had	been	known	in	European	circles	as	a	liberal	for	some																																																									150	Ibid.	
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time.151	Murad	Bey	was	also	in	near	constant	competition	with	Ahmed	Rıza	over	the	aims	and	methods	of	the	Young	Turks.	Unlike	Ahmed	Rıza,	Murad	felt	that	the	solution	to	the	current	problems	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	could	be	solved	by	foreign	intervention	by	the	Great	Powers.152	Murad	Bey	saw	the	path	to	reform	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	a	very	different	way	than	Ahmed	Rıza	and	the	motivation	for	his	defense	of	Islam	was	clearly	in	part	based	on	genuine	religious	devotion.153	His	engagement	with	Islam	in	the	context	of	émigré	engagement	was,	however,	bound	by	the	same	intellectual	framework	as	Ahmed	Rıza.	Murad	Bey	sought	to	both	educate	and	enlist	the	West	with	his	writing	and	thus	drew	on	many	of	the	same	themes	and	comparisons	as	his	fellow	writers,	especially	the	Islamic	past	reformulated	as	an	era	of	liberal	democracy.				To	highlight	this	point	he	again	holds	the	current	situation	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	up	to	the	mirror	of	a	supposed	ideal	Islamic	past.	“What	has	become	of	this	liberal	trend	of	the	first	Muslims,	their	civic	pride,	their	independence	of	spirit?”	he	asks.	‘What	has	become	of	the	marvelous	harmony	of	the	state	of	the	first	Caliphs?”154	Again,	like	Ahmed	Rıza,	Murad	draws	on	the	symbolic	importance	of	Islam’s	democratic	organizing	principles	and	frames	them	in	the	language	of	Western	republicanism:		
L’Islam	a	constitué	une	société	nouvelle	sur	une	base	d’égalité	parfaite,	sans	clergé,	sans	caste,	sans	
classe	quelconque	de	privilégiés.	Cependant	il	n’a	pas	fermé	le	champ	à	ceux	qui	aspirent	à	la	gloire	
et	aux	honneurs.																																																										151	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	77.	152	Ibid,	79.		153	Ibid,	91.		154	Ibid,	10.		
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(Islam	created	a	new	society	on	the	basis	of	perfect	equality,	without	clergy,	without	caste,	without	any	privileged	class.	However,	it	has	not	closed	the	field	to	those	who	aspire	to	glory	and	honor.)155		In	his	1895	publication	Le	Palais	de	Yilidiz:	Le	veritable	mal	d’Orient	in	which	he	argues	for	the	necessity	of	returning	power	to	the	Sublime	Porte	at	the	expense	of	the	Sultan	he	wrote	in	no	uncertain	terms	about	the	role	of	Islam	in	the	despotism	of	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II.	In	the	introduction	to	this	work	Murad	wrote:		
Avant	tout,	il	faut	écarter	cette	thèse	insoutenable	que	le	vice	du	système	gouvernemental	actuel	
viendrait	du	chef	de	la	religion	musulmane.		(Above	all,	we	must	avoid	this	untenable	thesis	that	the	vices	of	the	current	governmental	system	come	from	the	head	of	the	Muslim	religion.)156		Here	Murad	implicitly	separates	the	Caliphate	from	the	Sultanate	by	linking	the	problems	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	Abdülhamid	as	a	temporal	ruler,	not	a	spiritual	one.	Murad	refuses	to	admit	that	Abdülhamid’s	identity	as	a	Muslim	or	as	Caliph	is	responsible	for	the	current	governmental	dysfunction	in	the	Ottoman	Empire:		
Le	Coran	est	d’une	admirable	éloquence	et	d’une	parfaite	clarté	dans	ses	commentaires	des	
principes	civilisateurs.	Le	mal	a	sa	source	dans	la	hiérarchie	gouvernementale	turque.	
	(The	Quran	is	admirably	eloquent	and	perfectly	clear	in	its	commentary	on	civilizing	principles.	The	source	of	evil	is	in	the	Turkish	governmental	hierarchy.)157		
	
																																																								155	Ibid,	11.		156	Murad	Bey.	Le	Palais	de	Yilidiz:	Le	veritable	mal	d’Orient,	4.	157	Ibid,	4-5.		
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According	to	Murad	it	is	in	spite	of	and	not	because	of	Islam	that	the	Ottoman	Empire	find	itself	in	such	a	relatively	backward	and	corrupt	position.	The	fault	lies	mainly	on	the	shoulders	of	those	in	authority	whom	he	sees	as	not	representative	of	Islam	at	all.	In	a	second	work,	entitled	La	Force	et	la	Faiblesse	
de	la	Turquie	published	two	years	later	in	1897,	Murad	Bey	outlined	what	he	saw	as	the	necessity	for	mutual	understanding	between	Christians	and	Muslims	who,	he	claims,	are	not	really	that	different	and	calls	for	both	groups	to	“rise	above	vulgar	prejudices	and	habits	of	education.”158	The	essence	of	his	defense	of	Islam	in	this	work	can	be	found	in	the	numbered	conclusion	where	in	point	number	one	he	declares:	
	
La	religion	musulmane	n’est	pas	la	cause	directe	de	la	faiblesse	de	l’Empire	ottoman;	elle	ne	
constitue	pas	non	plus	un	obstacle	à	son	relèvement.		(The	Muslim	religion	is	not	the	direct	cause	of	the	weakness	of	the	Ottoman	Empire;	nor	does	it	constitute	an	obstacle	to	its	recovery.)159			Evoking	the	idealized	intellectual	character	of	the	Greek	city-states	and	the	philosopher	king	Murad	maintains	that	the	palace	in	early	Islamic	times	was	“le	
réceptacle	de	l’intelligence”,	and	says	that	in	every	aspect	of	early	Islamic	court	life	the	ruler	was	both	a	prince	politique	and	a	prince	de	la	pensée.160	Like	Ahmed	Rıza	he	wants	to	highlight	the	rational	and	enlightened	aspects	of	early	Islam.	Again	this	did	not	indicate	a	desire	to	return	to	early	Islamic	norms	or	to	base	any	future	Ottoman	government	on	explicitly	Islamic	principles.	Murad	is	clear	about	the	failures	of	the	early	Islamic	state	and	what	he	sees	as	the	negative	
																																																								158	Murad	Bey,	La	Force	et	la	Faiblesse	de	la	Turquie,	8.		159	Ibid,	58.		160	Ibid.		
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progression	from	consultative	decision	making	to	the	absolute	ruler,	whether	he	is	a	prince	de	la	pensée	or	not.	He	laments	the	loss	of	individuality	and	the	emergence	of	a	culture	of	servility	that	the	centralization	of	intellectual	life	created.	For	Murad	the	problem	lay	in	the	excessive	centralization	of	intellectual	life:		
Tout	est	devenu	«	officiel	»:	la	science,	les	lettres,	les	arts,	même	l’amour	de	la	liberté	et	de	
l’émancipation	intellectuelle	reçoivent	ce	cachet	honorifique.		(Everything	has	become	“official”:	science,	letters,	arts,	even	the	love	of	freedom	and	of	intellectual	emancipation	receive	this	honorary	stamp.)161			The	benefits	of	the	receptiveness	to	intellectual	pursuits	inherent	in	Islam	could	be	put	to	their	most	effective	use	under	a	more	enlightened	system	of	government.	Murad	Bey	stresses	that	the	Ottoman	Empire	is	more	than	capable	of	reforming	and	renewing	itself	and	that	it	simply	required	a	change	in	government	that	would	be	achieved	with	the	assistance	of	Europe.	The	constant	reiteration	of	the	rational	and	progressive	aspects	of	Islam	sought	to	indicate	to	the	European	reading	public	that	the	religion	was	not	a	barrier	to	meaningful	reform.			Murad	was	also	highly	skeptical	of	the	ways	in	which	the	West	used	Islam	as	a	pretext	for	a	critical	or	aggressive	stance	towards	the	Ottoman	Empire.		He	clearly	recognizes	the	self-interest	behind	European	claim	that	Islam	was	a	barrier	to	reform.	He	highlights	the	fact	that	every	time	there	is	any	resistance	to	Europeanization	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	it	is	always	blamed	on	the	fanaticism	of	
																																																								161	Ibid,	10.		
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the	people	and	the	ulama.	This	was	a	crucial	aspect	of	European	opposition	to	Islam,	which	saw	it	as	animating	the	backward	and	reactionary	nature	of	the	average	Ottoman.	Murad	sees	this	as	an	unfair	characterization	of	the	general	Ottoman	attitude	towards	reform	and	emphasizes	that:		
	
Les	ulémas	n’aiment	pas	ces	imitations	serviles	de	l’Europe	exécutées	pour	le	seul	plaisir	d’imiter.		(The	ulama	do	not	like	these	slavish	imitations	of	Europe	performed	only	for	the	sake	of	imitation.)162			This	cynical	appreciation	of	the	realities	of	European	Great	Power	politics	suggested	that	Murad	conceived	of	a	more	popular	European	audience	who,	once	educated	about	the	realities	of	Islam	and	the	Ottoman	Empire,	could	serve	as	a	counterweight	to	their	manipulative	governments.			When	Muslim	Ottomans	like	Ahmed	Rıza	and	Murad	Bey	called	for	an	understanding	between	Christians	and	Muslims	they	were	generally	referring	to	those	Christians	in	Western	Europe.	The	Ottoman	Empire,	as	the	publications	of	many	Ottoman	Muslim	writers	pointed	out,	was	very	religiously	diverse.	For	some	of	these	non-Muslim	Ottoman	writers	a	defense	of	Islam	was	inextricably	linked	to	a	defense	of	the	Empire.	Those	non-Muslim	writers	who	believed	in	maintaining	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	could	not	ignore	its	Islamic	foundations	and	character.	To	admit	that	Islam	was	antithetical	to	civilization	and	progress	would	be	to	admit	the	impossibility	of	a	workable	modern	Ottoman	state.	Thus	it	became	incumbent	upon	many	of	these	non-Muslim	Ottomans	to	ensure	that	Islam	was	perceived	as	neither	more	nor	less	
																																																								162	Ibid,	39-40.		
	 68	
amenable	to	modernity	than	Christianity	or	Judaism.	In	this	sense	it	was	not	so	much	a	defense	of	the	religion	as	it	was	an	attempt	to	make	sure	that	it	ceased	to	be	seen	as	a	barrier	to	reform	by	Europe.	To	this	end	an	article	appeared	in	1899	in	the	French	supplement	of	the	Young	Turk	paper	Osmanli	entitled	L’esprit	
liberal	de	l’Islam	attributed	to	and	presumably	written	by	Un	Chrétien	ami	de	
l’Islam.	This	article	followed	many	of	the	well-worn	arguments	and	Ahmed	Rıza	and	Murad	Bey	in	presenting	Islam	as	being	at	its	heart	a	liberal	religion	whose	liberal	spirit	represents	its	true	grandeur.163	The	article	ascribes	the	apparent	illiberality	of	certain	Islamic	rulers	to	a	failure	to	follow	the	tenets	of	original	Islam	properly.	This	was	a	tactic	of	both	the	Young	Turks	and	other	Ottoman	writers	as	it	allowed	them	to	detach	their	criticism	of	the	regime	of	Abdülhamid	II	from	a	criticism	of	Islam.	The	article	states	forcefully	that	if	the	Sultan	followed	Islam	properly	he	would	be	the	head	of	liberal	believers,	a	sincere	friend	of	reforms	and	would	respect	the	rights	and	religion	of	all	his	subjects.164	The	failure	to	utilize	the	potential	of	Islam	as	a	force	for	the	production	and	dissemination	of	knowledge	is	highlighted	by	referring	to	the	role	of	earlier	Islamic	rulers	in	this	process:			…	c’est	à	lui	que	l’on	doit	le	merveilleux	développement	de	la	civilisation	arabe	au	moyen	âge,	de	
cette	civilisation	qui	éclaire	l’Europe	plongée	alors	dans	la	barbarie.		(…	it	is	to	him	that	we	owe	the	marvelous	development	of	Arab	civilization	in	the	Middle	Ages,	this	civilization	that	illuminated	a	Europe	then	plunged	into	barbarism.)165		
																																																								163	“L’esprit	liberal	de	l’Islam”,	Osmanli,	5	January	1899.		164	Ibid.		165	Ibid.		
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Not	all	Ottoman	Christian	assessments	of	Islam	proved	to	be	so	openly	favourable.	Many	Greek	and	Armenian	Christian	writers	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	intensely	opposed	the	Sultan	and	the	pan-Islamic	overtones	of	his	reign.	Those	Greek	and	Armenian	Christians	that	remained	in	favour	of	maintaining	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	felt	it	necessary	to	refute	European	critiques	of	Islam	as	they	served	to	undermine	an	essential	aspect	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	they	were	trying	to	preserve.	Conversely	they	needed	to	make	sure	that	their	articles	denying	the	incompatibility	of	Islam	with	reform	were	not	construed	as	being	pan-Islamic	or	pro-Hamidian.	The	prevalence	of	separatist	and	irredentist	sympathies	among	Greek	and	Armenian	Ottomans	during	this	period	made	it	increasingly	difficult	to	balance	between	the	support	of	Islam	required	by	a	pro-Ottoman	stance	and	their	desire	for	secular	reform.		These	writers	largely	achieved	this	by	dealing	with	Islam	as	it	existed	in	a	contemporary	context	rather	than	as	a	set	of	abstract	organizing	principles	and	institutions.		In	his	newspaper	La	Turquie	Contemporaine	the	Ottoman	Greek	Nicholas	Nicolaides,	writing	under	the	pseudonym	Demitrius	Georgiades,	expressed	his	concern	over	the	growing	role	that	Islam	was	taking	in	the	government	of	Abdülhamid	II.	His	writings	demonstrate	the	fine	line	that	he	was	forced	to	walk	as	a	pro-Ottoman	and	non-Muslim	opponent	of	the	Hamidian	regime	who	was	writing	in	support	of	Islam.	Like	his	Muslim	counterparts	he	is	quick	to	emphasize	that	Islam	is	at	its	heart	“…une	religion	très	simple,	très	rationnelle,	
très	peu	surnaturelle…”	(…a	religion	that	is	very	simple,	very	rational,	and	hardly	supernatural)	but	he	is	far	more	concerned	with	how	things	work	in	practice	and	
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the	ways	in	which	Islam	is	used	as	a	basis	for	government.166	Nicolaides	is	intensely	suspicious	of	the	growing	pan-Islamic	character	of	the	Sultan	and	sees	this	as	a	firm	barrier	to	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	attempts	to	modernize.	This	attitude	is	similar	to	that	held	by	many	in	the	West	who	were	wary	of	the	dangers	of	pan-Islamism.	Unlike	many	of	his	Western	European	contemporaries,	however,	this	Ottoman	Greek	is	not	anti-Islamic	and	expresses	his	admiration	for	the	role	that	Islam	played	in	the	creation	and	dissemination	of	knowledge	during	the	Middle	Ages.	He	does	not	see	Islam	itself	as	a	barrier	to	reform	but	rather	the	institutionalized	version	of	it	promoted	by	the	Ottoman	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II.	Nicolaides	is	sure	to	draw	the	distinction	between	Islam	and	Islamism	in	his	critique	and	that	it	is	with	Islamism	as	a	formal	and	institutionalized	form	of	government	that	the	problem	exists.167	He	sees	much	of	the	Islamic	rhetoric	coming	from	the	Sultan	as	largely	part	of	his	personal	ambition	for	power	but	is	alarmed	by	the	potential	consequences	for	the	Ottoman	Empire	if	this	institutional	Islamism	is	taken	to	its	logical	conclusion.	Nicolaides	writes	that:		
Et	en	tant	que	le	Coran	est	la	base,	le	principe	fondamental	de	l’État,	l’Empire	ottoman	ne	pourra	
jamais	se	relever	pour	marcher	en	harmonie	avec	le	reste	des	sociétés	civilisées.		(And	as	long	as	the	Qur'an	is	the	basis,	the	fundamental	principle	of	the	State,	the	Ottoman	Empire	will	never	rise	to	walk	in	harmony	with	the	other	civilized	societies.)168		Like	many	of	his	Muslim	counterparts	Nicolaides	believed	that	Islam	was	not	in	and	of	itself	antithetical	to	progress	but	as	the	basis	for	a	theocratic	state	was	inherently	unsuitable	for	the	modern	age.	In	this	belief	he	mirrored	many	of	his																																																									166	D.	Georgiades,	“La	Turquie	Contemporaine	II”,	La	Turquie	Contemporaine,	1	May	1891.		167	Ibid.		168	Ibid.		
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Muslim	counterparts	who	also	believed	that	it	was	necessary	to	find	a	more	secular	and	universal	base	for	the	authority	of	the	Ottoman	government.	In	later	articles	he	would	call	for	the	separation	of	the	office	of	Caliph	and	Sultan	and	for	a	formal	distinction	to	be	made	between	spiritual	and	temporal	power.			From	a	very	different	segment	of	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	non-Muslim	population	came	a	similar	assessment	of	the	how	the	institution	of	the	Caliphate	would	fit	into	an	Ottoman	reform	program.	This	was	found	in	an	article	entitled	L’avenir	
de	l’Islam	in	an	1896	issue	of	the	newspaper	La	Jeune	Turquie.	The	paper	would	only	run	for	a	single	issue	and	was	published	by	the	Comité	Turco-Syrien.	This	committee	whose	executive	committee	was	composed	of	three	Arab	Christians,	including	the	frequent	contributor	to	Ahmed	Rıza’s	Mechveret	Supplément	
Français	Halil	Ganem	and	the	Lebanese	Druze	notable	Amīr	Amīn	Arslān,	began	their	activities	in	Europe	around	the	same	time	as	the	Young	Turks	and	would	eventually	be	absorbed	into	the	CUP.169			For	these	authors	the	issue	at	hand	is	Islamism	as	a	political	ideology,	which	they	claim	is	wanton.170	Like	many	of	their	Muslim	counterparts	the	authors	claimed	that	the	office	of	Caliph	in	Islam	conferred	no	immunity	on	the	holder	of	that	office.171	Like	Nicholaides	these	non-Muslim	Ottomans	want	to	see	the	Caliphate	detached	from	the	source	of	political	power	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	They	don’t	perceive	Islam	as	any	sort	of	barrier	to	the	future	progress	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	“Is	there	a	way	of	raising	Islam?”	they	ask.	“Without	a	doubt”	they																																																									169	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	45.		170	“L’avenir	de	l’Islam”,	La	Jeune	Turquie,	5	June	1896.				171	Ibid.		
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answer.	They	see	in	Islam	a	freedom	emanating	from	a	vibrant	spirit	that	is	constantly	aspiring	towards	progress.172	The	Caliph	for	them	should	remain	merely	a	religious	figurehead	and	for	them:		
Si	un	régime	s’adapte	au	tempérament	des	Mahométans,	et	en	général	de	tous	les	Orientaux,	c’est	
bien	le	régime	parlementaire.		(If	there	is	a	regime	adapted	to	the	temperament	of	Muslims,	and	all	Orientals	in	general,	it	is	indeed	a	parliamentary	regime.)173			In	talking	of	a	Muslim	or	Oriental	temperament	the	authors	skillfully	avoid	the	issue	of	religion	and	instead	alludes	to	a	more	general	or	universal	set	of	shared	traits	that	demonstrate	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	potential	for	reform.	Thus	they	carefully	discussed	the	issue	of	how	the	Sultan	as	Caliph	would	fit	into	the	new	political	reality	they	envisioned	for	the	Ottoman	Empire.			Abdülhamid’s	emphasis	of	his	role	as	both	Caliph	and	Sultan	during	this	period	resulted	in	increased	European	suspicion	surrounding	this	dual	role	and	its	potential	impact	in	the	Islamic	world.	This	negative	perception	was	tied	to	the	growing	European	preoccupation	with	pan-Islamism	and	its	perceived	potential	to	rally	Muslims	against	colonial	occupation.	European	governments	saw	the	specter	of	pan-Islamism	behind	even	purely	local	reactions	to	imperialism	by	Muslims.174	Behind	Muslim	unrest	in	the	colonies	of	Europe	they	saw	an	“illusory	unity	of	purpose”175	For	Europe	pan-Islamism	was	inextricably	linked	with	the	Ottoman	Caliphate	and	Abdülhamid	in	his	role	as	Caliph.	Works	such	as	those	by																																																									172	Ibid.		173	Ibid.		174	Rodinson,	67.		175	Ibid.		
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Gabriel	Charmes	emphasized	the	threat	that	the	ideology	of	pan-Islamism,	as	encouraged	by	Abdülhamid	in	his	role	as	Caliph	posed	the	security	of	Europe	and	the	stability	of	her	Muslim	territories.176	The	specter	of	Pan-Islamism	in	the	nineteenth	century,	such	as	it	was,	emerged	out	of	the	increased	politicization	of	Islam	as	a	response	to	Western	imperialism.177	Intellectuals	like	Charmes,	however,	sought	to	link	this	phenomenon	specifically	with	the	figure	of	the	Sultan-Caliph.		In	response	to	this	perception	Ahmed	Rıza	wrote	an	article	in	which	he	sought	to	outline	the	duties	of	the	Caliph	and	his	role	in	Islamic	society.	For	Ahmed	Rıza	the	Caliph	as	an	Islamic	figure	occupies	the	same	space	in	the	European	imagination	as	that	other	exotic	Islamic	institutions,	the	palace	and	the	harem	that	all:	“…assume	a	character	that	is	mysterious	and	hidden	like	souvenirs	from	
A	Thousand	and	One	Nights.”178	Ahmed	Rıza	acknowledges	that	man	is	naturally	seduced	by	the	unknown	and	like	many	Young	Turk	writings	on	Islam	from	this	period	this	one	aims	at	education	and	enlightenment.	In	this	article	he	attempts	to	separate	the	perceived	absolutism	and	despotism	of	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	from	any	Islamic	underpinning	or	justification.	He	writes	that	the	Sultan	appears	in	the	West	as	the	holder	of	total	power,	absolute	master	of	the	lives	of	his	subjects,	as	a	Roman	dictator	invested	with	boundless	power	and	from	this	false	conception	the	Sultan	alone	benefits.179	Drawing	on	an	idealized	conception	of	
																																																								176	Charmes,	Gabriel.	L’Avenir	de	la	Turquie,	Le	Pan-Islamisme.	Paris:	Calmann	Levy,	1882.			177	Sendesni,	Wajda.	“The	Young	Turks	and	Arabs	in	Egypt:	Bewteen	Ottomanism,	Pan-Islamism	and	Nationalism”,	in	Penser,	agir	et	vivre	dans	
l’Empire	ottoman	et	en	Turquie.	Nathalie	Clayer	and	François	Georgeon	eds.	Paris:	Peeters,	2013,	39.		178	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Calife	et	ses	devoirs”,	93.	179	Ibid.		
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the	Caliph	from	the	early	Islamic	period	Ahmed	Rıza	stresses	that	the	role	of	Caliph	in	early	Islamic	society	bears	little	to	no	resemblance	to	the	autocratic	Sultan-Caliph	figure	of	Abdülhamid	II.	Rather,	in	this	article	he	claims	that	he	will	show	the	true	origins	of	the	Caliphate	and	reveal	the	true	traditions	that	it	is	the	Caliph’s	duty	to	observe.180	This	follows	Ahmed	Rıza’s	previous	tendency	to	stress	the	value	of	Islam	from	an	originalist	position.	He	aims	to	demonstrate	that	the	caliphate	as	it	was	originally	conceived	was	an	enlightened	institution.	Crucially	as	well	Ahmed	Rıza	seeks	to	describe	the	Caliphate	in	the	language	of	liberal	democracy.			Ahmed	Rıza	frames	the	Caliphate	as	a	limited	monarchy	in	its	ideal	early	Islamic	conception.	The	early	Caliph	emerges	as	the	enlightened	monarch:	“…a	dictator,	freely	elected,	clothed	in	absolute	power,	but	accountable	to	the	people.”181	What	is	important	for	Ahmed	Rıza	in	this	case	is	that	the	accountability	and	limits	of	the	Caliph’s	power	have	a	thoroughly	Islamic	basis.	He	frames	the	accountability	of	the	Caliph	in	almost	constitutional	terms,	showing	that	he	was	very	clearly	limited	in	the	exercise	of	his	power	by	the	regulations	contained	in	the	Qur’an.	The	ulama	are	presented	as	the	guardians	of	these	regulations	and	are	empowered	to	depose	him	if	he	strays	from	the	regulations	contained	in	the	Qur’an.	He	also	mentions	the	role	of	the	early	Caliphs	in	spreading	and	encouraging	the	study	of	Roman	law	and	Greek	science182,	which	again	represents	a	direct	refutation	of	the	belief	put	forward	by	Renan	that	these	disciplines	flourished	despite	of	Islam	not	because	of	it.	He	also	stressed	the	role																																																									180	Ibid.		181	Ibid.		182	Ibid,	97.		
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of	the	Caliph	as	the	servant	of	the	Muslim	community	and	that	no	one	was	compelled	to	kneel	and	kiss	his	feet	as	they	would	the	Pope.183	Here	Ahmed	Rıza	is	not	merely	showing	that	Islam	contains	concepts	within	it	that	resemble	those	of	both	classical	civilization	and	modern	European	civilization,	but	also	that	there	is	an	ingrained,	latent	familiarity	with	these	concepts	among	Muslims	themselves.	The	practice	of	the	power	of	a	ruler	being	constrained	by	the	rules	contained	in	a	supreme	document,	such	as	a	constitution,	would	not	be	unfamiliar	to	Muslims	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.		In	his	attempts	to	fit	Islamic	political	structures	into	the	language	of	Western	constitutional	democracy	he	stresses	the	deliberative	and	consultative	character	of	the	early	Caliphate,	mentioning	that	the	Caliph	had	a	duty	to	consult	leading	men	and	scholars	before	undertaking	any	major	decision.184	In	Ahmed	Rıza’s	conception	the	Caliph	is	presented	as	the	thoughtful	and	restrained	classical	statesman	in	contrast	to	the	Western	image	of	Abdulhamid	as	Oriental	despot.	He	mentions	the	duty	of	the	Caliph	to	respect	the	liberty	of	his	people	and	to	occupy	himself	with	their	wants	and	listen	to	their	demands.185	The	mosque	in	the	early	Islamic	period	becomes	a	place	of	reasoned	debate,	bringing	together	isolated	individuals	to	multiply	the	force	of	Islam.	Ahmed	Rıza	even	reframes	the	ablutions	as	a	merely	symbolic	preparation:		
…à	un	office	plus	noble	et	plus	civique,	c'est-à-dire	à	la	délibération	publique	sur	les	affaires	du	pays.		
																																																								183	Ibid.		184	Ibid,	94.		185	Ibid.	
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(…for	a	more	noble	and	civic	office,	that	is	to	say,	in	public	deliberation	on	the	affairs	of	the	country.)186		For	Ahmed	Rıza	the	fact	that	Islam,	at	its	roots,	encouraged	and	nurtured	an	idea	of	civil	society	and	communal	responsibility	allowed	him	to	claim	a	parallel	and	concurrent	connection	with	the	classical	virtues	that	Western	Europeans	had	drawn	upon	in	earnest	since	the	eighteenth	century.	Just	as	those	in	the	West	“…tried	to	use	the	image	of	Roman	republican	ideals	to	establish	a	more	unifying	of	individual	freedom	that	was	not	incompatible	with	the	notion	of	either	aristocracy	or	constitutional	monarchy”187,	Ahmed	Rıza	drew	on	similar	notions	in	early	Islam.	Many	in	Europe	at	the	time	considered	Oriental	governments	as	excessively	feminized	and	held	themselves	and	their	governments	in	the	Greco-Roman	tradition	“as	possessing	the	internal	moral	strength	to	let	public	duty	prevail	over	personal	desire.”188	To	counter	this	perception	Ahmed	Rıza	mentions	that	Mohammed	himself	consulted	his	companions,	something	that	was	advised	by	the	quintessential	eighteenth	century	enlightenment	monarch	Frederic	the	Great.189	In	this	sense	Ahmed	Rıza	was	trying	to	insert	Islam	into	the	continuity	between	classical	civilization	and	modern	Europe.	Islam	represented	not	a	break	in	that	chain	but	an	integral	part	of	it	with	the	early	Caliph	representing	and	sustaining	many	of	the	classical	virtues	of	leadership	that	were	so	admired	in	Europe.		
																																																								186	Ibid.	187	Toner,	Homer’s	Turk,	107.		188	Ibid,	109.		189	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Calife	et	ses	devoirs”,	94.		
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	As	with	other	aspects	of	Islam	Ahmed	Rıza	deals	primarily	with	the	early	and	somewhat	idealized	conception	of	the	role	of	Caliph	in	Islam.	He	does	not	address	the	current	Ottoman	possession	of	the	Caliphate	except	to	briefly	mention	that	it	was	Sultan	Selim	that	acquired	the	title	in	1516190.	This	reluctance	to	discuss	at	any	length	the	Caliphate	as	it	existed	at	that	time	as	an	institution	in	the	Ottoman	can	be	partly	explained	by	Ahmed	Rıza’s	intentions	in	writing	this	article.	As	has	been	stated	before,	while	Ahmed	Rıza’s	discussions	of	Islam	in	his	French-language	writings	were	highly	originalist	in	their	emphasis	on	the	purity	of	early	Islamic	practices,	he	was	not	advocating	a	return	to	a	state	modeled	on	the	early	Caliphate.	The	importance	of	the	early	Caliphate	for	Ahmed	Rıza	in	these	early	writings	is	to	demonstrate	Islamic	society’s	connection	to	concepts	such	as	individual	liberty,	representative	government	and	civic	virtue.	He	writes	that:	“Arab	civilization	was	the	sum	of	individual	progress”	and	the	Caliph	as	enlightened	leader	was	charged	with	ensuring	the	safety	and	independence	of	individuals.191	As	for	the	Caliph	in	his	current	incarnation	Ahmed	Rıza	states	that	he	now	merely	a	religious	figurehead,	not	unlike	the	Pope.192	Ahmed	Rıza’s	vision	for	the	future	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	one	of	constitutional	monarchy	not	a	return	to	the	Caliphal	authority	of	the	8th	century.	For	him	the	importance	of	the	early	Islamic	state	and	its	leader	as	he	presents	it	is	one	of	intellectual	and	institutional	legacy.	To	emphasize	this	point	he	concludes	the	article	by	saying	that	Islam	is	not	only	preoccupied	with	spiritual	matters	and	that	it	does	not	say:	
																																																								190	Finkel,	Caroline.	Osman’s	Dream:	The	Story	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	1300-1923,	493.		191	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Calife	et	ses	devoirs”,	96.		192	Ibid,	97.		
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Laissez	à	César	ce	qui	appartient	à	César,	mais	il	enseigne	à	ses	adeptes	qu’ils	ont	un	devoir	civique	
à	remplir	ici-bas	et	notamment	celui	de	contrôler	la	conduite	de	César.		(Leave	to	Caesar	what	belongs	to	Caesar,	but	it	taught	its	followers	that	they	have	a	civic	duty	to	perform	here,	especially	that	of	controlling	the	conduct	of	Caesar.)193			This	statement	tries	to	credit	Islam	with	imbuing	its	followers	with	a	sense	of	civic	duty,	a	claim	that	sought	to	combat	the	European	belief	that	the	Islamic	world	was	held	back	by	a	crushing	fatalism,	which	was	directly	linked	to	Islam.	In	addition	to	dealing	with	claims	of	stagnation	brought	on	by	Islamic	fatalism	a	large	part	of	their	defense	of	Islam	for	both	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	in	this	period	was	focused	on	dispelling	European	beliefs	concerning	its	apparent	intolerance	and	fanaticism.			One	of	the	most	comprehensive	defenses	of	Islam	to	emerge	in	this	period	was	again	offered	by	Ahmed	Rıza	in	a	lengthy	article	for	La	Revue	Occidentale	published	in	1896	entitled	Tolérance	Musulmane.		He	outlines	the	aims	of	his	piece	quite	clearly	when	he	writes:		
Je	me	propose	en	écrivant	cet	article	un	double	but:	réfuter,	dans	l’intérêt	de	la	vérité, l’opinion si 
généralement accréditée en Europe concernant l’intolérance des musulmans et laver ces derniers de 
l’accusation plus ou moins intéressée d’avoir exécuté par fanatisme religieux les récents massacres en 
Orient. 
 (I	propose	for	myself	in	writing	this	article	a	double	goal:	to	refute,	in	the	interest	of	truth,	the	opinion	so	generally	given	credence	in	Europe	concerning	the	intolerance	of	Muslims	and	to	wash	them	of	the	more	or	less	self-serving	accusation	of	having	committed	the	recent	massacres	in	the	East	through	religious	fanaticism.)194		
																																																								193	Ibid,	98.		194	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Tolérance	Musulmane”,	in	La	Revue	Occidentale,	Tome	VI.	Paris:	Société	Positiviste,	1896,	304	
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For	Ahmed	Rıza	the	article	serves	a	purpose	both	universal	and	immediate.	In	his	role	as	an	Ottoman	intellectual	he	seeks	to	challenge	and	correct	European	beliefs	about	the	inherent	fanaticism	and	backwardness	of	Islam	and	as	an	activist	he	seeks	to	ensure	that	Islam	is	not	blamed	for	the	current	sectarian	conflicts	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	In	the	article	Ahmed	Rıza	challenges	the	West	for	its	inaccurate	portrayal	of	Islam	as	an	inherently	fanatical	religion	that	is	inherently	anti-modern.			To	make	his	argument	Ahmed	Rıza	uses	the	example	of	Algeria	and	claims	that:			
Je	montrerai	ensuite	les	nobles	qualités	des	populations	musulmanes	que	la	France	a	sous	sa	
dépendance,	et	qui	ont	pris	leur	germe	dans	la	religion	islamique.	
	(I	will	then	show	the	noble	qualities	of	the	Muslim	populations	that	France	has	under	its	control,	and	which	took	their	root	in	the	Islamic	religion.)195		As	in	many	of	his	other	writings	the	focus	is	on	emphasizing	the	specific	strengths	of	Islam	and	its	suitability	to	modernization.	However	the	way	in	which	he	goes	about	this	differs.	He	doesn’t	attempt	to	recast	these	“noble	qualities	of	France’s	Muslim	population	that	took	root	in	Islam”	in	liberal	democratic	terms.	Instead	he	attacks	French	antipathy	towards	Islam	on	theological,	rather	than	intellectual	grounds.	His	defense	of	Islam	too	is	largely	rooted	in	a	combination	of	Islamic	principles	and	historical	and	contemporary	examples.	This	marks	a	change	from	his	previous	defenses,	which	tended	to	combine	an	appeal	to	Islamic	principles	that	were	then	repackaged	in	liberal-democratic	terms.	This	could	partially	be	explained	by	the	way	that	this	article	
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makes	us	of	the	example	of	the	French	in	Algeria,	which	necessitated	a	defense	that	was	less	abstract.							He	is	not	openly	critical	of	the	French	occupation	of	Algeria,	but	dismisses	the	idea	that	the	Arabs	of	Algeria	were	resistant	to	modern	ideas	and	could	not	be	assimilated.196	As	in	his	earlier	writings	he	sees	the	primary	reason	for	the	current	antagonism	between	the	French	and	their	Muslim	Algerian	subjects	as	being	a	lack	of	knowledge	about	the	realities	of	Islam.	He	mentions	that:		
Dans	ces	derniers	temps	seulement	et	depuis	Jules	Ferry	surtout,	on	a	commencé	à	étudier	
sérieusement	les	Arabes,	à	s’intéresser	à	leurs	mœurs	et	à	leur	caractère,	au	point	de	vue	d’un	
rapprochement	avec	la	métropole.		(Only	in	recent	times	and	mainly	since	Jules	Ferry,	we	have	begun	to	seriously	study	the	Arabs,	to	have	an	interest	in	their	manners	and	their	character,	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	rapprochement	with	the	urban	center.)197		In	his	role	as	a	writer	in	conversation	with	a	European	audience	Ahmed	Rıza	sees	himself	as	a	participant	in	this	effort	to	engender	political	change	through	writing.	However,	the	targets	of	his	attempt	to	explain	Islam	are	not	to	be	found	within	the	pages	of	La	Revue	Occidentale.	Ahmed	Rıza	sees	the	main	drivers	of	anti-Islamic	feeling	in	Algeria	as	being:		
…les	commerçants,	les	industriels,	les	exploiteurs	de	toute	sorte,	aux	allures	hautaines	et	au	langage	
dédaigneux,	blessent	ces	fières	populations,	pendant	que	les	missionnaires	heurtent	leurs	sentiments	
religieux,	en	affectant	de	considérer	leurs	croyances	comme	des	erreurs.		(The	businessmen,	the	industrialists,	all	sorts	of	exploiters,	with	their	haughty	manner	and	snobbish	speech,	harm	these	proud	populations,	while	the	missionaries	affront	their	religious	sentiments,	feigning	to	consider	their	beliefs	as	errors.)198																																																										196	Ibid.		197	Ibid.		
	 81	
	He	believes	education	is	a	major	element	of	reform	in	Algeria	as	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	sees	a	lack	of	knowledge	of	about	Islam	and	its	principles	as	being	a	major	obstacle	to	meaningful	progress	for	France’s	Muslim	Algerian	subjects.	Ahmed	Rıza	implores	his	French	readers	to	be	patient	in	dealing	with	a	people	with	such	proud	and	glorious	traditions	and	that	successful	governance	of	Algeria	depends	on	mutual	understanding	and	knowledge.199	This	firm	belief	in	the	power	of	education	to	strip	away	the	layers	of	superstition,	combat	ignorance	and	reveal	a	core	set	of	Islamic	principles	perfectly	compatible	with	modern	civilization	was	frequently	repeated	by	Young	Algerians	as	their	output	increased	in	the	early	twentieth	century.	Like	Ahmed	Rıza	they	saw	as	means	of	offering	proof	that	it	was	ignorance	and	not	Islam	that	was	the	cause	of	the	perceived	backwardness	of	the	Islamic	world.			Ahmed	Rıza	is	deeply	critical	of	the	prevailing	European	tendency	at	the	time	of	ascribing	the	cause	of	every	conflict	or	disturbance	in	the	East	to	Islam.	He	claims	that	Europeans	blame	Muslim	fanaticism	for	every	instance	of	violence	between	Muslims	and	non-Muslims	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	points	out	that	the	same	reasoning	is	never	applied	to	violence	within	predominantly	Christian	countries.200	For	Ahmed	Rıza	the	situation	in	Algeria	provided	a	useful	case	study	with	which	to	lead	into	a	more	general	discussion	of	Islam	and	to	make	his	case	that	Islam	cannot	be	blamed	for	recent	massacres	of	non-Muslims	in	the	Eastern	Ottoman	Empire.	He	accuses	the	West	of	taking	advantage	of	the	recent	disorders	in	Turkey	and	to	use	them	as	evidence	of	Islam’s	anti-modern	nature																																																																																																																																																															198	Ibid,	304-05.		199	Ibid,	305.		200	Ibid.		
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when	it	is	clear	in	Ahmed	Rıza’s	mind	that	the	problem	lies	with	the	current	government.201	Ahmed	Rıza	of	course	accepts	that	fanaticism	can	be	a	feature	of	any	religion	but	stresses	that	it	is	an	aberration	and	not	a	condition	that	is	inherently	linked	to	Islam.	Similar	attempts	to	counter	claims	of	Muslim	fanaticism	appear	in	another	article	by	Ahmed	Rıza	in	which	he	says	that	if	Muslim	Turks	were	actually	serious	about	exterminating	the	infidels	they	would	have	done	it	after	the	conquest	of	Constantinople	rather	than	allowing	the	conquered	Byzantine	Greeks	to	keep	their	religion,	language	and	schools.202	For	Ahmed	Rıza	the	supposed	barbarity	and	intolerance	of	Muslims	is	not	borne	out	by	history.	By	claiming	that	missionaries	are	doing	more	harm	than	good	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	he	is	again	stressing	that	Islam	alone	will	not	prevent	the	Ottomans	from	becoming	a	modern	nation.			For	Ahmed	Rıza	a	discussion	of	the	roots	of	French	antipathy	towards	Islam	offers	an	indication	of	the	shift	in	argument	that	emerges	in	this	article.	To	understand	this	shift	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	locates	this	antipathy	in	the	Middle	Ages	(Ces	préjugés,	ces	préventions	injustes	datent	du	moyen	Âge).203		Ahmed	Rıza	writes	of	anti-Islamic	prejudice	as	being	something	that	is	deeply	rooted	in	Christian	nations	and	as	something	that	will	not	be	eliminated	overnight.204	What	is	so	important	about	this	article	is	that	it	Ahmed	Rıza	is	reluctant	to	acknowledge	the	many	modern	attacks	against	Islam	as	a	belief	system	that	were	currently	in	circulation,	such	as	those	by	Renan	and	Charmes,																																																									201	Ibid,	306.		202	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Les	Missionnaires	en	Turquie”,	in	La	Revue	Occidentale	Tome	III,	1899,	129-30.		203	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Tolérance	Musulmane”,	306.		204	Ibid.		
	 83	
and	instead	focuses	on	anti-Islamic	feeling	as	the	result	of	the	ignorance,	in	his	mind	maintained	primarily	by	Christianity,	of	the	common	people.	In	fact	at	a	later	point	in	the	article	Ahmed	Rıza	would	use	Renan’s	work	to	his	own	advantage	by	including	a	lengthy	quote	from	his	L’Islamisme	et	la	Science	to	provide:	“…a	striking	example	of	freedom	of	thought	and	religious	tolerance	that	Muslims	agreed	to	even	at	the	height	of	their	greatness.”205	This	approach	reflects	both	Ahmed	Rıza’s	faith	in	an	enlightenment	defense	of	Islam	as	well	as	his	elitist	beliefs,	underpinned	by	his	reading	of	the	work	of	French	sociologist	Gustave	Le	Bon,	about	the	dangers	of	the	people	(la	foule)	and	the	need	for	elite	leadership.206	He	writes	glowingly	about	how	the	prejudices	of	the	Middle	Ages	were	attacked	by	the	efforts	of	the	great	writers	(grands	écrivains)	of	the	18th	century,	but	laments	that:		
Malheureusement	ces	écrivains,	dont	le	nom	est	cependant	si	souvent	prononcé,	ne	sont	plus	guère	
lus	aujourd'hui,	et	la	foule	continue	toujours	à	juger	d'après	le	témoignage	de	prêtres	militants	qui	
ont	intérêt	à	dissimuler	ou	à	fausser	la	vérité.		(Unfortunately	these	writers,	whose	names	are	yet	so	often	mentioned,	are	hardly	read	today,	and	the	crowd	continues	to	judge	them	by	the	testimony	of	militant	priests	who	are	interested	in	concealing	or	distorting	the	truth.)207			For	Ahmed	Rıza	it	is	the	easily	mislead	masses	that	are	the	main	source	of	anti-Islamic	feeling	and	further	blames	certain	journals	and	newspapers	which	have	an	interesting	spreading	these	beliefs.208	For	him	it	seems	that	this	antipathy	must	have	a	religious	rather	than	an	intellectual	root.	Conversely,	as	mentioned	above,	his	defense	in	many	rests	largely	on	asserting	Islam’s	superiority	over																																																									205	Ibid,	314.		206	Hanioğlu,The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	206.		207	Ahmed	Rıza,	“Le	Tolérance	Musulmane”,	305.		208	Ibid.		
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Christianity	as	a	belief	system	best	suited	for	the	practical	application	of	its	principles	in	the	real	world.	He	accomplishes	this,	as	was	mentioned,	by	relying	heavily	on	theological	and	historical	examples	from	Islam	and	makes	frequent	use	of	the	ignorant	European	as	a	straw	man	to	advance	his	arguments.		Ahmed	Rıza	accuses	the	West	of	being	naïve	for	thinking	that	such	a	large	gulf	separates	them	from	the	East.	He	writes:		
On	constate	aujourd’hui	que	l’Occident	est	plus	ou	moins	débarrassé	des	querelles	religieuses	et	des	
luttes	violentes	qu’engendre	le	fanatisme,	et	la	foule	en	conclut	volontiers	qu’il	en	a	toujours	été	
ainsi.		(Today	we	note	that	the	West	is	more	or	less	free	from	the	religious	strife	and	violent	struggles	engendered	by	fanaticism,	and	the	crowd	willingly	concludes	that	it	has	always	been	so.)209		While	still	addressing	a	fundamentally	intellectual	audience	within	the	pages	of	a	European	journal	Ahmed	Rıza	seems	more	intent	on	reiterating	the	ignorance	of	the	masses	(la	foule)	than	trying	to	portray	Islam	in	a	classical	or	liberal-democratic	light.	At	one	point	when	discussing	the	foundation	of	Islam	he	does	mention	that	Mohammed	was	also	inspired	by:	“…des	antiques	traditions	
romaines	dans	la	constitution	des	ses	lois	religieuses	et	civiles…”210	He	claims	that	for	the	masses	history	is	a	dead	letter	and	that	they	know	nothing	of	the	past.211	Additionally	he	accuses	them	of	interpreting	events	in	the	Christian	and	Islamic	worlds	based	on	their	own	religious	prejudices	and	not	by	a	rational	analysis	of	the	facts.																																																											209	Ibid,	306.		210	Ibid,	307.		211	Ibid,	306.		
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This	belief	in	the	ignorance	of	the	masses	underpins	the	main	body	of	the	text,	which	seeks	through	historical	example	to	demonstrate	Islam’s	tolerance	and	relative	liberalism.	Ahmed	Rıza	does	not	rely	on	the	same	overt	comparisons	to	the	classical	period	as	he	does	in	his	other	writings,	but	one	underlying	theme	that	remains	is	the	emphasis	placed	on	Islam	as	being	a	part	of	the	upward	progression	of	history.212	In	discussing	the	Islam	from	a	historical	point	of	view	Ahmed	Rıza	touches	upon	themes	common	to	many	writing	about	Islam	in	the	period,	such	as	the	historical	context	of	early	jihad,	the	tolerance	and	liberality	of	Muslim	rulers	in	Baghdad	and	Spain	and	the	sack	of	Jerusalem	as	an	example	of	Christian	fanaticism.213	This	broad	treatment	then	moves	quickly	into	a	discussion	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	As	was	seen	in	Chapter	1	it	was	important	for	the	Ottoman	writers	to	link	their	civilization	to	certain	aspects	of	early	or	Golden	Age	Islamic	civilization	while	at	the	same	time	stressing	the	Empire’s	particular	virtues.	Ahmed	Rıza	sums	this	up	when	he	says:		
Si	les	Turcs	n'ont	pas	continué	la	tradition	de	la	civilisation	arabe,	ils	n'ont	pas	moins	été	imprégnés	
des	idées	morales	que	Mahomet	avait	semées	dans	tout	l'Orient.			(If	the	Turks	have	not	continued	the	tradition	of	Arab	civilization,	they	were	nevertheless	imbued	with	the	moral	ideas	that	Mohammed	planted	throughout	the	East.)214		He	goes	on	to	stress	the	Islamic	roots	of	more	modern	developments	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	such	as	the	Tanzimat	reforms	of	the	mid	19th	century	and	
																																																								212	Ibid,	309.		213	Ibid,	309-312.		214	Ibid,	314-315.		
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stresses	the	degree	of	toleration	that	the	Ottoman	government	has	for	its	non-Muslim	subjects.215			It	is	also	telling	that	the	source	material	for	his	arguments	tends	to	be	exclusively	European.	In	fact	other	than	direct	quotations	from	the	Qur’an	Ahmed	Rıza	does	not	employ	any	other	Islamic	sources	in	this	article.	This	can	largely	be	explained	by	the	particular	context	in	which	he	was	writing	and	in	many	cases	he	employs	these	authors	precisely	to	assure	his	readers	of	his	lack	of	bias.	For	example	when	discussing	the	relative	tolerance	of	the	Ottoman	state	towards	non-Muslims	he	writes	that:		
Voltaire,	qui	n’est	pas	suspect	de	partialité	à	l’égard	des	Turcs,	reconnaît	cependant	qu’ils	usèrent	à	
toute	époque	de	la	plus	large	tolérance	envers	les	chrétiens.216			(Voltaire,	who	is	not	suspected	of	partiality	towards	the	Turks,	recognises	however	that	they	showed	in	every	era	the	greatest	tolerance	towards	the	Christians.)		Ahmed	Rıza	ultimately	concludes	that	a	combination	of	a	weak	government	and	foreign	interference	were	responsible	for	the	recent	massacres	in	the	Eastern	Ottoman	Empire	and	not	Islam.	Religion	is	detached	from	the	historical	and	political	context	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	but	only	to	the	extent	that	it	furthers	his	argument.	For	Ahmed	Rıza	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	the	present	and	the	early	Islamic	period	when	it	comes	to	the	role	of	religion	in	society.	While	the	tolerance	of	eleventh	century	Spain	can	be	comfortably	brought	forward	as	an	example	of	the	tolerance	of	Islam,	the	problems	ongoing	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	can	be	traced	only	to	a	series	of	secular	causes.	This	approach	would	also	be																																																									215	Ibid,	315.		216	Ibid.		
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utilized	by	Algerian	writers,	who	were	trying	to	navigate	a	defense	of	Islam	within	a	colonial	context.			For	Algerians	during	this	period	a	strong	defense	of	Islam	was	likewise	of	paramount	importance	in	their	efforts	to	secure	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	Europe.	The	Young	Algerians,	like	their	Ottoman	counterparts,	were	trying	in	their	French	language	writings	to	mount	a	defense	of	Islam	in	order	to	correct	what	they	saw	as	European	misconceptions,	especially	those	held	by	the	strongly	anti-Islamic	French	Algerian	colons.	They	also	hoped	to	appeal	to	the	more	enlightened	sections	of	French	intellectual	life	in	the	capital	and	to	justify	Islam’s	worthiness	as	a	basis	for	modern	civilization.	Like	the	Ottomans	they	were	keen	to	show	that	full	integration	into	the	European	state-system,	in	this	case	the	extension	of	French	citizenship,	did	not	require	the	abandonment	or	suppression	of	their	religion.	In	the	Young	Algerian	newspaper	El	Hack217	in	an	article	urging	the	French	government	to	work	towards	further	integration	for	the	indigenous	Muslim	population	the	author	writes	that:		
La	science,	la	philosophie,	la	médecine,	l’astronomie,	autant	de	mystères	ont	été	légués	aux	infidèles	
par	le	peuple	de	Mahomet,	peuple	dont	la	splendeur	rayonnait	sur	tout	l’univers	et	qui	au	Moyen-
Age	avait	atteint	l’apogée	de	sa	gloire	et	de	sa	magnificence.		(Science,	philosophy,	medicine,	astronomy;	many	mysteries	were	bequeathed	to	the	infidels	by	the	people	of	Muhammad,	people	whose	splendor	shone	all	over	the	world	and	in	the	Middle	Ages	had	reached	the	height	of	its	glory	and	magnificence.)218																																																											217	El	Hack	was	founded	and	published	in	Bône	in	1893	and	was	shut	down	by	administrative	decree	in	1894.	It	reappeared	in	1911	in	Oran	and	ran	until	1914.	In	its	sencond	incarnation	it	was	largely	opposed	to	the	assimilationist	program	of	the	Young	Algerians	and	were	opposed	to	naturalization	as	French	citizens.		218	Zeïd	ben	Dieb,	“En	Avant”,	El	Hack,	10	September	1893.		
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This	reference	to	the	glories	of	the	Moyen-Age	follows	the	script	laid	out	by	the	Ottomans	in	their	publications.	Unlike	their	Ottoman	counterparts,	however,	the	Young	Algerians	did	not	draw	on	the	past	examples	of	Islam’s	role	in	intellectual	development	in	order	to	advocate	for	a	return	to	an	originalist	form	of	Islam,	but	rather	to	show	that	Islam	contained	the	necessary	elements	for	modernity.	This	was	a	defense	born	out	of	a	desire	to	participate	fully	in	French	Algerian	society.	There	was	a	need	for	legitimacy	and	an	acknowledgement	of	Islam’s	role	in	the	creation	and	evolution	of	‘modern’	civilization.	Like	his	counterpart	in	Osmanli	the	author	explains	why	this	appreciation	of	Islam’s	role	in	the	transfer	and	production	of	knowledge	is	important:		
	
Parce	que	c’est	nous	qui	avons	été	les	civilisateurs	et	c’est	nous	qui,	les	premiers,	avons	donné	
l’exemple	aux	peuples	barbares	qui	maintenant,	hélas!	Nous	laissent	bien	loin	derrière	eux.	(Because	it	is	we	who	were	the	civilizers	and	it	is	we	who	were	the	first	to	have	set	an	example	for	the	barbarians	who	now,	alas!	Leave	us	far	behind.)219		Among	both	the	Ottomans	and	the	Algerians	there	is	a	palpable	regret	that	the	current	relative	state	of	Islamic	civilization	has	made	European	observers	wrongly	credit	Islam	for	the	cause	of	that	reality.	As	was	addressed	in	the	previous	chapter	there	was	a	fixation	on	the	decline	of	Islamic	civilization	relative	to	the	rise	of	Europe	in	the	writings	of	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers.	A	part	of	combating	this	perception	of	decline	was	to	counter	the	newer	forms	of	anti-Islamic	rhetoric	coming	from	Europe	that	were	cloaked	in	the	language	of	science	and	rational	thought.	El	Hack	objected	strongly	to	these	new	scientific	explanations	for	the	current	state	of	Islamic	civilization.		
																																																								219	Ibid.		
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In	an	article	entitled	Le	Mektoub	the	anonymous	author	addresses	the	fact	that	for	many	years	scholars	have	approached	the	apparent	fatalism	of	the	Arabs	as	condition	inextricably	linked	to	Islam	and,	according	to	the	author,	given	the	name	fatum	mahométanum.220	He	complains	that	this	theory	has	been	easily	and	blindly	accepted	by	Europe	along	with	the	belief	that	Islam	prohibits	all	progress,	suppresses	science	and	destroys	civilization.	In	fact,	as	the	author	says,	Islam	is	presented	as	being	essentially	non-human	leading	Europeans	to	believe	that:		
…en	un	mot,	ceux	qui	oseraient	la	pratiquer	ne	seraient	pas	des	êtres	humains,	mais	de	véritables	
brutes.		(...	In	a	word,	those	who	would	practice	it	are	not	human	beings,	but	total	brutes.)221			It	has	become,	in	the	author’s	mind,	far	too	easy	for	Europe	to	find	in	Islam	the	cause	for	the	various	ills	afflicting	the	Islamic	world.	He	says	that	the	decline	of	Arab	civilization	into	decadence	was	not	because	the	Arabs	were	prevented	from	developing	due	to	their	fatalist	Islamic	character	“but	for	other	reasons	that	all	the	world	knows”.222	The	article	closes	with	an	exhortation	to	Muslim	Algerians	to	rise	up,	reclaim	their	rightful	place	and	throw	off	European	perceptions	of	fatalistic	lethargy.223							
																																																								220	Noureddin,	“Le	Mektoub”,	El	Hack,	28	October	1893.		221	Ibid.		222	Ibid.		223	Ibid.	
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Correcting	the	Orientalists:	1902-1908	The	period	from	1902-1908	saw	a	shift	in	the	numbers	and	focus	of	many	Ottoman	French-language	journals.	Many,	such	as	Le	Croissant,	Le	Libérale	
Ottoman	and	La	Turquie	Contemporaine	had	long	ceased	publication.	The	vast	majority	of	the	remaining	Ottoman	French	language	journals	were	dealing	primarily	with	more	immediate	topics,	such	as	separatism,	political	violence	and	the	influence	of	the	various	Great	Powers.	In	the	major	remaining	French-language	Young	Turk	journal,	Ahmed	Rıza’s	Mechvéret,	the	topics	definitely	turned	more	towards	politics	and	issues	concerning	the	Great	Powers	and	conflict	among	the	various	minority	groups	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.		It	was	clear	however,	that	some	in	the	Ottoman	community	still	felt	that	the	subject	of	Islam	was	important	enough	to	necessitate	further	explanation	to	a	European	audience.	This	came	in	the	form	of	Ahmed	Rıza’s	work	entitled	La	Crise	
de	l’Orient:	Ses	Causes	et	ses	Remèdes	published	in	1907	in	which	he	sought	to	systematically	dismantle	European	beliefs	about	Islamic	practices	and	institutions	and	their	ascribed	role	in	the	apparent	decline	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Around	the	same	time	the	Algerian	writer	Ismael	Hamet	published	his	work	on	the	history	of	the	Islamic	Maghreb,	which	also	devoted	considerable	space	to	refuting	negative	perceptions	of	Islam.	A	third	significant	work	that	would	be	published	in	this	period	was	entitled	L’Esprit	Libéral	du	Coran,	by	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi	(1876-1944),	a	Tunisian	writer	and	poltician	who	would	go	on	to	found	the	Destour	Party	in	the	interwar	period.			
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The	way	that	these	authors	approached	Islam	was	in	many	ways	determined	by	the	context	in	which	they	were	writing,	but	both	reflected	their	positions	as	writers	engaged	in	conversation	with	a	European	audience.		These	authors	relied	on	a	combination	of	European	scholars	and	Islamic	sources	to	bolster	their	arguments.	Additionally	they	presented	themselves	as	insiders	who	could	provide	an	authentic	perspective	on	Islam	and	Islamic	society	and	in	some	cases	they	simply	sought	to	provide	and	authentic	interpretation	of	existing	European	writings	on	Islam.			What	primarily	sets	these	works	apart	from	each	other	is	the	differing	goals	of	the	respective	authors.	Ahmed	Rıza	was	seeking	to	refute	European	prejudices	about	Islam	in	part	to	justify	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	ability	to	operate	on	the	same	level	as	other	European	states.	Ismael	Hamet	on	the	other	hand	was	working	from	within	a	French	colonial	context	to	argue	for	the	possibility	of	integration	and	equality	without	the	renunciation	of	Islamic	status.225	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi	was	similarly	eager	to	demonstate	the	compatibility	of	Islam	with	modernity.	Ismael	Hamet,	unlike	his	Ottoman,	and	especially	Young	Turk,	counterparts	was	not	defending	Islam	in	order	to	legitimate	a	future	reinvigorated	state,	but	rather	to	show	that	Islam	is	not	fundamentally	incompatible	with	French	republicanism.	An	analysis	of	these	works	will	demonstrate	some	of	the	diversity	of	within	defenses	of	Islam,	but	also	the	similarities	in	style	and	structure	that	this	form	of	intellectual	engagement	involved.			
																																																								225	Zack,	Lizabeth.	“French	and	Algerian	Identity	Formation	in	1890’s	Algiers”,	
French	Colonial	History,	1/2	(2002),	115-143.	
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Ahmed	Rıza’s	1907	work	La	Crise	de	l’Orient:	Ses	Causes	et	ses	Remèdes	was	published	in	the	same	year	as	the	Congress	of	Ottoman	Opposition	Parties	in	Paris	and	not	long	before	the	start	of	Young	Turk	Revolution	in	1908.	It	was	published	by	the	official	Young	Turk	organization,	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress,	and	is	a	more	deliberate	and	polemical	work	than	many	of	Ahmed	Rıza’s	earlier	writings.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient	is	an	explicit	attempt	to	communicate	to	a	European	audience	the	inaccuracy	of	their	commonly	held	beliefs	about	Ottoman	society	and	Islamic	society	more	broadly,	although	the	two	in	this	work	are	generally	held	to	be	synonymous.	Ahmed	Rıza	is	adamant	in	his	introduction	that	those	who	want	clearly	to	understand	the	affairs	of	Turkey:	“…will	not	be	afraid	to	refuse	to	lend	a	sympathetic	ear	to	the	voice	of	a	Turk.”226	Like	his	Algerian	contemporary	Ismael	Hamet,	Ahmed	Rıza	had	great	faith	in	the	combination	of	rational	analysis	and	insider	perspective.	This	belief	is	reinforced	when	he	states	that	most	foreigners	who	have	visited	the	Orient:	“…collect	only	incomplete	information.”227	He	positions	himself	as	one	who	will	provide	Europe	with	the	correct	information	about	Islam	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	counter	the	“handful	of	unscrupulous	writers”	who	have	sought	to	intentionally	mislead	their	audiences.228	Like	his	earlier	works	it	is	focused	on	educating	a	European	audience.	Despite	being	a	much	more	overtly	political	publication	than	his	writings	for	La	Revue	Occidentale	it	is	still	primarily	an	intellectual	discussion	of	Islam	and	Islamic	society	with	the	aim	of	legitimating	both.			
																																																								226	Rıza,	Ahmed.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient:	Ses	Causes	et	ses	Remèdes,	1.		227	Ibid.		228	Ibid,	2.		
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The	work	is	comprised	of	refutations	of	negative	European	perceptions	of	various	elements	of	Ottoman	society	and	Islam	in	general.	The	main	body	of	the	text	takes	the	form	of	eleven	chapters	dealing	with	a	specific	aspect	of	Eastern	or	Islamic	society.	These	can	be	most	succinctly	divided	into	psychological/theological	topics	such	as	fatalism,	intolerance	and	fanaticism,	and	institutional	or	ideological	topics	such	as	pan-Islamism,	the	Caliphate	and	Holy	War.	The	final	chapter	deals	with	the	Turks,	acknowledging	the	racial	nature	of	a	great	deal	of	European	prejudice	towards	non-Western	people	as	well	as	the	growing	increasingly	Turco-centric	worldview	of	the	CUP	at	this	time.	This	can	also	be	seen	by	the	frequent	substitution	in	the	text	of	the	word	“Turk”	for	the	word	“Ottoman”,	which	can	be	partially	explained	by	Ahmed	Rıza’s	developing	belief	that	those	elements	most	interested	in	maintaining	the	integrity	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	are	Turks.229	The	text’s	body	chapters	offer	a	fairly	comprehensive	list	of	the	topics	most	commonly	addressed	by	writers	when	dealing	with	Islam.230			In	his	introduction	Ahmed	Rıza	declares	that	Islam	cannot	simply	be	dismissed	as	a	backwards	and	pre-modern	religion.	He	states	that:	“Islam	is	not	simply	a	religion	in	the	vulgar	sense	of	the	word;	it	is	at	the	same	time	a	moral	and	civil	code.”231	As	in	his	earlier	writings	Ahmed	Rıza	does	not	see	Islam	as	in	itself	inimical	to	progress.	He	stresses	that	given	the	Islam’s	prevalence	and	role	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	the	aim	should	not	be	its	removal,	but	rather	refashioning.		For																																																									229	Hanioğlu,	Preparation	for	a	Revolution,	299.		230	The	full	chapter	list	in	order	is	as	follows:	Islam,	Fatalism,	The	Caliphate,	The	
Dual	Powers	of	the	Sultan,	Pan-Islamism,	Holy	War,	Fanaticism,	Inequality,	
Intolerance,	The	Harem	and	Polygamy,	The	Turks.		231	Ibid,	5.		
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Ahmed	Rıza	the	spreading	of	information	about	Islam	to	a	European	audience	is	an	integral	part	of	its	evolution	and	adaptation	to	modern	needs	(aux	nécessités	
modernes).232	What	is	most	important	about	the	introduction	to	La	Crise	de	
l’Orient	is	that	it	explicitly	draws	attention	to	Ahmed	Rıza’s	perception	of	himself	as	being	uniquely	positioned	to	comment	on	topics	such	as	Islam.	As	was	seen	in	Chapter	1,	there	is	a	palpable	feeling	of	dismay	on	the	part	of	Ahmed	Rıza	that	the	history	of	the	Turks,	as	it	is	known	in	Europe,	is	largely	a	synthesis	of	the	writings	of	European	diplomats.233	He	writes	in	more	general	terms	that:		
Un	Anglais	ne	peut	pas	sentir	comme	un	Arabe.	La	conscience	et	la	mentalité	d’un	Russe	ne	se	
substitueront	jamais	à	celles	d’un	Turc.		(An	Englishman	cannot	feel	like	an	Arab.	The	mind	and	mentality	of	a	Russian	can	never	replace	those	of	a	Turk.)234			
La	Crise	de	l’Orient	opens	with	a	short	description	of	the	current	situation	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	This	section	repeats	earlier	statements	from	both	Ahmed	Rıza	and	Murad	Bey	that	Islam	cannot	be	blamed	for	the	injustices	and	absolutism	of	Sultan	Abdulhamid	and	writes	that:	“Justice	is	also	as	much	a	myth	for	the	Christians	as	for	the	Muslims.235	In	the	short	first	chapter	on	Islam	Ahmed	Rıza	reflects	on	the	way	that	Islam	remains	a	focal	point	in	European	assessments	of	Ottoman	society.	He	repeats	his	belief	that	among	European	writers	Islam	is	blamed	for	all	of	the	shortcomings	and	evils	in	the	Islamic	world	and	states	that:			
																																																								232	Ibid.		233	Ibid,	6.		234	Ibid,	6-7.		235	Ibid,	8.		
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Partant	de	cette	conviction	absolue,	toutes	recherches	nouvelles	leurs	paraissent	superflues,	sinon	
gênantes.		(From	this	absolute	conviction,	all	new	research	seems	to	them	superfluous,	if	not	harmful).236			This	statement	is	especially	important	as	it	reflects	Ahmed	Rıza’s	claim	to	be	writing	from	a	privileged	position.	He	discounts	both	the	blatantly	anti-Islamic	writings	of	more	conservative	European	writers,	but	also	the	work	of	those	he	sees	as	coming	from	a	strong	liberal	background,	but	who	nonetheless	see	in	Islam	an	insurmountable	barrier	to	progress.237	Ahmed	Rıza	criticizes	those	‘eminent	writers	of	the	West’	(éminents	écrivains	de	l’Occident)	who,	convinced	that	all	progress	in	the	West	occurred	despite	Christianity	and	the	Church	attempt	to	apply	this	same	reasoning	to	the	East	and	Islam.238	Rather	he	reserves	his	praise	for	those	European	scientists	who	have	studied	the	foundations	of	the	social	order	in	Turkey	and	“recognize	the	absurdity	of	these	insinuations.”239	Ahmed	Rıza	sees	himself	in	the	company	of	these	rational	and	methodical	interpreters	of	Islam	and	Islamic	societies.	His	position	as	rationalist	and	insider,	an	identity	also	claimed	by	his	Algerian	contemporary	Ismael	Hamet,	is	a	key	element	to	his	projection	of	the	realities	of	Islam	back	to	Europe.		Ahmed	Rıza	sees	an	obvious	political	motivation	behind	the	refusal	of	Europeans	to	acknowledge	the	contributions	that	Islam	in	the	past	has	made	to	the	
																																																								236	Ibid,	13.		237	Ibid.		238	Ibid,	15.		239	Ibid.		
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intellectual,	moral	and	material	development	of	both	the	East	and	the	West.240	He	also	points	out	that:			
L’Europe	se	garde	bien	de	faire,	surtout	dans	les	milieux	musulmans,	l’apologie	de	cette	civilisation.	(Europe	is	careful,	especially	in	Muslim	circles,	to	make	an	apology	for	this	civilization.)241		The	reason	for	this	reluctance,	for	Ahmed	Rıza,	can	be	found	in	Europe’s	fear	that	any	open	acknowledgement	of	the	positive	aspects	of	Islam	and	its	contributions	to	civilization	would	incite	the	various	Muslims	under	European	control	to	rise	up	and	question	Europe’s	supposed	supremacy	over	them.242	Here	we	can	see	a	shift	in	tone	from	his	earlier	writings,	which	sought	to	gently	combat	a	genuine	ignorance	about	Islam	and	Islamic	societies	to	a	much	more	adversarial	approach	intent	on	exposing	European	hypocrisy	and	self-interest.	This	shift	is	reflected	in	the	format	of	Ahmed	Rıza’s	discussion	of	Islam	and	its	defense.	There	is	a	move	away	from	discussions	of	Islam	as	a	belief	system	and	organizing	force	in	an	abstract	sense.	Instead	the	discussion	is	rooted	firmly	in	the	pragmatic	defense	of	Islamic	institutions	as	they	exist	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.		As	Ahmed	Rıza	writes:		
En	tout	cas,	dans	l’Islamisme,	ce	ne	sont	pas	la	foi	et	le	culte	qui	sont	le	plus	attaqués,	mais	les	
institutions	politico-religieuses	ou	des	pratiques	qui	en	découlent.		(In	every	case,	in	Islam,	it	is	not	belief	and	worship	that	are	the	most	attacked,	but	the	politico-religious	institutions	or	the	practices	that	result	from	them.)243		
																																																								240	Ibid,	14.		241	Ibid,	14-15.		242	Ibid,	15.	243	Ibid.	
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In	two	chapters244	Ahmed	Rıza	returns	to	the	subject	of	the	Caliphate,	a	subject	that	he	had	covered	before	in	La	Revue	Occidentale.	These	chapters	are	especially	important	as	they	highlight	a	shift	in	the	way	he	defends	and	legitimizes	Islam	in	the	face	of	changing	contextual	circumstances.	As	in	this	earlier	article	Ahmed	Rıza	acknowledges	the	singular	importance	that	that	Caliphate	as	an	Islamic	institution	has	in	the	eyes	of	the	West.245	Unlike	his	previous	treatment,	however,	these	chapters	reflect	an	approach	to	the	Caliphate	more	rooted	in	its	contemporary	form	than	in	an	idealized	past.			The	aim	of	the	chapters	is	still	decidedly	educational,	but	the	focus	on	the	Caliphate	as	it	currently	exists	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	altered	the	ways	in	which	Ahmed	Rıza	seeks	to	explain	and	legitimate	the	institution.	This	work	was	intended	to	function	as	a	more	direct	piece	of	propaganda	for	the	CUP.	Its	intended	audience	remained	largely	the	same	as	Ahmed	Rıza’s	previous	writings,	but	its	intended	purpose,	as	a	publication	that	aimed	to	legitimate	Ottoman	and	Islamic	society,	necessitated	a	more	contemporary	approach	its	topics.			This	approach	is	evident	from	the	way	in	which	Ahmed	Rıza	treats	negative	European	perceptions	of	the	Caliph	as	like:	“…une	sorte	de	dictateur	romain	
investi	d’une	autorité	sans	bornes.”	(...a	type	of	Roman	dictator	invested	with	boundless	authority.)246	In	a	reversal	of	his	previous	tactics	Ahmed	Rıza	refutes	a	classical	comparison	made	by	Europeans.		Rather	than	address	these	critiques	by	attempting	to	portray	Caliphal	authority	in	classical	or	more	modern	liberal-																																																								244	Le	Khalifat	and	Les	deux	pouvoirs	du	Sultan.		245	Ibid,	19.		246	Rıza,	Ahmed.	Le	Calife	et	ses	Devoirs,	93.		
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democratic	terms	Ahmed	Rıza	instead	attacks	the	hypocrisy	of	the	West	in	its	singular	obsession	with	this	particular	Islamic	institution.	He	draws	attention	to	the	West’s	error	in	thinking	that	the	titles	usually	attributed	to	the	Caliph,	such	as	the	Deputy	of	God	on	Earth	(Ombre	de	Dieu	sur	la	terre)	and	Head	of	the	Believers/Leader	of	the	Faith	(Chefs	de	Croyants)	are	somehow	the	sole	property	of	Oriental	monarchs.247			To	support	this	claim	Ahmed	Rıza	mentions	several	European	thinkers,	such	as	Bossuet,	Fenelon	and	Hobbes,	and	reflects	on	their	views	on	the	relationship	between	God	and	kingship.	He	then	goes	on	to	highlight	the	religious	titles	held	by	a	variety	of	reigning	European	monarchs,	including	England	and	Austria,	in	order	to	expose	the	belief	in	Europe	that:	“…le	chimère	du	droit	divin	n’est	plus	de	
notre	temps.”	(…the	chimera	of	divine	right	is	no	longer	of	our	time.)248	Ahmed	Rıza	counters	claims	that	the	problem	lay	in	the	Sultan’s	role	as	Caliph	and	its	impact	on	the	Sultan’s	non-Muslim	subjects	by	pointing	out	that	the	English	King	Edward	VII	ruled	as	a	Christian	monarch	over	India.249	In	this	way	Ahmed	Rıza	has	moved	from	an	attempt	to	legitimize	the	Caliphate	in	Classical	or	Western	terms	towards	a	strategy	of	contemporary	comparison.	He	instead	is	acknowledging	that	the	Caliphate	is	no	better	or	worse	than	comparable	rulers	across	Europe.			A	defense	rooted	in	contemporary	comparison	and	pragmatic	realities	continues	in	the	second	chapter	of	Ahmed	Rıza’s	discussion	of	the	Caliphate.	This	chapter,																																																									247	Rıza,	Ahmed.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient:	Ses	Causes	et	ses	Remèdes,	19-20.			248	Ibid,	20.		249	Ibid.		
	 99	
Les	deux	pouvoirs	du	Sultan,	focuses	more	explicitly	on	the	contemporary	situation	and	the	function	of	the	Caliphate	as	an	Islamic	institution	within	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Discussion	of	the	role	of	the	Caliphate	in	the	contemporary	Ottoman	context	is	underpinned,	as	in	his	previous	article,	by	the	assertion	that	Islam	is	not	merely	a	supernatural	(supraterrestre)	religion.250	Ahmed	Rıza	repeats	the	historical	conception	of	the	Caliph	as	a	balancing	force	and	that	his	power	is	technically	limited	by	the	fundamental	laws	of	Islam	and	the	Ulema.	As	he	writes:	“Son	pouvoir	a	des	bornes	comme	celui	d’un	empereur	constitutionnel…”	(His	power	has	limits	like	those	of	a	constitutional	emperor…)251	However	this	comparison	is	not	intended	to	imbue	the	Ottoman	Caliphate	in	its	current	form	with	a	set	of	Classical	or	liberal-democratic	qualities.			In	this	section	Ahmed	Rıza	is	much	more	concerned	with	addressing	European	concerns	over	the	Ottoman	Caliphate,	in	so	far	as	it	represents	an	office	combined	with	that	of	the	Sultan,	as	an	example	of	Islamic	absolutism.	He	writes	that:	
	
J’examinerai	dans	la	seconde	partie	de	cette	étude	comment	ces	principes	ont	été	violés	et	comment	
la	confusion	des	deux	genres	de	pouvoir	en	une	même	personnalité	fut	un	instant	plutôt	nuisible	
qu’utile	au	progrès.		(I	will	discuss	in	the	second	part	of	this	study	how	these	principles	have	been	violated	and	how	the	confusion	of	two	kinds	of	power	in	the	same	personality	was	more	harmful	to	progress	than	it	was	useful.)252			
																																																								250	Ibid,	21.	See	also	Ahmed	Rıza,	Le	Calife	et	ses	Devoirs,	98.		251	Ibid,	22.			252	Ibid,	23.		
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Ahmed	Rıza	seeks	in	this	section	to	acknowledge	the	deficiencies	of	the	Ottoman	Caliphate	in	its	current	form	while	maintaining	that	these	deficiencies	are	not	the	result	of	Islam	as	an	organizing	principle.	His	goal	is	to	separate	the	original	principles	of	the	Caliphate,	which	he	sees	as	ultimately	beneficial,	from	the	way	that	the	institution	has	evolved	within	the	Ottoman	context.	In	his	mind	it	is	wrong	to	confuse	these	two	aspects	of	the	Caliphate	and	to	use	this	as	a	justification	for	its	abolition.253	As	shall	be	demonstrated	in	Chapter	4	Ahmed	Rıza’s	discussion	of	the	Caliphate	is	rooted	firmly	in	the	context	of	reform,	reflecting	the	consolidation	and	growing	activism	of	the	Young	Turk	movement	during	this	period.	The	Caliph	and	the	concern	that	it	aroused	in	the	minds	of	Europeans	was	of	course	inextricably	linked	to	another	source	of	anxiety	for	Europeans	vis-à-vis	the	Ottoman	Empire:	the	ideology	of	pan-Islamism.			In	the	beginning	of	his	discussion	of	pan-Islamism	Ahmed	Rıza	attempts	to	assuage	European	fears	of	Muslim	political	unity	against	Europe.	He	offers	a	quote	from	the	Quran	describing	the	common	goal	for	Muslims	of	the	creation	of	a	fraternal	society,	but	frames	this	in	universal	and	humanistic	terms.	For	Ahmed	Rıza	the	unity	promoted	by	Islam	amongst	believers	is	simply	an	aspect	of	a	broader	unity	amongst	mankind.	The	promotion	of	unity	is,	for	this	reason,	a	common	feature	of	all	religions.254	The	nature	of	Islam,	in	his	mind,	is	simply	more	suited	to	the	extension	and	maintenance	of	these	links	and	connections	than	other	faiths.	Ahmed	Rıza	mentions	that	the	unity	between	Muslims	is	not	
																																																								253	Ibid.		254	Ibid,	28.		
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merely	theological,	but	also	signifies	social	obligation.255	In	this	way	he	is	emphasizing	the	diffuse	and	communal	nature	of	these	obligations	while	at	the	same	time	attempting	to	lessen	the	role	of	any	central	politico-religious	authority,	such	as	the	Caliph,	in	directing	or	encouraging	them.			Ahmed	Rıza’s	discussion	of	pan-Islamism	in	this	case	displays	a	reluctance	to	engage	overtly	with	the	actual	substance	of	European	fears	of	Muslims	acting	as	a	united	political	bloc	under	the	direction	of	the	Ottoman	Sultan-Caliph.	He	mentions	that	while	it	is	technically	the	duty	of	the	Caliph	to	rally	the	believers	under	the	sacred	flag	(drapeau	sacerdotal),	it	was	rare	for	any	Caliph	to	perform	this	task	in	a	sensible	or	practical	way.256	He	addresses	pan-Islamism	largely	in	doctrinal	and	social	terms	and	not	as	a	political	ideology.	He	seeks	In	this	way	he	reframes	the	debate,	which	gives	his	defense	a	much	greater	strength	by	avoiding	engagement	with	any	of	pan-Islamism’s	more	challenging	criticisms.			Ahmed	Rıza	sets	the	terms	of	his	discussion	by	framing	pan-Islamism	in	relatively	benign	terms	as	merely	the	spread	of	Islam	in	places	such	as	Africa	and	East	Asia.	He	points	to	Islam’s	decentralized	nature	as	evidence	that	the	religion’s	spread	in	these	regions	is	not	underpinned	by	any	nefarious	political	aims.	He	writes:		
En	realité,	les	Turcs	n’ont	jamais	cherché	à	faire	de	la	propagande	religieuse,	ni	à	organiser	une	
lutte	contre	la	Chrétienté.	L’Islamisme	se	propage	de	bouche	en	bouche,	par	simple	contact	
individuel.																																																									255	Ibid.		256	Ibid,	29.		
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	(In	reality	the	Turks	have	never	sought	to	spread	religious	propaganda	or	to	organize	a	struggle	against	Christianity.	Islam	is	spread	from	mouth	to	mouth,	by	simple	individual	contact.)257		Rather	than	address	criticisms	of	pan-Islamism	as	an	overt	political	issue,	Ahmed	Rıza	works	instead	to	portray	the	spread	of	Islam	and	any	links	to	the	Ottoman	Empire	as	ultimately	beneficial	for	Europe.	To	arrive	at	this	conclusion	he	makes	the	argument	that	Islam	provides	the	ideal	transition	state	for	those	fétichistes	under	French	or	British	control	in	Africa.	He	attempts	to	assuage	European	concerns	that	the	spread	of	Islam	and	the	strengthening	of	Islamic	networks	in	Africa	will	result	in	colonial	subjects	becoming	haughty,	proud	or	rebellious	(hautain,	fier,	insoumis).258	Ahmed	Rıza	makes	the	argument	that	the	conversion	of	polytheistic	indigenous	colonial	populations	to	Islam	would	in	many	ways	be	preferable	to	direct	conversion	to	Christianity.	He	uses	the	example	of	both	the	indigenous	populations	of	North	America	and	those	Sub-Saharan	Africans	who	had	converted	to	Christianity	and	claims	that	had	they	converted	to	Islam	they	might	have	avoided	the	alcoholism	and	abject	poverty	to	which	many	succumbed.259	He	argues	that	moving	from	a	rudimentary	society	to	an	advanced	society	requires	caution.	In	Ahmed	Rıza’s	opinion	Islam	alone	lay	the	ground	for	this	transition	to	modern	civilization.260	In	fact,	he	asks,	if	the	principles	of	fraternity	and	solidarity	are	inscribed	on	the	base	of	all	modern	civilization	then	surely	we	must	esteem	a	doctrine	that	loudly	proclaims	then	as	a	social	necessity.261	Finally	he	makes	the	argument	that	practiced	properly	and	with	
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tolerance	the	spread	of	Islam	will	in	fact	bind	the	diverse	groups	of	these	territories	together	and:	
	
…aplanir	les	différends	qui	existent	parmi	eux,	contribuant	ainsi	à	assurer	l’ordre	–	base	de	tout	
progrès.		(…smooth	out	the	differences	that	exist	between	them,	thus	contributing	to	assuring	order	–	the	foundation	of	all	progress.)262		In	this	section	Ahmed	Rıza	offers	an	uncharacteristically	pragmatic	defense	of	Islam	and	one	that	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	his	professed	anti-Imperialism.	Like	Ismael	Hamet,	Ahmed	Rıza	desired	to	educate	his	French	audience	about	the	realities	of	Islam.	He	writes:			
Le	Musulman,	quel	qu’il	soit,	passe,	malgré	l’histoire,	malgré	les	faits,	pour	fanatique,	intolérant	et	
intransigeant.		(The	Muslim,	whatever	happens,	despite	history,	despite	the	facts,	is	passed	off	as	fanatic,	intolerant	and	intransigent.)263			As	we	have	seen,	Ismael	Hamet	had	been	an	interpreter	in	the	French	army	while	pursuing	a	parallel	career	as	a	scholar	of	North	Africa.	In	addition	to	his	1906	book	he	also	contributed	extensively	to	French	journals	such	as	La	Revue	du	
Monde	Musulman	and	L’Islam.	Hamet’s	defense	of	Islam	is	rooted	in	his	desire	to	further	the	integration	of	Muslim	Algerians	into	French	society.	In	this	he	was	typical	of	the	French-speaking	Algerian	elite	that	was	emerging	in	the	first	decade	of	the	20th	century.264	While	ostensibly	a	purely	academic	work	dealing	with	both	the	history	and	current	social,	political	and	economic	situation	in																																																									262	Ibid,	33.		263	Hamet,	Ismael.	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	267.		264	Saadallah,	69-77,	70.		
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North	Africa,	Hamet’s	work	also	had	an	overt	political	function.	As	seen	in	Chapter	1,	the	way	in	which	Ismael	Hamet	presents	the	material	in	his	book	strongly	reflects	his	position	as	a	member	of	the	Muslim	Algerian	assimilationist	elite.	His	interpretation	of	the	region’s	history	and	contemporary	situation	was	aligned	with	his	belief	in	the	ability	of	Muslim	Algerians	to	be	successfully	integrated	into	French	society	without	renouncing	their	status	as	Muslims.			The	purpose	of	his	publication	is	made	clear	in	the	introduction	by	A.	Le	Chatelier,	a	professor	at	the	College	de	France,	who	writes:			
Puisse	tout	votre	appel	être	entendu	tel	qu’il	est	–	avec	sa	signification	entière,	et		notre	“politique	
indigène”	d’Algérie	et	de	Tunisie	devenir	une	politique	d’instruction,	de	progrès	social	et	
d’émancipation,	qui,	de	nos	“sujets”	musulmans	d’hier,	fasse,	demain,	des	concitoyens.		(May	your	call	be	understood	as	it	is	-	with	its	full	meaning,	and	our	"native	policy"	for	Algeria	and	Tunisia	become	a	policy	of	education,	social	progress	and	emancipation,	in	which	in	our	Muslim	"subjects"	of	yesterday	do	tomorrow	become	our	fellow	citizens.)265								The	work	is	expressly	intended	to	function	as	a	source	of	propaganda	despite	being	presented	in	the	language	of	scholarly	neutrality.	Like	his	Ottoman	counterparts	Ismael	Hamet	uses	his	French	language	platform	to	engage	in	a	defense	of	Islam	from	the	perspective	of	an	insider.	Ismael	Hamet	constructs	his	defense	by	balancing	the	ideals	of	Islam	and	its	founding	principles	with	what	he	perceives	to	be	the	realities	on	the	ground.	Like	Murad	Bey	and	Ahmed	Rıza,	Hamet	is	unwilling	to	concede	that	Islam	is	in	any	way	inherently	incompatible	with	modern	civilization.																																																											265	Ibid,	IV.		
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Unlike	the	majority	of	his	Ottoman	counterparts	Ismael	Hamet	was	not	attempting	to	justify	the	ability	of	Islam	to	underpin	an	independent	state	that	could	be	seen	as	on	par	with	the	Great	Powers	of	Europe.	Rather	he	sought	to	make	clear	that	Islam	was	not	an	insurmountable	barrier	to	full	Muslim	Algerian	participation	in	French	society	and	politics.	In	this	way	Hamet’s	work	was,	somewhat	convolutedly	making	a	much	more	direct	appeal	to	the	French	than	were	his	Ottoman	counterparts.	He	is	much	less	concerned	with	highlighting	the	qualities	that	make	Islam	particularly	amenable	to	modern	civilization	or	even	liberal	politics.	In	his	discussions	of	Islam	there	are	none	of	the	classical	comparisons	found	in	the	writings	of	Murad	Bey	and	Ahmed	Rıza.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	the	way	in	which	Ismael	Hamet	presents	the	history	of	North	Africa	is	inextricably	linked	to	his	political	position	as	one	in	favour	of	assimilation	not	independence.	Likewise	his	defense	of	Islam	can	be	read	in	the	same	way.	It	can	be	argued	that	the	classical	comparisons	found	in	many	Ottoman	defenses	of	Islam	were	unnecessary	given	the	political	and	intellectual	context	in	which	Hamet	was	operating.	The	French	administration	saw	Islam	as	a	fundamental	barrier	to	full	integration	so	Ismael	Hamet,	like	his	Algerian	and	Tunisian	contemporaries,	sought	to	portray	religion	as	a	matter	of	conscience	as	opposed	to	a	set	of	rules	and	regulations	that	underpinned	Muslim	Algerian	society.266			This	position	is	made	clear	early	in	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique	through	attempts	to	downplay	the	significance	of	religion	as	the	primary	focus	of	identity	or	the	primary	means	of	assimilation	in	modern	society.																																																											266	Saadallah,	74.		
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Rather	than	seeing	Islam	as	a	barrier	to	integration	with	the	French	Hamet	writes:			
La	religion	qui,	aux	siècles	passés,	était	le	seul	moyen	d’assimiler	les	peoples,	s’efface	aujourd’hui	et	
cède	le	pas	au	jeu	des	lois	sociologiques	et	économiques.		(Religion,	which	for	centuries	past	was	the	only	way	to	assimilate	people,	today	disappears	and	gives	way	to	the	game	of	sociological	and	economic	laws.)267		This	position	drives	Hamet	to	locate	his	defense	of	Islam	primarily	in	an	analysis	of	Islam	as	it	exists	in	contemporary	Algeria	and	not	by	appealing	to	the	virtues	of	Islam’s	founding	principles.			Hamet	defines	his	aims	in	discussing	Islam	as	being	about	refuting	the	anti-Islamic	beliefs	held	by	the	French	both	in	France	and	in	Algeria	which	are	rooted,	as	Ahmed	Rıza	also	believed,	in	arguments	recycled	from	the	Middle	Ages.268	Like	Ahmed	Rıza,	this	tactic	also	allowed	Ismael	Hamet	to	construct	a	defense	of	Islam	that	required	only	a	refutation	of	prejudice	rather	than	anything	more	intellectually	rigorous.	Hamet	claims	that	he	will	bring	a	more	modern	and	rational	approach	to	his	investigation	of	Islam	in	Algeria	and	states	that	one	should	not	judge	men	by	the	morals	that	are	taught	in	their	books,	but	by	their	practices.269	In	this	dual	role	as	the	dispassionate,	rational	and	modern	scholar	and	the	native	informant	he	exemplifies	the	internal	contradiction	of	the	Young	Algerian	as	one	caught	between	France	and	Algeria.	This	approach	underpins	
																																																								267	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	13.		268	Ibid,	268.		269	Ibid.		
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nearly	all	of	Hamet’s	work	on	Islam	and	reflects	his	position	as	an	intermediary	between	a	colonial	power	and	its	subjects.			In	his	role	as	intermediary	Ismael	Hamet	sought	to	explain	the	reality	of	Islam	and	Islamic	practice	to	his	French	audience.	Like	many	of	his	Young	Turk	and	other	Ottoman	counterparts,	Hamet	held	strongly	elitist	views	concerning	the	role	of	the	elite	in	shaping	the	masses.270	Therefore	he	was	not	in	any	way	opposed	to	decrying	what	he	saw	as	the	destructive	and	anti-modern	attitudes	of	the	religious	brotherhoods	in	Algeria	writing	that:		
…par	leur	zèle	fanatique,	entretiennent	chez	leurs	adeptes	la	haine	des	Chrétiens,	l’espoir	de	la	
revanche,	le	rêve	d’un	mouvement	panislamique	reconstituant	la	nationalité	arabe.		(…by	their	fanatic	zeal,	maintain	among	their	followers	a	hatred	of	Christians,	the	hope	of	revenge,	the	dream	of	a	pan-Islamic	movement	to	revive	the	Arab	race.)271			Ismael	Hamet	is	quick	to	separate	the	opinions	of	these	religious	leaders,	whom	those	belonging	to	this	French-educated	class	considered	superstitious	and	reactionary272,	from	the	way	in	which	Islam	governs	the	daily	life	of	the	average	Algerian.	It	is	an	attack	on	the	religious	leadership	class,	especially	the	Marabouts,	that	forms	the	basis	for	his	defense	of	Islam.	Hamet	traces	the	history	of	Islam	in	the	Maghreb	to	make	his	case	that	the	domination	of	these	groups	in	religious	matters	and	the	beliefs	and	practices	they	espoused	did	not	necessarily	reflect	Islam’s	compatibility	with	French	society.				
																																																								270	Hanioğlu,	Preparation	for	a	Revolution:	The	Young	Turks,	1902-1908,	309.		271	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	267-8.		272	Saadallah,	70.		
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In	many	ways	this	was	a	decidedly	different	approach	to	defending	Islam	from	many	of	the	earlier	Ottoman	efforts.	Whereas	earlier	Ottoman	writings	tended	to	highlight	the	universal	and	theoretical	elements	of	Islam	and	often	attempted	to	portray	them	in	liberal-democratic	or	classical	terms	to	mount	their	defense,	Ismael	Hamet	puts	far	less	emphasis	on	Islam’s	original	principles.	Like	his	Ottoman	counterparts	he	includes	the	obligatory	summary	of	the	essential	elements	of	Islamic	belief	and	it	is	clear	that	he	views	its	simplicity,	in	comparison	to	Christianity,	as	a	positive	aspect.	He	writes	that:		
La	simplicité	de	ces	principes	et	des	obligations	qui	en	découlent,	la	constitution	essentiellement	
laïque	de	la	société	musulmane,	devaient	la	mettre,	plus	que	toute	autre,	à	l‘abri	d’une	domination	
cléricale.	Il	fallut	donc	des	circonstances	d’un	caractère	particulier,	pour	permettre	à	une	caste	
religieuse,	d’exercer	sur	le	Maghreb	un	pouvoir	Presque	absolu.		(The	simplicity	of	these	principles	and	obligations,	the	essentially	secular	constitution	of	the	Muslim	society	should	have	kept	it,	more	than	any	other,	sheltered	from	clerical	domination.	It	was	therefore	necessary	to	have	circumstances	of	a	particular	character,	to	allow	a	religious	caste	to	exercise	in	the	Maghreb	almost	absolute	power.)273		It	is	a	summary	of	these	circumstances	that	Ismael	Hamet	uses	to	construct	his	defense	of	Islam.	It	is	within	the	specific	context	of	the	history	of	Islam	in	the	Maghreb	that	a	justification	for	the	integration	of	Algerian	Muslims	into	French	society	will	be	made.	Ismael	Hamet	maintains	that	it	is	crucial	to	know	the	character,	from	a	religious	point	of	view,	of	the	Muslim	inhabitants	of	the	Maghreb.274		
																																																								273	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	269.		274	Ibid.		
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The	importance	for	Ismael	Hamet	of	the	current	practice	and	the	specific	context	of	Algerian	Islam	is	further	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	he	was	intensely	dismissive	of	those	French,	and	other	European,	intellectuals	who	would	claim	to	find	in	the	Qur’an	the	reasons	for	the	behaviour	or	psychology	of	Muslims.	He	states	that	it	is	most	commonly	through	translations	of	the	Qur’an	or	the	Hadiths	that	these	individuals	make	their	analysis	of	the	“Muslim	soul”.	Their	conclusions	are	reached,	he	claims,	by:			
…en	invoquant	tel	ou	tel	verset,	en	dehors	des	lumières	de	l’Histoire	et	des	Commentaires,	on	aboutit	
à	une	psychologie	arbitraire,	puisqu’on	admet	que	tous	les	actes	des	Musulmans	s’inspirent,	à	la	
lettre,	des	versets	du	Livre.		(…citing	this	or	that	verse,	outside	the	light	of	history	or	the		commentary,	leading	to	an	arbitrary	religious	psychology,	since	it	is	possible	that	all	actions	made	by	Muslims	are	inspired,	to	the	letter,	by	the	verses	of	the	Book.)275		Hamet	largely	wishes	to	refute	the	idea	that	Islam	can	be	viewed	as	a	monolithic	or	universal,	especially	as	regards	current	practice	in	Algeria.	He	writes	that	the	influence	of	particular	Islamic	practices	has	historically	been	varied	and	that	Islam	must	be	seen	as	an	evolutionary	faith	and	not	a	static	one.276	This	position	is	also	what	underpinned	Hamet’s	discussions	of	the	history	of	North	Africa,	and	Algeria	in	particular,	where	he	emphasized	a	cyclical	process	of	migration	and	cultural	transfer.			
C'est	ainsi	que	le	régime	maraboutique	a	été	une	phase	de	l'évolution	du	Maghreb	musulman	et	que	
le	régime	de	la	domination	française	qui	lui	a	succédé	en	est	une	autre.		
																																																								275	Ibid,	268.		276	Ibid,	269.		
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(Thus	the	Marabout	regime	was	a	phase	in	the	evolution	of	the	Islamic	Maghreb	and	the	regime	of	French	domination,	which	succeeded	it,	is	another.)277		Thus	in	walking	his	reader	through	the	history	of	Islam	in	the	Maghreb,	and	Algeria	in	particular,	from	its	beginnings	up	to	the	present,	Ismael	Hamet	intended	to	accomplish	three	things:	the	first	was	to	show	the	particular	historical	circumstances	that	led	to	the	domination	of	the	marabouts	in	religious	matters.	The	second	was	to	indicate	by	way	of	his	historical	narrative	the	flexible	and	evolutionary	nature	of	Islam,	and	finally	to	provide	evidence	of	the	realities	of	Islamic	practice	as	it	exists	in	contemporary	Algeria.	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter	it	is	useful	to	look	at	only	Ismael	Hamet’s	third	goal	as	it	best	represents	his	approach	in	contradistinction	to	his	Ottoman	contemporaries.			Despite	references	to	the	historic	virtues	of	Islam	Ismael	Hamet’s	defense	fundamentally	rests	on	the	argument	that	Islamic	society	is	amenable	to	French	secularization.	He	writes	that	European	skepticism	has	certainly	had	an	influence	on	Muslim	Algerians,	but	that	they	still	retain	an	attachment	to	many	of	the	outward	displays	involved	in	Islam.	He	is	very	clear	that	these	Muslims	have	not	renounced	their	beliefs.	He	writes:		
…ce	n'est	pas	de	l'incroyance,	ce	n'est	pas	encore	de	la	libre	pensée,	mais	c'est	de	la	tiédeur.		(…it	is	not	disbelief,	nor	is	it	yet	free	thought,	but	it	is	lukewarm.)278		This	goes	to	the	heart	of	Ismael	Hamet’s	argument	that,	far	from	presenting	a	barrier	to	progress,	modernization	and	ultimately	full	integration	and	equality,																																																									277	Ibid.		278	Ibid,	285.		
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Islam,	in	the	face	of	modernizing	influence	would	slowly	fade	in	intensity.	He	disputes	the	beliefs	of	Henri	de	Castries,	a	French	scholar	whose	work	was	influential	in	the	period,	that	while	some	Islamic	practices	may	be	declining	the	Muslim	is	still	incapable	of	free	thought.279	Interestingly	Ahmed	Rıza	would	use	the	work	of	this,	in	his	words,	distinguished	writer	(écrivain	distingue)	to	support	his	argument	in	his	article	La	Tolérance	Musulmane.280	Ismael	Hamet’s	defense	of	Islam	is	inherently	optimistic.	He	does	not	desire	to	argue	merely	that	Islam,	and	by	extension	Muslim	Algerians,	can	be	integrated	into	French	society,	but	that	they	are	perfectly	able,	as	Muslims,	to	achieve	full	social,	cultural	and	intellectual	equality	with	the	French.				The	period	from	1909-1914	saw	a	growth	in	the	number	of	Algerian	writers	contributing	to	French	journals	such	as	La	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman.	In	the	pages	of	these	journals	the	authors	found	a	space	to	address	issues	ranging	from	French	colonial	policy	to	Islamic	law	to	questions	of	fanaticism	and	backwardness	in	Algerian	society.	In	a	sense	the	Algerians	picked	up	where	the	Ottomans	left	off.	As	the	Young	Turks	and	other	Ottoman	writers	began	to	focus	more	exclusively	on	contemporary	politics	in	their	French	language	publications	these	Young	Algerians	were	using	their	printed	platform,	much	as	the	Ottomans	did	in	the	period	before	1902,	to	engage	in	the	same	reasoned	debates	about	the	compatibility	of	Islam	and	modern	civilization.			
																																																								279	Ibid,	286.		280	Ahmed	Rıza,	“La	Tolérance	Musulmane”,	305.		
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Ismael	Hamet’s	criticism	lay	in	the	practitioners,	not	in	the	religion	itself.	He	preferred	that	Islam	be	separated	from	secular	society	and	stated	that:	“…the	confusion	of	religious	and	civil	law	condemns	the	Muslim	to	a	place	outside	of	modern	civilization.”281	Hamet	urged	the	French	to	see	Islam	stripped	down	to	its	fundamental	principles	and	to	judge	the	Algerian	Muslim	not	by	his	beliefs	but	by	his	actions.	In	his	conclusion	Hamet	stated	that:	“This	unification	(of	Algerian	society)	that	was	formerly	undertaken	by	the	Muslim	religious	castes,	on	the	basis	of	Islamic	civilization,	will	be	made	on	the	basis	of	French	civilization.”282	For	Hamet	Islam	must	be	pushed	into	the	private	realm,	stripped	of	all	superstitious	elements	and	made	compatible	with	French	society.			Hamet	used	his	position	as	an	academic	authority	in	the	pages	of	French	journals	to	advance	this	belief	and	lobby	on	behalf	of	his	countrymen	and	against	their	perceived	unsuitability,	on	religious	grounds,	for	civilization.	In	an	article	on	the	practice	of	polygamy	in	Algeria	Hamet	emphasizes	the	practice’s	links	to	nomadism.283	This	was	also	a	clear	indication	of	his	debt	to	Ibn	Khaldun	and	his	theories	regarding	the	division	of	society	into	sedentary	and	nomadic	groups.	For	Hamet	much	of	what	Europeans	considered	the	negative	practices	of	Islam	were	merely	the	result	of	social,	cultural	and	environmental	conditions	that,	if	altered,	would	result	in	the	rapid	decrease	and	eventual	disappearance	of	these	practices.	This	was	one	of	the	key	themes	of	Hamet’s	writings	and	it	underpinned	nearly	all	of	his	articles.	It	was	in	this	way	that	he	presented	himself	as	the	
																																																								281	Ibid.		282	Ibid,	313.	283	Hamet,	Ismael.	“Des	Conditions	sociales	de	la	vie	nomade	chez	les	Musulmans	africains	–	Les	causes	déterminantes	de	la	Polygamie”	L’Islam	July-August,	1909.	
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insider	authority,	speaking	almost	from	the	position	of	the	anthropologist,	countering	abstract	and	textual	European	assumptions	about	Islam	with	the	reality	on	the	ground.			He	advanced	this	theory	vis-à-vis	polygamy	without	straying	into	the	dangerous	territory	of	claiming	that	any	of	the	proscriptions	or	regulations	in	the	Qur’an	were	incorrect	by	reminding	his	readers	that	polygamy	was	always	an	optional	practice,	strictly	regulated,	which,	by	his	reasoning,	meant	that	under	different	circumstances	the	choice	or	need	to	practice	polygamy	would	no	longer,	or	very	rarely,	be	made.	He	writes	that:	“It	follows	that	where	it	is	no	longer	necessary,	the	plurality	of	wives	decreases	or	disappears	naturally.”284	He	reiterates	this	same	point	in	a	later	article	in	the	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman	from	1913	where	he	wrote	that	polygamy	was	allowed	but	not	recommended	precisely	because	it	imposed	a	societal	form	that	was	only	appropriate	under	certain	circumstances,	specifically	nomadic	ones.285	According	to	Hamet	the	very	fact	that	polygamy	was	more	widely	practiced	by	nomadic	groups	in	North	Africa	was	proof	that	it	was	not	an	inherent	and	eternal	part	of	Islamic	society.			Similarly	in	a	1910	issue	of	L’Islam	Ismael	Hamet	was	a	member	of	a	panel	discussion	on	the	rarity	of	human	figures	in	Islamic	art.	In	discussing	this	topic	Hamet	begins,	like	many	of	his	co-panelists,	by	discussing	the	Qur’anic,	and	ultimately	Mosaic,	roots	of	the	prohibition	against	the	representations	of	human	figures	in	Islamic	art.	He	then	moves	to	point	out	that	despite	these	prohibitions																																																									284	Ibid.	184.		285	Hamet,	Ismael.	“Les	Musulmanes	de	l’Afrique	du	Nord”,	Revue	du	Monde	
Musulman,	1913,	286.		
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there	was	great	variation	in	their	interpretation	and	points	out	the	common	appearance	of	human	and	animal	figures	in	the	art	of	Muslim	India,	Persia	and	Spain.	As	with	his	discussions	of	polygamy	Hamet	takes	great	pains	to	remind	his	readers	that	there	is	often	a	gap	in	the	Qur’an	between	the	letter	and	the	spirit	of	the	law.	Hamet	writes	that:	“It	is	necessary	here,	as	with	everything	related	to	religious	requirements,	to	consider	the	text	and	how	it	is	observed	in	practice.”286					This	is	essentially	the	same	argument	that	Hamet	makes	with	regards	to	polygamy.	Islamic	practice	cannot	be	viewed	in	absolute	terms	and	certain	practices	that	are	common	in	the	Islamic	world	should	not	be	viewed	as	inherently	or	universally	Islamic.	To	bolster	this	argument	he	gives	the	example	of	modern	Morocco	where,	despite	clear	Qur’anic	prohibitions	against	it,	the	distilling	and	consumption	of	alcohol	was	widely	tolerated	but	portrait	painting	and	photography	were	seen	as	suspect.287	Hamet	attributed	this	apparent	contradiction	to	ignorance	and	superstition	not	religion.	The	young	and	the	ignorant	were	opposed	to	painting	and	photography	not	because	they	were	Muslim	but	because	they	were	ignorant.	Again,	as	with	polygamy	the	unstated	but	clearly	implied	point	is	that	it	is	only	a	lack	of	education	that	holds	these	people	back	and	determines	their	behaviour,	not	Islam.	To	close	the	article	and	round	off	his	point	he	cited	the	newly	opened	Egyptian	School	of	Fine	Arts	as	an	example	of	the	triumph	of	civilization	and	liberalism.288	These	treatments	of	
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aspects	of	Islamic	culture	served	to	reinforce	its	flexibility	and	adaptability	and	ultimately	its	ability	to	form	part	of	a	common	French-Algerian	identity.			Many	of	these	same	ideas	concerning	the	practice	and	influence	of	Islam	were	reflected	in	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi’s	work	L’Esprit	Libéral	du	Coran.	Like	Ismael	Hamet,	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi	was	focused	on	presenting	a	view	of	Islam	that	showed	it	to	be	compatible	with	modernization	and	that	it	should	not	be	viewed	as	an	impediment	to	progress.	Like	his	Algerian	and	Ottoman	counterparts	this	work	was	published	in	Paris	and	intended	for	consumption	by	a	European	audience.			Abdelaziz	Thaalbi	chooses	to	begin	his	work	by	pointing	to	the	advancements	made	by	Egypt	in	the	nineteenth	century	as	evidence	of	Islam’s	compatibility	with	modernization.289	This	example	is	meant	to	convey	the	ability	of	the	state	to	influence	the	way	in	which	the	Qur’an	is	interpreted.	For	Thaalbi,	a	liberal	and	enlightened	ruler	or	state	can	ensure	a	liberal	and	correct	interpretation	of	the	Qur’an.			Thaalbi	focuses	much	of	his	work	on	explaining	that	the	various	ways	in	which	the	original	conception	of	Islam	has	been	corrupted.	Unlike	his	contemporaries	in	Egypt,	such	as	Muhamamd	Abduh,	he	does	this	not	to	suggest	a	return	to	a	classical	Islamic	lifestyle,	but,	like	Ahmed	Rıza,	to	show	how	this	originalist	Islam	is	perfectly	compatible	with	Western	society.	He	writes	in	favour	of	the	suppression	of	the	veil	and	declares	it	akin	to	the	spread	of	progress	and	
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civilization	as	well	as	“…the	reconsitution	of	Muslim	society	as	it	was	in	the	times	of	the	Prophet	and	his	companions,	that	is	to	say,	as	European	society.”290			The	comparison	between	first	Caliphs	and	modern	elected	leaders	as	well	as	the	role	of	Islamic	society	in	spreading	classical	thought	to	the	West	is	also	emphasized.291	In	this	sense	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi’s	work	treads	much	the	same	ground	as	Ismael	Hamet	and	Ahmed	Rıza’s.	It	places	nearly	all	the	blame	for	the	current	negative	perceptions	of	Islam	on	the	various	Muslim	brotherhoods	and	holy	men	who	are	responsible	for	spreading	ignorance,	superstititon,	and	fanaticism	among	the	Muslim	populations	of	North	Africa.292	He	also	locates	the	solution	to	this	problem	in	education	and	the	creation	of	an	elite	that	will	encourage	intermingling	and	the	breaking	down	of	confessional	and	class	barriers.293				But	in	many	ways	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi’s	is	a	more	sophisticated	analysis	and	explanation	of	Islam’s	virtues.	Unlike	either	Ismael	Hamet	or	Ahmed	Rıza,	he	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	the	spiritual	and	the	political	in	his	discussion	of	Islamic	culture.	For	Thaalbi	it	is	wrong	to	consider	Islam	as	a	faith	that	specifically	condones	or	requires	violence.	He	stresses	that	the	wars	of	the	early	Islamic	period	were	political	in	nature	and	not	driven	by	faith	alone.294	Islam,	for	him,	is	highy	susceptible	to	misinterpretation	and	exploitation	by	rulers	who	would	seek	to	use	it	to	justify	their	own	aims.	He	claims	that	the	verses	in	the																																																									290	Ibid,	12.		291	Ibid,	28-35.		292	Ibid,	66.	293	Ibid,	67.		294	Ibid,	83.		
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Qur’an	directed	against	Jews	and	pagans	are	not	directed	against	followers	of	those	beliefs	in	general,	but	against	specific	political	enemies	of	the	early	Muslims,	rooted	in	a	particular	historical	context.295	For	Abdelaziz	Thaalbi	ensuring	the	correct	interpretation	of	the	Qur’an	is	part	of	the	project	of	modernization	in	North	Africa.	Like	Ismael	Hamet	and	Ahmed	Rıza	this	analysis	seeks	to	ensure	equal	participation	in	the	modernization	project	and	to	integrate	Islamic	beliefs	into	its	achievement.			Islam	remained	one	of	most	seemingly	insurmountable	differences	between	the	societies	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	North	Africa	and	their	European	neighbors.	Throughout	their	works	these	writers	sought	to	refute	claims	that	Islam	was	inherently	antithetical	to	progress	and	development	as	defined	by	the	West.	In	the	pages	of	their	French-language	writings	they	provided	evidence	of	early	and	medieval	Islam’s	accomplishments	and	worked	to	trace	continuities	with	a	classical	past	that	was	revered.	This	defense	was	a	matter	of	self-assertion	and	reflected	a	declaration	of	intent	in	the	face	of	often	overwhelming	criticism.	By	feeling	the	need	to	defend	Islam	to	their	readers	they	made	it	part	of	their	identity.	Both	Muslim	and	non-Muslim	alike	found	himself	where	Islam	as	something	inextricably	linked	to	grappling	with	the	question	of	what	makes	an	Algerian,	Tunisian	or	an	Ottoman	became	essential.				 																																																										295	Ibid,	84.		
	 118	
Chapter	3		
Making	Ottomans	and	Frenchmen:	Forms	and	
Constructions	of	Identity			 			Throughout	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	Ottoman	and	North	African	writers	and	intellectuals	struggled	to	conceptualize	and	articulate	their	present	and	future	within	the	modern	European	state	system.		A	large	part	of	this	future	was	the	changing	loci	of	power	and	loyalty	that	needed	to	be	addressed	in	the	wake	of	European	nationalism.	Ottomans	and	French	North	African	writers	enmeshed	in	a	French	journalistic	and	intellectual	milieu	frequently	dealt	with	issues	of	identity,	equality	and	the	desire	for	a	workable	shared	patriotism	that	could	overcome	differences	in	race	and	religion.	At	the	same	time	these	individuals	occupied	themselves	with	talk	of	how	this	could	be	accomplished	and	the	changes	that	would	be	required	to	bring	their	respective	territories	in	line	with	European	states	in	a	manner	that	suited	their	unique	origins	and	composition.			In	this	chapter	I	intend	to	explore	the	relationship	between	the	conceptualization	of	a	shared	Ottoman	identity	that	included	both	Muslims	and	non-Muslims	and	that	of	a	common	French	identity	expanded	to	include	Muslim	Algeria	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century.	These	ideas	will	be	examined	in	the	context	of	the	shared	cultural,	political	and	linguistic	space	of	
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French-language	publishing.	This	chapter	will	trace	the	development	and	diversity	of	conceptions	of	Ottomanism	and	link	it	to	parallel	ideas	of	French	identity	being	advanced	from	Algeria.	While	the	case	of	Algeria	is	obviously	substantively	different	from	that	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	terms	of	the	power	dynamics	between	colonizer	and	colonist,	both	groups	of	writers	used	their	French	language	publications	to	try	and	engage	European	public	opinion	in	what	they	considered	to	be	crucial	debates	over	national	identity.				I	will	try	to	avoid	overemphasis	on	the	particular	political	affiliation	of	particular	writers.	One	reason	for	this	is	that	unnecessary	focus	on	certain	figures’	affiliation	as	‘Young	Turks’	or	members	of	the	Committee	for	Union	and	Progress	would	create	a	lopsided	analysis	as	no	similarly	defined	opposition	groups	existed	for	many	of	the	Algerian	writers	at	the	time.	While	the	Young	Turks	can	be	considered	a	clearly	defined	faction	within	the	exile	opposition	to	Sultan	Abdülhamid,	the	term	‘Young	Algerians’,	while	in	use,	was	a	much	more	vague	term	that	technically	applied	to	any	member	of	the	Muslim	Algerian	elite	who	was	French-educated.296	Additionally	I	want	to	avoid	essentializing	certain	ideologies	as	‘Young	Turk’	or	otherwise.	The	intent	of	this	chapter	is	to	analyze	ideas	as	they	emerged	within	the	common	space	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	French-language	publishing	and	not	necessarily	as	the	positions	of	particular	political	factions.			This	chapter	will	begin	with	a	discussion	of	Ottomanism	as	it	emerged	in	the	French	language	publications	of	the	1890’s.	From	there	I	will	integrate	the																																																									296	Saadallah,	69-70.		
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writings	of	Algerian	intellectuals	as	they	emerged	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century.	I	argue	that	the	discussion	of	an	inclusive	Ottoman	and	French	identity	were	much	more	diverse	and	long	lasting	than	is	often	stated.	Rather	than	being	an	early	step	that	faded	into	intellectual	obscurity	as	part	of	a	chain	leading	to	a	‘pan’	identity	(either	pan-Islamist	or	pan-Turkist)	and	finally	to	ethnic	(Turkish,	Arab)	or	territorial	(Algerian)	nationalism,	Ottomanism	and	Frenchness	developed	in	parallel	to	these	competing	identities,	reacting	and	developing	in	relation	to	them	and	maintaining	real	intellectual	strength	until	the	start	of	the	First	World	War.			
Ottomans	and	Frenchmen		The	intellectual	elites	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	sought	to	engage	with	the	press	culture	of	France,	and	Europe	more	broadly,	to	put	forward	and	refine	their	ideas	about	identity	and	reform.	A	great	part	of	their	concern	was	how	to	fashion	a	durable	national	identity	that	would	transcend	the	enormous	ethnic	and	religious	diversity	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	on	the	one	hand	and	the	colonial	realities	of	French	North	Africa	on	the	other.297	During	the	period	under	discussion	(1890-1914)	Ottomanism	has	often	been	approached	as	a	failed	identity	along	with	pan-Islamism	that	was	inevitably	replaced	by	fragmented	nationalisms	(Arab,	Turkish,	Armenian	etc…).	As	mentioned	above	much	of	this	secondary	work	focuses	on	Ottoman	Levantines	and	Egyptians,	often	non-Muslim	and	their	attempts	to	come	to	grips	with	a	sense	of	loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	State	in	a	period	of	burgeoning	Arab	nationalism.		
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Conceptualizations	of	Ottomanism	varied	with	the	individuals	articulating	them.	Turkish	Muslims,	non-Turkish	Muslims,	Greek	and	Armenian	Christians,	Jews	and	others	all	approached	the	idea	of	Ottoman	identity	slightly	differently	based	on	their	relationship	to	the	centre	of	power.	What	is	most	interesting,	however,	is	how	slight	these	variations	actually	were.	For	those	willing	to	embrace,	at	least	journalistically,	the	idea	of	Ottomanism	there	seemed	to	be	a	fairly	broad	consensus	as	to	what	this	would	entail.	A	reason	for	this	may	be	rooted	in	the	fact	that	among	the	myriad	journals	and	pamphlets	that	expressed	some	form	of	Ottomanism	very	few	provided	any	sort	of	blueprint	as	to	how	this	new	identity	would	precisely	function	and	be	sustained	in	practice.			Ottomanism	as	a	political	ideology	is	difficult	to	clearly	and	consistently	define.	Throughout	the	late	Ottoman	period	it	developed	and	evolved	and	was	voiced	from	numerous	vantage	points	within	the	Empire:	from	Muslim	and	non-Muslim,	Arab	and	Turk,	Greek	and	Armenian.	This	being	the	case	the	source	material	for	much	of	the	work	done	on	Ottomanism	comes	in	the	form	of	published	material,	such	as	newspapers,	books	and	pamphlets	through	which	a	wide	variety	of	Ottoman	intellectuals,	politicians	and	activists	attempted	to	articulate	what	they	believed	Ottomanism	entailed.	Studies	rarely	rely	heavily	on	official	political	documents	to	define	Ottomanism,	in	part	because	so	few	provide	any	sort	of	satisfactory	definition	of	Ottomanism	that	transcends	the	time	they	were	written.	In	this	sense	Ottomanism	is	a	much	more	difficult	concept	to	profile	than	other	types	of	nationalism	or	ideologies	such	as	Communism.	In	fact	it	is	debatable	as	to	whether	Ottomanism	can	even	be	described	as	a	form	of	nationalism	in	the	modern	sense.	There	was	never	any	generally	agreed	upon	
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vision	of	what	Ottomanism	would	entail,	no	manifesto	or	widely	accepted	official	doctrine.	This	being	said	there	are	certain	broad	characteristics	that	can	be	applied.	It	is	possible	to	agree	that	those	individuals	who	claimed	to	subscribe	to	the	ideal	of	Ottomanism	felt	some	sense	of	general	‘Ottoman	patriotism’	and	believed	strongly	in	maintaining	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	Empire.	Beyond	this	the	intellectual	content	of	Ottomanism	remains	as	varied	as	the	individuals	who	espoused	it.					Ottomanism	as	it	appears	in	the	historiography	can	be	divided	roughly	into	two	sections:	the	first	is	the	study	of	Ottomanism	as	it	appeared	in	the	First	Constitutional	Period	and	the	earlier	Tanzimat	policies	of	Ali	and	Fuad	Paşa,	with	special	attention	paid	to	the	Islahat	Fermanı	(Reform	Edict)	of	1856,	which	granted	full	equality	to	Muslims	and	non-Muslims	with	respect	to	civil	and	political	rights.298	The	concept	of	Ottoman	equality	as	an	officially	enshrined	legal	policy	during	the	period	from	1856-1876	has	been	thoroughly	studied	in	numerous	works	on	Ottoman	reform.299	The	second	is	the	study	of	Ottomanism	in	the	context	of	emerging	Arab	and	Turkish	nationalism,	both	during	the	Hamidian	and	Second	Constitutional	periods,	until	the	end	of	the	First	World	War.	These	are	obviously	very	broad-brush	categories,	however,	as	dominant	
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historiographical	trends	they	will	be	useful	in	making	sense	of	in	what	contexts	Ottomanism	is	analyzed	as	a	historical	phenomenon.			As	a	specific	ideology	and	aspect	of	Ottoman	intellectual	thought,	however,	Ottomanism	during	this	period	is	generally	approached	through	the	lens	of	a	group	of	Muslim	intellectuals	known	as	the	Young	Ottomans.	This	group	of	intellectuals	was	active	in	the	1860s	and	1870s	and	many	were	products	of	the	Ottoman	bureaucracy,	especially	the	Translation	Bureau,	and	shared	a	common	knowledge	of	European	civilization.300	The	intellectual	and	political	reactions	of	this	group	of	individuals,	through	their	newspapers,	pamphlets	and	even	novels	and	plays,	to	the	changes	brought	on	by	the	Tanzimat	statesmen	forms	the	basis	for	an	analysis	of	Ottomanism.			Şerif	Mardin’s	The	Genesis	of	Young	Ottoman	Thought	still	remains	one	of	the	definitive	works	on	the	subject.	In	this	work	the	concept	of	Ottomanism	is	approached	as	both	a	policy	of	the	government	of	Fuad	and	Ali	Paşa	and	as	an	ideology	conceptualized	and	articulated	by	the	Young	Ottomans	as	a	reaction	to	this	policy.	Mardin	portrays	the	Ottomanism	of	the	government	as	largely	a	pragmatic	gesture	to	appease	the	European	powers,	who	were	becoming	more	and	more	involved	in	the	affairs	of	the	Empire’s	Christian	populations,	and	therefore	remove	one	of	the	most	common	justifications	for	European	interference	in	Ottoman	domestic	affairs.301	What	emerges	in	Mardin’s	discussion	is	the	creation	of	an	Ottoman	nationality	out	of	necessity	and	not	
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desire.	This	is	echoed	in	the	work	of	Nazan	Çiçek’s,	which	stresses	the	importance	of	the	creation	of	a	universal	Ottoman	legal	status	as	a	prerequisite	for	the	Empire’s	entrance	into	the	‘Concert	of	Europe’	following	the	end	of	the	Crimean	War.302	It	is	largely	for	this	reason	that	the	official,	government-sanctioned	concept	of	Ottomanism	is	not	studied	in	any	real	depth	as	an	ideology	in	these	works.	There	appeared	to	be	very	little	intellectual	substance	behind	the	official	policy	of	Ottoman	equality	beyond	pressure	from	the	powers	and	nearly	wholesale	adoption	of	European	political	documents.303		In	contrast,	analysis	of	the	Young	Ottoman	reaction	and	response	to	Tanzimat	reforms,	particularly	the	Islahat	fermanı	of	1856,	offers	valuable	insight	into	articulations	of	Ottoman	identity.	Like	the	Ottomanism	of	Fuad	and	Ali	Paşa,	the	Ottomanism	of	the	Young	Ottomans	was	also	underpinned	by	the	pragmatic	belief	that	creating	a	strong	Ottoman	identity	was	necessary	to	ensure	the	continued	integrity	of	the	empire.	The	Young	Ottomans	were	motivated	by	an	intense	patriotism	that,	as	Mardin	says:	“…made	them	think	of	reform	for	Ottomans,	by	Ottomans	and	along	Islamic	lines.”304	This	Islamic	aspect	to	the	Young	Ottoman	conception	of	Ottomanism	is	crucial,	as	Mardin	and	Çiçek	make	clear,	for	understanding	the	roots	of	their	opposition	to	the	European-led	and	seemingly	un-Islamic	reforms	of	the	Tanzimat	statesmen.	The	Ottomanism	of	the	Young	Ottomans	emerges	as	fundamentally	Islamic	in	character.	It	is	a	patriotism	linked	to	the	figure	of	the	Sultan	and	the	House	of	Osman	in	their	capacity	as	symbols	of	Islamic	power.	The	Young	Ottoman	Namık	Kemal	emphasized	the																																																									302	Çiçek,	109.		303	Ibid.	118.		304	Mardin,	21.		
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importance	of	the	fatherland,	but	as	Şerif	Mardin	points	out,	was	never	exactly	clear	as	to	what	the	fatherland	consisted	of.305	Carter	Findley	also	points	out	that	while	the	Young	Ottomans	spoke	often	of	“the	people”	they	were	rarely	certain	exactly	who	“the	people”	were.306		In	the	second	historiographical	period,	roughly	1876-1918,	Ottomanism	began	to	be	approached	largely	as	an	intellectual	current	within	nascent	Arab	or	Turkish	nationalist	movements,	or,	alternatively,	as	an	aspect	of	both	the	nahda	or	the	Young	Turks.	Analysis	of	Ottomanism	in	the	context	of	Arab	intellectual	history	and	the	rise	of	Arab	nationalism	is	exemplified	in	the	works	of	Ernest	C.	Dawn	and	Albert	Hourani307,	who	profile	the	importance	of	Ottomanism	as	an	ideology	among	the	Arab	intellectuals	in	Egypt	and	the	Levant.	In	these	works	Ottomanism	is	presented	as	a	doomed	ideology,	one	whose	influence	would	inevitably	be	subsumed	under	the	pull	of	Arab	nationalism.			In	his	important	early	work	on	Ottomanism	and	Arab	nationalism,	Dawn	focuses	on	particularly	Islamic	character	to	Ottomanism	as	it	was	articulated	in	Egypt	and	the	Levant	during	the	late	nineteenth	century.	He	cites	the	work	of	Muhammad	Abduh	and	Muhammad	Rashid	Rida,	whose	Ottomanism	is	defined	by	loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	Sultan	as	Caliph	and	as	leader	of	the	strongest	
																																																								305	Ibid.	328.		306	Findley,	Carter.	“The	Advent	of	Ideology	in	the	Islamic	Middles	East	(Part	II),	
Studia	Islamica,	56	(1982),	155.		307	See	Ernest	C.	Dawn,	From	Ottomanism	to	Arabism:	Essays	on	the	Origins	of	
Arab	Nationalism,	(Urbana	IL:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1973)	and	Albert	Hourani,	Arabic	Thought	in	the	Liberal	Age:	1789-1939,	1962.		
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remaining	Islamic	state.308	For	Dawn	the	Ottomanism	of	these	Arab	intellectuals	was	primarily	pragmatic	as	they	saw	loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	State	as	necessary	to	preserve	the	integrity	of	the	empire,	which	in	turn	would	allow	for	an	Arab	revival.309	Dawn	distinguishes	between	the	conservative	Ottomanism	of	Abdülhamid	II	and	the	modernist	Ottomanism	of	the	Young	Turks,	but	sees	them	both	as	having	ideological	similarities	to	Arab	Ottomanism.	Dawn	identifies	a	second	strain	of	Ottomanism	within	the	Arab	Christian	intellectuals	of	the	time	that	was	more	secular	in	its	outlook	and	envisioned	a	shared	Arab	identity	as	sitting	comfortably	within	a	larger	shared	Ottoman	identity.310	Dawn	concludes	by	stating	that:	“Islam	was	as	much	at	the	center	of	Arabism	as	it	was	of	Ottomanism.”311			In	a	later	work	Dawn	defines	Ottomanism	as	one	of	two	ideologies	(the	other	being	Arabism)	competing	for	the	loyalty	of	the	Arab	subjects	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	the	decades	leading	up	to	the	First	World	War.312	Dawn	claims,	as	he	did	before,	that	the	central	concern	of	both	Arabism	and	Ottomanism	before	1914	was	a	defence	of	Islam	and	the	East	in	the	face	of	the	overwhelming	domination	of	the	Christian	West.	This	is	as	close	as	Dawn	gets	to	a	coherent	definition	of	Ottomanism:	an	ideology	that	was	largely	reactionary	and	defensive	and	that	had	a	decidedly	Islamic	character.	He	again	stresses	as	well	the	relative	pragmatism	of	Ottomanism	by	stating	that	those	elites	in	Syria	who	had	more	of																																																									308	Dawn,	Ernest	C.	“From	Ottomanism	to	Arabism:	The	Origin	of	an	Ideology”,	
The	Review	of	Politics,	23/3	(1961),	389-391.		309	Ibid.	392.		310	Ibid.	395.		311	Ibid.	399.	312	Dawn,	Ernest	C.	“The	Rise	of	Arabism	in	Syria”,	Middle	East	Journal,	16/2	(1962),	145.		
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a	vested	interest	in	the	Ottoman	State	were	Ottomanists	and	those	who	didn’t	were	Arabists.313	This	particular	thesis	has	recently	been	challenged	by	scholars	such	as	Mahmoud	Haddad	who	critiques	the	fact	that	Ottomanism	is	too	often	analyzed	as	merely	an	ideological	pragmatism	for	non-Turkish,	generally	Arab,	elements	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.314	Rather,	he	believed	that	a	sincere	commitment	to	an	over-arching	Ottoman	nationality	drove	many	Arabs	to	support	the	idea	after	1908.		Like	Dawn,	Butrus	Abu-Maneh	approaches	Ottomanism	as	an	ideology	both	entwined	with	and	competing	against	Arabism	or	Arab	nationalism.	He	defines	the	goal	of	the	Ottomanism	as	enshrined	in	the	policies	of	Fuad	and	Ali	Paşa	as	the	desire	to:	“…transfer	the	loyalty	of	the	non-Muslims	from	the	local	community	and	the	Ottoman	dynasty	to	the	fatherland	and	the	state.”315	Abu-Maneh	locates	the	failure	of	the	Ottomanism	to	become	a	viable	ideology	in	the	latter	part	of	the	nineteenth	century	to	the	policies	of	Abdülhamid	II	after	1876.316	Ottomanism	as	he	defines	it	as	a	strain	of	Arab	thought	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	concept	of	decentralization	and	regional	autonomy.	According	to	Abu-Maneh	Syrian	Arab	Christians	such	as	Butrus	Al-Bustani	found	Ottomanism	appealing	because	of	its	ability	to:	“…establish	the	identity	and	the	legal	status	of	the	subjects	upon	
																																																								313	Ibid.	163.		314	See	Mahmoud	Haddad,	“The	Rise	of	Arab	Nationalism	Reconsidered”,	in	
International	Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies,	26/2	(1994).	For	a	more	detailed	look	at	Ottomanism	in	the	Arab	provinces	see						315	Abu-Maneh,	287.	316	Abu-Maneh,	Butrus.	“Arab-Ottomanists’	Reactions	to	the	Young	Turk	Revolution,	in	Late	Ottoman	Palestine:	The	Period	of	Young	Turk	Rule.	Yuval	Ben-Bassat	and	Eyal	Ginio	eds.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2011,	148.		
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secular	ideals,	rather	than	upon	religious	belief.”317	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	Ottomanism	of	another	Levantine	Christian	Farid	Kassab	as	mentioned	by	Stephen	Wild	in	his	article	Ottomanism	versus	Arabism:	The	Case	of	Farid	Kassab	
(1884-1970).	Kassab’s	Ottomanism	is	not	defined	by	opposition	to	Abdülhamid	II	or	by	the	principle	of	total	civic	equality.318	Another	element	that	emerges	in	the	Ottomanism	of	many	of	the	figures	that	Abu-Maneh	is	their	conviction	that	a	common	language	was	needed	to	sustain	a	workable	Ottoman	identity.319	This	became	especially	important	to	smaller	ethnic	and	religious	groups	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	such	as	the	Empire’s	Jewish	population.			In	an	article	on	Ottoman	Sephardim	in	Palestine	Michelle	U.	Campos	highlights	their	embrace	of	Ottomanism	in	terms	of	its	ability	to	create	an	equal	citizenship	and	tear	down	communal	boundaries,	but	also	in	so	far	as	it	would	allow	for	a	degree	of	federalization.320	She	also	defines	the	Ottomanism	of	the	Sephardi	Jews	as	concerned	with	self-preservation,	and	that	embracing	this	ideology	as	a	method	of	preserving	life	under	an	“Ottoman	umbrella”	was	preferable	to	any	of	the	alternatives.321	Again	she	stresses	the	hybrid	nature	of	Ottomanism:	an	overarching	ideology	that	would	co-exist	comfortably	with	smaller,	more	localized	or	particular	ideologies.	In	the	case	of	the	Sephardim	this	other	
																																																								317	Abu-Maneh,	The	Christians	Between	Ottomanism	and	Syrian	Nationalism,	296.		318	Wild,	Stephen,	“Ottomanism	versus	Arabism:	The	Case	of	Farid	Kassab	(1884-1970)”,	Die	Welt	des	Islams	28/1/4	(1988),	622.		319	Abu-Maneh,	Arab-Ottomanists	Reactions,	155.		320	Campos,	Michelle	U.	“Between	“Beloved	Ottomania”	and	“The	Land	of	Israel”:	The	Struggle	over	Ottomanism	and	Zionism	among	Palestine’s	Sephardi	Jews,	1908-13”,	International	Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies,	37/4	(2005),	462.	See	also	Cohen,	Julia	Phillips.	Becoming	Ottomans:	Sephardi	Jews	and	Imperial	Citizenship	
in	the	Modern	Era.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014.		321	Ibid.	479.		
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ideology	was	Zionism.	What	Dawn,	Abu-Maneh	and	others	reflect	in	their	work	is	an	Ottomanism	that	is	highly	contextual.	As	investigations	of	Ottomanism	these	studies	are	often	limited	by	their	need	to	define	Ottomanism	in	the	context	of	the	group	or	individuals.	They	rarely	allow	for	comparison	and	thus	it	is	difficult	to	grasp	diversity	and	particularity	of	how	Ottomanism	was	defined	in	the	period.				In	the	second,	but	related,	half	of	this	historiographical	period	are	works	that	deal	with	Ottomanism	as	part	of	the	ideology	of	the	Young	Turks.	Prior	to	the	Young	Turk	revolution	of	1908	the	ideology	of	Ottomanism	existed	more	as	an	intellectual	exercise	rather	than	a	concrete	policy.	In	his	authoritative	works	on	the	Young	Turks	before	1908	Şükrü	Hanioğlu	explores	the	diversity	of	Ottomanism	as	a	doctrine	of	equality	through	the	writings	of	the	Young	Turks.322		Similarly	Wajda	Sendesni,	in	her	study	of	Ottomanism	as	it	appeared	in	the	Young	Turk	publications	in	Cairo	before	1908,	shows	that	the	relation	of	the	author(s)	to	the	dominant	ethnic	and	religious	group	impacted	their	conception	of	Ottomanism.	Newspapers	published	by	multi-ethnic	committees,	such	as	Şura-
yi	Osmanî,	tended	to	support	the	widest	and	most	secular	definition	of	Ottomanism.323	Conversely	others	were	only	concerned	with	the	fate	of	Anatolian	Muslims	or,	like	the	Egyptian	reformer	Mustafa	Kamil,	saw	Ottomanism	as	a	strategy	against	British	occupation.324	Like	the	Arabs	the	Young	
																																																								322	See	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition	and	Preparation	for	a	Revolution:	
The	Young	Turks,	1902-1908.		323	Sendesni,	Wajda.	“The	Young	Turks	and	the	Arabs	in	Egypt	between	Ottomanism,	Pan-Islamism	and	Nationalism”,	in	Penser,	agir	et	vivre	dans	
l’Empire	ottoman	et	en	Turquie.	Nathalie	Clayer	and	François	Georgeon	eds.	Paris:	Peeters,	2013,	34.		324	Ibid.	36.		
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Turks,	especially	once	in	power,	are	portrayed	as	embracing	Ottomanism	only	in	so	far	as	it	was	politically	advantageous	to	them.			In	his	analysis	of	the	major	Young	Turk	journals	in	the	post-1908	period	Masami	Arai	highlights	the	distinction	made	by	many	intellectual	at	the	times	between	pre-Tanzimat	Ottomanism,	which	was	strictly	Islamic	(umma	Ottomanism)	and	the	post-Tanzimat	Ottomanism	that	included	all	the	ethnic	groups	of	the	Empire.325	Arai	portrays	Ottomanism	as	a	vehicle	for	Turkish	primacy,	especially	after	the	defeats	of	the	Balkan	Wars.	However,	like	many	of	their	Arab	and	non-Muslim	counterparts	the	many	Young	Turks,	such	as	Ziya	Gökalp	believed	that	any	durable	national	identity	must	be	created	top-down	and	disseminated	through	education	and	a	shared	language.326	The	Ottomanism	of	the	Young	Turks	at	this	point	was	decidedly	anti-federalist	again	reflecting	the	importance	of	one’s	relationship	to	the	centre	of	power	in	determining	one’s	conception	of	Ottomanism.	The	historiography	of	Ottomanism	is	complex	and	the	multitude	of	angles	from	which	it	is	approached	makes	it	difficult	to	profile.	This	chapter	therefore	hopes	to	contribute	to	the	field	by	analyzing	Ottomanism	through	a	common	cultural	and	linguistic	lens	that	overlaps	with	particular	ethnic,	religious	or	political	ones.			
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Early	Ottoman	Engagement	with	the	Question	of	Identity	1888-1905	The	late	1880s	and	early	1890s	saw	the	first	Ottoman	publications	in	our	period	emerge	in	Paris	that	addressed	issues	of	identity.	One	of	the	earlier	Ottoman	publications	published	by	a	non-Muslim	from	this	period	was	L’Orient	(1888-1912),	which	was	edited	by	one	N.	Nicholaides,	who	also	edited	two	other	journals,	Le	Yildiz	and	La	Turquie	Contemporaine,	under	the	pseudonym	of	Demetrius	Georgiades.327	Hanioğlu	mentions	Nicholaides	as	an	example	of	an	émigré	publisher	who	was	inaccurately	considered	a	Young	Turk	by	observers	in	Europe.328	In	many	ways	Nicoliades	exemplified	Ottoman	engagement	with	French	press	culture,	as	he	was,	above	all,	concerned	with	perception	and	polemic	in	his	publications.	Following	a	reconciliation	with	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II329	L’Orient	reflected	a	shift	away	from	openly	declaring	itself	to	be	in	favour	of	Greek	interests	to	a	more	overtly	Ottomanist	position.	This	shift	to	a	more	Ottomanist	outlook	can	most	easily	be	seen	in	the	changing	subtitles	of	L’Orient	from	1888	until	1902.	When	it	first	emerged	in	1888	the	paper	was	termed	a	
Revue	Franco-Hellenique	and	its	subtitle	was	Organe	Spécial	des	Intérêts	Grecs.330	Following	his	reconciliation	with	the	Sultan	the	subtitle	was	changed	to	Organe	
spécial	des	Intérêts	Grecs	et	Orientaux331,	and	finally	in	1902	it	became	Journal	de	
défense	des	Intérêts	de	l’Empire	Ottoman.332	Here	we	can	see	the	progression	from	a	journal	committed	to	the	interests	of	Greeks,	albeit	ostensibly	within	an																																																									327	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	68.	Nicoliades	also	published	two	other	papers	under	his	own	name,	Les	Paillasses	Orientaux	(January-April	1893)	and	L’Abeille	du	Bosphore	(May-August	1893)	that	dealt	with	similar	topics	to	
L’Orient.	328	Ibid.		329	Ibid,	69.		330	L’Orient,	14	October	1888.		331	L’Orient,	5	January	1890.		332	L’Orient,	15	February	1902.		
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Ottoman	framework,	to	a	journal	that	presented	clear	loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	state.			In	the	first	issue	of	L’Orient	Nicholaides	declares	that	the	Greeks,	as	much	as	the	other	peoples	on	both	sides	of	the	Balkans,	should	have	a	special	publication	(un	
organe	spécial)	devoted	to	their	interests	in	Europe.333	Nicholaides	goes	on	to	dismiss	claims	that	the	journal	promotes	Greek	nationalism	or	revolution	and	proclaims	its	disposition	to	be	‘essentially	pacifistic’.334	A	noticeable	Francophilia	is	present	in	the	early	issues	of	L’Orient.	Nicholaides	speaks	glowingly	of	France’s	role	as	the	cultural	and	intellectual	cornerstone	of	Europe335	and	it	is	clear	that	he	believes	that	a	French-style	secular	identity	should	form	the	basis	for	any	future	Ottoman	identity.	As	the	journal	progressed	there	clearly	remained	some	confusion	over	its	position	vis-à-vis	Greek	nationalism.	In	a	message	to	subscribers	Nicholaides	offers	assurances	that	the	paper	in	no	way	supports	Greek	separatism,	which	he	believes	offers	little	benefit	to	Greece	and	would	cause	significant	damage	to	the	situation	in	Europe.336		He	qualifies	these	statements,	however,	by	saying	that	his	paper	is:		“…certainly	happy	to	balance	the	needs	of	Hellenism	with	its	respectful	attachment	to	the	Sovereign	reigning	now	and	with	wise	moderation	over	the	people	of	the	Turkish	East.”337		
																																																								333	N.	Nicholaides,	“A	Nos	Lecteurs”,	L’Orient,	14	October	1888.		334	Ibid.		335	Ibid.		336	N.	Nicholaides,	“Avis	aux	Abonnés	de	l’Orient”,	L’Orient,	5	January	1890.		337	Ibid.		
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Nicholiades’	position	as	it	develops	through	his	paper	in	its	first	years	of	publication	is	one	of	an	Ottomanism	that	still	holds	the	millet,	that	is,	a	defined	ethno-religious	community,	as	the	basic	unit	of	Ottoman	society.	Identification	and	political	action	in	the	pursuit	of	rights	on	purely	ethno-religious	or	confessional	grounds	is	acceptable	as	long	as	it	is	done	within	the	existing	Ottoman	framework.	Nicholaides	makes	no	appeal	to	a	shared	‘Ottoman’	identity	or	focal	point	for	loyalty	and	patriotism	beyond	the	figure	of	the	Sultan.		Interestingly,	and	a	possible	reason	for	their	publication	under	a	pseudonym,	the	other	papers	published	by	Nicholaides	at	this	time	present	a	much	more	familiar	Ottomanist	position.	La	Turquie	Contemporaine,	which	appeared	in	April	of	1891	carries	the	subtitle	Organe	de	la	Jeune	Turquie,	which	immediately	gives	it	a	more	adversarial	flavour	than	L’Orient.	This	paper,	published	under	Nicolaides	pseudonym	of	Demetrius	Georgiades	was	meant	largely	as	a	provocation	to	the	Sultan	who	clearly	recognized	the	importance	of	public	opinion	in	Europe.338		Digging	deeper	into	the	introductory	article,	however,	reveals	that	the	main	focus	of	the	paper	are	the	political	and	economic	questions	of	the	Ottoman	Eastern	Mediterranean.339	Like	L’Orient	the	paper’s	avowed	Ottomanism	is	largely	reactionary	and	a	response	to	accusations	of	separatist	goals.	It	claims	that	the	interests	that	the	paper	represents,	that	is	Ottoman	Greeks,	have	never	demanded	that	Europe	work	to	banish	the	Muslims	that	reside	in	its	territory	and	like	many	others	they	appeal	to	the	shared	roots	in	Asia	Minor	of	Turks	and	Greeks.340																																																											338	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	70.	339	“Au	Lecteur”,	La	Turquie	Contemporaine,	20	April	1891.		340	Ibid.		
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A	workable	Ottomanism	here	emerges	as	necessary	for	the	advancement	of	the	Empire.	The	paper	claims	that	they	call	on	all	enlightened	men	regardless	of	race	or	creed	to	form	a	powerful	league	that	will	lift	out	of	décrépitude	so	brave	and	hardworking	a	population.341	There	is	a	belief	implicit	here	that	any	sort	of	effective	Ottoman	unity	must	come	from	above.	Like	many	of	his	Young	Turk	counterparts	Nicholaides	is	well	aware	that	this	Ottomanism	must	be	created.	As	a	template	for	Ottoman	solidarity	Nicholaides	mentions	the	Russian	and	Austro-Hungarian	Empires	as	examples	and	insists	that	in	the	face	of	aggressive	and	ambitious	neighbours	the	diverse	citizens	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	cannot	afford	to	splinter	along	national	lines.342	Ottomanism	here	becomes	not	merely	a	means	to	progress	but	necessary	for	survival.			Very	little	appears	in	this	first	issue	of	La	Turquie	Contemporaine	regarding	how	an	Ottoman	identity	could	be	implemented	or	sustained.	Much	of	the	discussion	centres	on	the	tyranny	of	the	Sultan	and	the	corruption	of	the	Ottoman	state,	which	is	hardly	surprising	given	the	paper’s	ultimate	purpose	as	a	tool	to	extort	money	from	the	Ottoman	State.	However,	later	issues	at	least	attempt	to	offer	more	concrete	solutions	to	the	problem	of	Ottoman	nationality.	One	of	the	main	barriers	to	an	effective	Ottoman	nationality	according	to	Nicholaides,	in	this	paper	of	course	writing	under	his	pseudonym,	is	the	political	power	of	the	Sultan	as	Caliph.	In	his	article	he	calls	for	the	separation	of	political	authority	from	the	office	of	Caliph.343	Nicholaides	calls	for	a	secularization	of	political	power	and	
																																																								341	Ibid.		342	Ibid.		343	N.	Nicholaides,	“La	Turquie	Contemporaine	II”,	La	Turquie	Contemporaine,	1	May	1891.	
	 135	
sees	this	as	essential	for	the	creation	of	a	political	system	that	would	benefit	all	Ottoman	citizens.344	The	role	of	the	Sultan	as	a	politico-religious	ruler	was	preventing	the	creation	of	an	effective	national	assembly.	In	a	rare	instance	of	clear	policy	Nicholaides	states	that	such	an	assembly	would	have	to	be	based	on	proportional	representation	by	ethnic	and	religious	group.	Finally	he	warned	that	this	situation	allowed	Abdülhamid	to	sacrifice	the	interests	of	the	state	in	order	to	re-establish	the	“theocratic	and	barbarous	power	of	the	Caliphate”	(pouvoir	théocratique	et	barbare	du	califat).345				At	the	same	time	that	these	articles	were	being	published	in	the	L’Orient	another	Ottoman,	Abdul	Halim	Memdouh	(Abdülhalim	Memduh)	attempted	to	speak	in	favour	of	Ottoman	solidarity	in	his	journal	Le	Libéral	Ottoman.	Abdul	Halim	was	not	officially	aligned	with	any	of	the	major	Young	Turk	factions	and	the	subtitle	of	his	newspaper,	Organe	des	Revendications	du	Peuple	Ottoman,	reflected	his	desire	to	present	his	paper	as	a	universally	‘Ottoman’	publication.		The	first	issue	appeals	to	the	narrative	of	communal	suffering	as	a	basis	for	Ottoman	unity.	Memduh	wrote:	“all	Ottomans	regardless	of	race	or	religion	have	suffered	under	the	yoke	of	this	nefarious	government.”346	However	apart	from	claiming	to	defend	all	oppressed	Ottomans	Memduh	offers	little	in	the	way	of	concrete	ideas.			One	of	the	few	writers	to	offer	something	approaching	a	manifesto	in	their	French	language	publications	prior	to	1908	was	Yusuf	Fehmi.	A	self-proclaimed																																																									344	Ibid.		345	Ibid.		346	Abdul	Halim	Memdouh,	Le	Libéral	Ottoman,	15	January	1901.		
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Young	Turk,	Yusuf	Fehmi	had	moved	to	Paris	in	1897	and	remained	there	until	his	death,	publishing	multiple	works	criticizing	the	Sultan	and,	after	1908	wrote	an	account	of	the	revolution	that	was	highly	critical	of	the	CUP	government.347	He	had	actually	split	with	Ahmed	Rıza	over	the	issue	of	foreign	involvement	in	precipitating	a	revolution	to	overthrow	the	Sultan.348	In	his	book	Tablettes	
Revolutionnaires	d’un	Jeune	Turc,	published	in	1903,	Fehmi	lays	out	at	the	beginning	a	list	of	reforms	for	the	Ottoman	state.	He	begins	quite	generally	with	a	demand	for	Liberty	and	equal	Justice	for	all	Ottomans.	Additionally	he	calls	for	the	release	of	all	political	prisoners	regardless	of	race	or	religion.349	This	is	important	as	it	shows	that	he	believes	that	even	those	non-Muslim	Ottomans	that	rebelled	against	the	government	should	be	able	to	participate	in	the	creation	of	a	new	Ottoman	identity.	Additionally	he	calls	for	all	the	major	groups	or	millets	within	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	band	together	to	form	a	national	assembly	that	would	include,	most	importantly,	universal	suffrage.	It	is	probable	that	Fehmi’s	rational	positivist	sympathies	led	him	to	support	direct	elections	rather	than	some	sort	of	quota	system	represented	the	different	millets.	While	he	doesn’t	go	into	a	great	amount	of	detail	Yusuf	Fehmi	is	notable	for	presenting	something	of	a	political	program.	This	list	would	be	repeated	in	subsequent	books	suggesting	that	his	ideas	failed	to	evolve.350			
	
																																																								347	Fehmi,	Yusuf.	La	Révoluton	Ottomane.	Paris:	V.	Girad	&	E.	Brière,	1911.		348	Hanioğlu,	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	91.	349	Fehmi,	Yusuf.	Tablettes	Révolutionnaires	d’un	Jeune	Turc.	Paris:	A.	Michalon,	1903,	68.		350	See	Yusuf	Fehmi,	Les	Coulisses	Hamidiennes	Dévoilées	par	un	Jeune	Turc,	Paris:	A	Michalon,	1904.	
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Arab,	Berber,	Turk?	The	Limits	of	Race	in	Identity	The	Young	Algerians	at	this	time	also	grappled	with	the	pressing	question	of	identity.	For	figures	such	as	Ismael	Hamet	and	Cherif	Benhabilés	the	articulation	of	a	common,	or	at	least	communal	identity	was	crucial	to	their	vision	for	the	future	of	French	Algeria.	Unlike	the	term	Young	Turk,	Young	Algerian	possessed	very	little	of	the	former	term’s	association	with	a	clearly	defined	political	or	intellectual	movement.351	“Young	Algerians”	were	usually	defined	as	those	Muslim	Algerians	who	were	French-educated	and	most	often	belonged	to	one	of	the	liberal	professions,	such	as	law	or	medicine.352	The	activities	of	those	who	could	be	called	‘Young	Algerians’	were	far	more	individually	driven	and	lacked	an	overarching	organisational	direction.	A	consequence	of	this	was	that	discussions	of	Algerian	identity	in	the	émigré	context	tended	to	also	be	highly	individualised.	They	were	rarely	produced,	especially	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	under	the	direction	of	a	particular	party	or	movement.			There	was	a	general	agreement	among	those	who	called	themselves,	or	were	called,	Young	Algerians	that	they	were	capable	of	becoming	fully	integrated	into	French	society.	The	main	difference	lay	in	how	they	envisioned	this	integration	unfolding.	All	Young	Algerians	admitted	that	colonialism	had	brought	certain	benefits	to	Algeria	and	the	more	assimilationist	among	them	were	willing	to	renounce	their	status	as	Muslims	in	order	to	receive	French	citizenship.353	For	the	majority	of	the	Young	Algerians,	however,	there	was	a	firm	belief	that	their																																																									351	Saadallah,	69-70.		352	There	is	a	certain	amount	of	disagreement	among	scholars	as	to	the	exact	characteristics	of	Young	Algerian	identity.		353	Saleh	el	Din	el	Zein	el	Tayeb,	“The	Europeanized	Algerians	and	the	Emancipation	of	Algeria”,	206.		
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identity	as	Muslims	was	not	incompatible	with	a	second	French	or	even	a	new	‘Algerian’	identity.	Like	many	of	their	Ottoman	counterparts	these	individuals	believed	that	a	common	identity	could	be	created	and	underpinned	by	secular	political	institutions	and	a	constitution	and	in	which	religion	would	be	relegated	to	the	private	sphere.354	However,	unlike	in	the	case	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	the	majority	of	the	discourse	surrounding	identity	and	citizenship	was	conducted	by	French	intellectuals	and	politicians	and	not	by	Muslim	Algerians	themselves.	The	activities	of	the	Young	Algerians	prior	to	the	First	World	War	were	in	many	ways	intended	to	create	a	space	for	discussion	of	these	issues	within	this	intellectual	sphere.355	Those	Young	Algerians	that	contributed	to	journals	or	published	their	own	works	used	the	platform	provided	to	them	by	their	education	and	use	of	the	French	language	to	make	their	case	to	a	European	audience.			Ismael	Hamet’s	1906	publication,	“Les	Musulmans	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique”,	represented	one	of	the	first	major	attempts	to	deal	with	the	question	of	Algerian	identity	in	a	French	metropolitan	context.	In	his	role	as	an	intellectual	Hamet	sought	to	engage	with	a	specific	French-metropolitan	intellectual	sphere,	effectively	bypassing	the	debates	going	on	in	the	colon	press	in	Algeria	itself.	Through	the	latter	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	the	assimilationist	efforts	of	the	French	government	had	the	unintended	consequence	of	further	emphasizing	differences	between	the	various	groups	in	Algeria.356	Hamet	used	his	French-language	writings	to	counter	the	apparent	colon	monopoly	on	defining	identity	in	Algeria.	His	position	sat	uneasily	between	the	abstract	universalism	of	elite																																																									354	Ageron,	Charles,	“Le	Mouvement	jeune-algerien”,	230.		355	Dunwoodie,	56.		356	Zack,	Lisbeth,	“French	and	Algerian	Identity	Formation	in	1890s	Algiers”,	120.		
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republican	theory	and	the	importance	of	a	territory-based	idea	of	citizenship357	and	the	more	cosmopolitan	understanding	of	Algerian	identity	that	existed	during	the	reign	of	Napoleon	III.358			As	was	explored	in	Chapter	1	this	work	dealt	extensively	with	the	history	of	North	Africa	along	with	the	impact	of	the	French	occupation	of	the	region,	but	with	a	specific	focus	on	Algeria.	A	further	focus	of	the	work,	however,	was	to	present	and	promote	his	conception	of	a	civic	identity	in	Algeria	to	his	French	audience.	Hamet	saw	the	notion	of	legal	and	political	equality	as	being	crucial	for	the	creation	of	workable	Franco-Algerian	identity.	An	important	aspect	of	Hamet’s	defence	of	the	ability	of	Muslim	Algerians	to	be	fully	integrated	into	French	society	was	his	rejection	of	immutable	racial	categories	that	determined	a	group’s	cultural,	intellectual	or	political	potential.	As	with	the	Ottomanism	expressed	by	many	non-Turkish	and	non-Muslim	Ottomans,	the	identity	conceived	of	by	Hamet	can	be	seen	as	embodying	a	desire	for	self-preservation.	It	was	not,	as	many	in	France	believed,	a	question	of	“preserving	the	name	of	their	race	and	the	mark	of	their	nature	as	a	form	of	protest.”359		Both	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	placed	a	strong	emphasis	on	inter-ethnic,	inter-cultural	and	inter-religious	harmony	when	discussing	Ottoman	or	Algerian/Franco-Algerian	identity.	Attached	to	this	was	a	complementary	emphasis	on	adaptation	and	evolution.	Identity	was	conceived	of	and	presented	
																																																								357	Ibid,	121.		358	Murray-Miller,	Gavin,	“A	Conflicted	Sense	of	Nationality:	Napoleon	III’s	Arab	Kingdom	and	the	Paradoxes	of	French	Multiculturalism”,	French	Colonial	History	Vol.	15	(2014),	3.		359	Ibid,	9.		
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as	a	process	and	a	progression.	It	was	not	something	necessarily	innate,	but	something	to	work	towards.			In	Chapter,	1	Hamet	used	his	discussion	of	the	history	of	North	Africa	to	make	a	calculated	political	point	to	his	French	audience.	The	long	sweep	of	migration	and	ethnic,	linguistic	and	cultural	mixing	that	characterised	the	history	of	North	Africa,	Hamid	argued,	rendered	European	theories	of	racial	superiority	untenable.	He	rejected	the	idea	that	one	could	speak	confidently	of	“pure	ethnic	groups”	in	Algeria,	or	even	in	France	for	that	matter.360	Hamid’s	interpretation	of	the	history	of	North	Africa	is	crucial	for	one	aspect	of	his	interpretation	of	Algerian	identity:	that	the	apparent	backwardness	of	Muslim	Algerians	is	the	result	of	changeable	factors	such	as	culture	and	weak	political	institutions	and	not	due	to	inherent	racial	characteristics.361	Like	certain	interpretations	of	Ottomanism,	such	as	that	articulated	by	Yusuf	Fehmi,	Hamet’s	‘Franco-Algerianism’	rested	on	the	belief	that	a	non-racial	or	religious	identity	can	be	created	by	providing	an	effective	cultural	and	intellectual	underpinning.			The	emphasis	on	the	cycle	of	invasion,	migration	and	cultural	transfer	and	the	ultimate	creation	of	a	new	civilization	allowed	Hamet	to	position	Muslim	Algerians	as	historically	prepared	to	absorb	elements	of	French	civilization	and	out	of	it	create	a	new	Algerian	identity.																																																												360	Hamet,	Ismael.	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	98.		361	Ismael	Hamet	would	carry	this	interpretation	of	North	African	and	Algerian	history	through	his	later	writings	up	until	1914.		
	 141	
He	writes:		
Nous	venons	de	voir,	dans	les	grandes	lignes,	l'histoire	séparée	des	Berbères	et	des	Arabes;	nous	
allons	essayer	de	démontrer	comment	les	deux	peuples	se	sont	mélangés	assez	complètement	en	
Afrique,	pour	former	une	race	métisse	qui	n'est	pas	sans	avoir,	dans	la	région	maritime,	quelques	
affinités	avec	les	Latins.	(We	have	just	seen,	in	outline,	the	separate	history	of	the	Berbers	and	the	Arabs;	we	will	try	to	demonstrate	how	the	two	peoples	mingled	completely	in	Africa	to	form	a	mixed	race	that	is	not	without,	in	the	Maritime	region,	some	similarities	with	the	Latins.)362		This	view	of	the	flexibility	and	essential	arbitrary	nature	of	fixed	racial	identities	was	crucial	to	Ismael	Hamet’s	conception	of	the	future	of	Algerian	identity	and	their	integration	with	the	French.	In	his	French	language	writings	he	sought	to	use	a	set	of	European	and	Islamic	authors	to	buttress	his	ideas	about	the	primacy	of	culture	over	race	in	determining	the	potential	of	a	people	to	modernise.	Ismael	Hamet	was	keen	to	stress	the	Khaldunian	historical	pattern	of	rise	and	decline.	He	then	combined	this	with	the	works	of	several	European	writers	such	as	Boissier,	d’Avezac,	Mercier	and	Le	Bon	to	provide	evidence	of	the	historical	adaptability	of	the	population	of	North	Africa	throughout	history.363	One	can	see	the	clear	influence	of	Le	Bon’s	ideas	on	the	utility	of	nationalism	to	control	the	masses	and	overcome	any	apparent	differences	in	race	or	identity.364	In	this	way	Hamet	aimed	to	refute	certain	European	racial	theories	and	present	an	alternative	blueprint	for	progress	to	his	European	audience.			
																																																								362	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	84.		363	These	were	largely	works	of	history	such	as	d’Avezac’s	L’Afrique	ancienne,	Boissier’s	L’Afrique	romaine,	and	Le	Bon’s	La	Civilisation	des	Arabes.	364	Nye,	Robert	A.	The	Origins	of	Crowd	Psychology:	Gustave	Le	Bon	and	the	Crisis	
of	Democracy	in	the	Third	Republic.	London:	Sage	Publications,	1975,	35.		
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As	a	Muslim	Algerian	Ismael	Hamet	wanted	to	both	engage	with	and	subvert	the	work	of	French	Orientalist	scholars.	It	is	insufficient	to	see	his	conception	of	Algerian	identity	as	one	that	was	unabashedly	assimilationist.	Ismael	Hamet	sought	to	apply	his	ideas	about	the	transfer	of	culture,	language	and	learning	that	had	been	a	staple	of	early	North	African	history	to	Algeria’s	current	colonial	context.	He	accomplished	this	by	emphasising	the	contemporary	manifestations	of	this	cycle.	This	expressed	to	his	European	audience	the	viability	of	an	Algerian	identity	within	the	French-colonial	context.	Hamet	writes	that:		L’histoire	nous	montre	les	peuplades	berbères	s’infusant	le	sang	de	tous	leurs	vainqueurs:	Carthaginois,	Romains,	Vandales	et	Bysantins,	changeant	avec	eux	de	religion,	de	civilisation	et	de	moeurs,	mais	persistantes	comme	élément	dominant	de	population.	Pénétrés	et	influencés	plus	largement		qu’ils	ne	le	furent	jamais,	par	les	Arabes	qui	leur	imposent	partout	leur	religion,	leur	langue	et	leurs	moeurs,	les	Berbères	se	composent	avec	eux	comme	avec	les	autres	conquérants.		(History	shows	us	the	Berber	tribes	are	infused	with	the	blood	of	all	their	conquerors:	Carthaginians,	Romans,	Vandals	and	Byzantines,	changing	with	them	their	religion,	culture	and	morals,	but	persisted	as	the	dominant	element	of	the	population.	Penetrated	and	influenced	more	widely	than	ever	by	the	Arabs	who	imposed	everywhere	their	religion,	their	language	and	their	customs,	the	Berbers	mixed	with	them	as	with	other	conquerors.)365		What	Hamet	attempts	to	communicate	to	his	European	audience	is	the	malleability	and	illusory	nature	of	race	as	a	meaningful	category	in	Algeria.	Other	Young	Algerians,	such	as	Chérif	Benhabilès,	also	emphasized	the	“essential	Berberism	of	all	Algerians.”366	John	Ruedy	points	to	the	desire	to	reflect	certain	themes	in	French	colonial	scholarship	along	with	Benhabilès’	personal	status	as	
																																																								365	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	français	du	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	291.		366	Ruedy,	John.	“Cherif	Benhabyles	and	the	Young	Algerians”,	in	Franco	Arab	
Encounters.	Carl	L.	Brown	&	Matthew	S.	Gordon	eds.	Beirut:	American	University	of	Beirut	Press,	1996,	356.			
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Berber	as	driving	this	opinion.	It	would	seem,	however,	that	in	the	context	of		engagement	in	the	French	sphere	that	this	explanation	is	insufficient.367	It	is	more	useful	to	look	at	this	approach	as	one	designed	to	highlight	the	ability	of	Muslim	Algerians	to	absorb	and	reflect	the	values	of	their	conquerors	while	maintaining	control	of	the	levers	of	government	and	society	in	Algeria.	This	is	why	Ismael	Hamet,	for	instance,	makes	sure	to	emphasize	the	impact	of	Roman	and	Byzantine	influence	on	the	Berbers.	He	continues	to	make	this	point	through	his	discussion	of	the	Arab	conquest	and	subsequent	Islamicization	of	Algeria.			Hamet	aims	to	impress	on	his	audience	that	a	cultural	and	ethnic	affinity	with	Latin	culture.	Additionally	Hamet’s	emphasis	on	the	coastal	areas	goes	to	the	heart	of	the	particular	elitism	at	the	heart	of	his	vision	for	a	future	Algerian	national	identity.	He	accepts	that	the	modern	Algerian	identity	that	he	envisions	is	not	something	that	can	be	applied	to	the	entire	population.	Through	his	French-language	writings	he	sought	to	assure	his	French	audience	of	this	fact.	It	was	an	indirect	declaration	of	loyalty,	an	indication	of	mutual	understanding	within	a	distinctly	European	intellectual	space.	Just	as	the	Berbers	were	Latinized	and	Arabized	yet	retained	ultimate	numerical	superiority,	so	in	the	same	manner	they	could	be	Gallicized:		
Tout	se	mêlent	et	se	confondent,	sous	le	titre	de	sujets	francais,	dans	les	villes	anciennes	et	nouvelles,	
dans	les	villages	de	colonisation,	dans	les	tribes	autrefois	errantes,	aujourd'hui	fixées	au	sol	cultivé;	
et	dans	cet	ensemble,	un	seul	élément	demeure	dominant,	comme	race,	ainsi	qu'il	le	fut	toujours,	
c'est	l'élément	berbere.		
																																																								367	Ibid.		
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(All	mix	and	mingle	under	the	title	of	French	subjects	in	the	old	cities	and	the	new,	in	the	villages	of	colonization,	in	the	tribes	that	once	wandered,	now	attached	to	the	cultivated	land;	and	in	this	set,	a	single	element	remains	dominant,	as	a	race,	as	it	was	always,	the	Berber	element.)368		It	appears	that	despite	his	continued	insistence	on	the	historical	realities	that	render	the	division	of	humanity	along	strict	racial	lines	meaningless,	the	category	of	‘Berber’	holds	a	certain	importance	for	Hamet.	His	writings	on	this	subject	were	later	reprinted	in	an	issue	of	the	pro-association	newspaper	La	
France	Islamique	in	1913	in	order	to	reinforce	the	paper’s	argument	that	Muslim	Algerians	were	indeed	capable	of	being	integrated	into	French	society.	The	paper	was	founded	in	1913	by	two	French	indigèneophiles,	Paul	Bruzon	and	Numa	Leal,	and	included	contributions	from	both	French	and	Algerian	figures.	Hamet’s	article,	originally	published	in	1913	in	the	Revue	Indigène,	made	several	of	the	same	arguments	that	were	covered	in	his	1906	work.	The	emphasis	was	again	on	the	fact	that	since	the	pre-modern	period	the	Berbers	have	never	ceased	incorporating	foreign	elements	and	influences	while	still	remaining	the	dominant	group.369	The	article	closes	by	asking	why,	in	the	face	of	such	a	long	history	of	migration	and	intermingling,	do	Europeans	still	focus	on	the	“inanity	of	race.”370	Race	for	Hamet	is	minimized	as	a	useful	way	of	grouping	populations	in	his	writings,	yet	there	is	a	clear	sense	that	he	wishes	to	convey	to	his	French	audience	that	while	race	shouldn’t	be	used	to	ascribe	a	set	of	inherent,	immutable	characteristics	to	a	population	group,	it	still	had	meaning	when	talking	about	questions	of	political	control.		
																																																								368	Ibid,	293.		369	Hamet,	Ismail,	“Sur	Les	Affinités	Entre	Français	et	Arabo-Berbères”,	La	France	
Islamique,	30	January	1913.		370	Ibid.		
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Ahmed	Rıza	and	Questions	of	Turkishness	Many	Ottoman	writers	also	addressed	the	question	of	racial	superiority	in	their	French-language	publications.	The	Young	Turks,	for	instance,	while	supportive	of	European	authors	who	endorsed	the	existence	of	racial	hierarchies,	found	themselves	unable	to	effectively	invoke	those	theories	in	their	writings	due	to	the	relatively	low	rank	of	Turks,	Arabs	and	others	in	those	hierarchies.371	Thus,	in	their	engagement	with	a	European	audience	many	Ottoman	writers	found	themselves	in	the	position	of	having	to	overlook	or	refute	the	racial	theories	espoused	by	the	thinkers	they	so	admired.372	However,	as	a	more	open	embrace	of	explicitly	race-based	theories	of	nationalism	became	more	common	among	Ottoman	groups	including	the	Young	Turks,	especially	in	the	wake	of	the	Japanese	defeat	of	Russia	in	1904,	their	presentation	within	the	French	linguistic	and	cultural	sphere	was	markedly	more	measured.373			In	his	book	La	Crise	de	l’Orient	Ahmed	Rıza	criticizes	the	inability	of	Europeans	to	comprehend	the	true	causes	of	the	current	crisis	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	He	mentions	the	fact	that:		
…les	Européens	se	rabattent	ainsi	sur	la	singuliere	théorie	des	races	avec	laquelle	ils	croient	
expliquer	tout…		(…the	Europeans	fall	back	thus	on	the	singular	theory	of	races	with	which	they	believe	they	can	explain	everything…)374																																																									371	Hanioğlu,	Preparation	for	a	Revolution,	298.		372	Ibid.		373	Worringer,	Renée.	“”Sick	Man	of	Europe”	or	“Japan	of	the	Near	East”?:	Constructing	Ottoman	Modernity	in	the	Hamidian	and	Young	Turk	Eras”,	
International	Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies,	36	(2004),	207-230.		374	Ahmed	Rıza.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient:	Ses	Causes	et	ses	remèdes.	Paris:	Comité	Ottoman	d’Union	et	de	Progres,	1907,	123.			
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Ahmed	Rıza,	like	Ismael	Hamet,	rejects	the	European	idea	of	a	fixed	racial	hierarchy.	This	statement	reflects	the	particularities	of	émigré	engagement	with	the	intellectual	space	of	the	host	society.	Racial	distinctions	are	dismissed	as	meaningful	categories	for	explaining	the	decline	or	relative	backwardness	of	a	particular	group	or	civilization.	Just	as	Ismael	Hamet	rejects	the	idea	that	one	can	speak	in	any	useful	way	of	a	division	between	racially	pure	Berbers	and	Arabs,	Ahmed	Rıza	questions	the	validity	of	talking	about	Turks	as	a	meaningful	racial	category.			There	is	a	similar	desire	in	Ahmed	Rıza’s	book	to	counter	European	perceptions	of	racial	difference	by	highlighting	the	historical	realities	that	render	such	concepts	invalid	and	shift	the	focus	of	identity	from	ethnicity	to	language	and	culture.	Ahmed	Rıza	points	out	that:		
On	ne	peut,	certes,	nier	l'influence	de	climat	-	l'homme	est	fils	de	la	terre	qu'il	habite	-;	ni	celle	des	
traditions,	des	institutions,	politiques	et	religieuses,	sur	le	caractère	d'une	nation.		(We	cannot,	of	course,	deny	the	influence	of	climate	-	man	is	the	son	of	the	land	he	inhabits	-;	nor	that	of	the	traditions,	the	political	and	religious	institutions,	on	the	character	of	a	nation.)375		This	is	essentially	the	line	of	reasoning	that	Ismael	Hamet	takes	when	addressing	his	conception	of	Muslim	Algerian	identity	to	a	European	audience.	The	importance	of	the	factors	listed	above	for	both	Ismael	Hamet	and	Ahmed	Rıza	is	the	fact	that	they	are	all	malleable.	The	specific	direction	of	engagement	that	these	French-language	writings	embody	creates	a	discussion	that	is	as	much	about	repurposing	as	refutation.			
																																																								375	Ibid,	124.		
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Şükrü	Hanioğlu	emphasizes	the	shift	toward	a	more	Turkist	and	even	Turkish	nationalist	line	in	Young	Turk	writings	between	1902	and	1907.376	For	Ahmed	Rıza	an	appeal	to	the	relative	irrelevance	of	race	was	balanced	with	an	explicit	acknowledgement	of	Turk	as	a	useful	category	for	analysis.	He	worked	to	de-emphasize	the	racial	character	of	Turk	as	a	category	of	identity	in	much	the	same	way	as	Ismael	Hamet.	Ahmed	Rıza	asks	if	Europeans	can	actually	point	to	anyone	who	is	a	pure	‘Turk’	and	highlights	the	long	history	of	racial	mixing,	especially	in	Istanbul	between	Turks	and	Greeks	and	Circassians.377	He	then	goes	further	stating	that:			
Toute	une	population	de	Turquie	d’Europe,	de	races	différentes,	une	fois	convertie	à	l’Islamisme,	
s’est	également	mélée	à	la	race	turque.		(An	entire	population	of	European	Turkey,	of	different	races,	once	converted	to	Islam,	also	mixed	with	the	Turkish	race.)378		This	conception	of	racial	mixing	was	very	similar	to	that	proposed	by	Ismael	Hamet	in	his	works.	Like	his	Ottoman	counterparts	Hamet’s	vision	of	this	new	Algerians	identity	was	highly	elitist.	Just	as	the	Ottomanism	envisioned	by	Ottoman	writers	was	largely	concerned	with	those	in	the	urban	and	elite	sections	of	society,	so	too	was	Ismael	Hamet’s	Algerian	identity	a	limited	one.	Hamet	uses	his	historical	model	to	demonstrate	how	this	new	Algerian	identity	is	being	formed	and	the	shape	that	it	would	take.	For	Hamet	this	new	identity	involves	the	integration	of	French	practices,	but	not	the	wholesale	suppression	of	the	pre-existing	Arabo-Berber	identity.	A	people’s	identity	was	something	
																																																								376	Hanioğlu,	Preparation	for	a	Revolution,	295.		377	Ahmed	Rıza.	La	Crise	de	l’Orient,	123.		378	Ibid.		
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malleable	that	could	be	augmented	by	French	influence	without	being	wholly	subsumed.	Once	Ismael	Hamet	had	laid	out	the	historical	justification	for	the	ability	of	Muslim	Algerians	to	both	absorb	and	augment	French	culture	he	then	set	about	explaining	to	his	European	audience	how	exactly	this	would	be	achieved.379			Ismael	Hamet	saw	a	specific	class	of	indigène	as	responsible	for	the	creation	of	an	integrated	Franco-Algerian	identity.	This	class	was	formed	of	those	Muslim	Algerians	who	lived	in	close	proximity	to	and	had	regular	contact	with	Europeans	and	came	largely	from	the	merchant	and	professional	classes.380	It	was	this	class,	coastal	and	educated,	that	was	instrumental	in	creating	this	new	identity.	Belief	in	the	importance	of	an	elite	as	the	natural	drivers	of	creating	a	new	Algerian	identity	was	bound	up	with	Hamet’s	conception	of	North	African	history.	For	Hamet	the	history	of	the	region	provided	a	template	for	the	creation	of	this	new	identity.	Just	as	the	Romans	had	spread	their	civilization	among	a	“semi-barbarous”	elite	the	French,	with	their	superior	methods	of	penetration	would	effect	a	similar	change	among	a	far	greater	segment	of	the	population.381	Crucial	for	Hamet	was	the	tendency,	as	he	saw	it,	for	this	class	to	engage	in	mixed	marriages	and	some	of	the	youngest	among	them	who	were	even	born	to	European	mothers.382	For	Hamet	it	is	necessary	to	express	to	his	European	audience	the	accomplishments	of	this	class	of	Muslim	Algerians	as	an	indication	of	the	shape	that	the	new	Algerian	identity	would	take.		
																																																								379	Hamet,	Les	Musulmans	français	dans	le	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	246.	380	Ibid,	247.		381	Ibid,	293.		382	Ibid,	247-8.		
	 149	
Like	many	of	his	Ottoman	counterparts,	Ismael	Hamet	used	his	French-language	writings	to	stress	that	religious	diversity	was	not	an	impediment	to	a	workable	communal	identity.	Hamet,	as	we	saw	in	Chapter	2,	believed	that	Islam	was	not	inherently	antithetical	to	progress.	He	praised	those	in	the	elite	who	maintained	a	strong	affinity	for	Islam	as	a	personal	faith	“…sans	rapport	avec	les	liens	des	
anciennes	groupements	indigènes…”383	A	new	Algerian	identity	needed	to	embrace	an	Islam	stripped	of	its	overt	political	content.	Hamid	needed	to	stress	to	his	European	audience	that	religion	pushed	into	the	private	sphere	would	not	represent	an	impediment	to	the	formation	of	a	modern	Algerian	identity.	Rather	Hamet	blamed	the	reactionary,	institutionalized	religion	in	the	form	of	the	inquisition	and	the	marabout	caste	for	breaking	the	natural	links	and	affinity	between	the	northern	and	southern	coasts	of	the	Mediterranean.384		What	is	clear,	however,	is	that	the	formation	of	this	new	identity	is	contingent	upon	the	continued	dominance	of	the	Berber	element	in	Algeria.	Hamet	concludes	his	1906	study	by	writing:			
En	résumé	les	éléments	divers	dont	se	compose	la	société	africaine	de	l'Algérie	sont	appelés	â	
s'unifier,	en	s'incorporant	des	éléments	européens,	mais	au	bénéfice	de	la	prédominance	croissante	
de	la	race	berbère.		(In	summary,	the	various	elements	that	make	up	the	African	society	of	Algeria	are	called	to	unite,	by	incorporating	European	elements,	but	for	the	benefit	of	the	growing	dominance	of	the	Berber	race.)385			
																																																									383	Ibid,	248.		384	Ibid,	312.		385	Ibid,	313.		
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Duties	of	Empire,	Duties	of	Citizens:	1908-1914	For	both	Ottoman	and	Algerian	émigrés	the	concepts	of	identity	and	citizenship	were	often	closely	linked	with	questions	of	duty	and	obligation	between	the	state	and	its	subjects.	The	Young	Turk	Revolution	of	1908	brought	with	it	renewed	hopes	for	the	future	among	many	groups	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Those	intellectuals	and	writers	outside	of	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress,	the	central	organization	behind	the	revolution,	were	encouraged	by	the	claims	of	individual	liberty,	press	freedom	and	other	liberalizations	promised	by	the	new	government.			The	Ottomanism	of	the	post-1908	period	was	driven	largely	by	initial	expectations	that	the	restoration	of	the	constitution	and	the	parliament	would	work	to	buttress	a	workable	Ottoman	identity	and	later	by	reaction	to	the	increasingly	Turkist	stance	and	policies	of	the	CUP.	The	success	of	the	CUP	in	restoring	the	constitution	and	the	parliament	breathed	new	life	into	the	desire	of	many	of	those	both	inside	and	outside	the	movement	to	create	a	workable	Ottoman	citizenship.	As	one	author	put	it:			
Aussitôt	après	la	proclamation	du	régime	libéral	et	constitutionnel,	Turcs,	Arméniens,	Grecs,	
delivrés	du	joug	qui	les	opprima	si	longtemps,	s’embrassaient	dans	les	rues	de	Constantinople	et	
musulmans,	chrétiens	et	juifs	se	visitaient	réciproquement	dans	les	synagogues,	églises	et	mosques.	(Immediately	after	the	proclamation	of	the	liberal	and	constitutional	regime,	Turks,	Armenians,	Greeks,	delivered	from	the	yoke	that	oppressed	them	so	long,	embraced	in	the	streets	of	Constantinople	and	Muslims,	Christians	and	Jews	visited	each	other	in	their	synagogues,	churches	and	mosques.)386																																																										386	Chérif,	“La	Constitution	en	Turquie	et	les	Agissements	du	Comité”,	
Méchroutiette,	15	October	1909.		
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For	the	Young	Algerians	the	introduction	in	1912	of	mandatory	conscription	for	the	territory’s	Muslim	subjects	provoked	considerable	resistance	and	reassessment	from	many	of	these	ostensibly	pro-French	figures.	Service	in	the	French	army	prompted	renewed	discussion	over	identity	and	belonging	among	many	Young	Algerians.	The	failure	of	the	French	government	to	effectively	integrate	the	Muslim	Algerian	population	into	French	society	was	seen	by	many	of	the	Young	Algerians	as	simply	a	failure	to	understand	the	racial,	cultural	and	religious	realities	of	Algeria.			By	1909	many	Ottoman	publications	began	to	express	concern	over	the	policies	of	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	government.	The	perceived	abuses	of	power	and	increasing	Turco-centric	policies	of	the	CUP	forced	writers	to	engage	with	renewed	vigour	questions	of	identity	and	citizenship.387	The	shape	that	this	identity	was	to	take	and	how	was	it	was	to	be	maintained	and	developed	took	on	a	much	more	pressing	importance	in	light	of	the	rapid	changes	and	reforms	being	carried	by	the	CUP	government.			Some	of	these	Ottoman	writers,	such	as	Nicholas	Nicolaides,	never	returned	to	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	continued	to	publish	L’Orient	through	the	1908	revolution	and	its	aftermath	until	1912.	Others,	such	as	those	involved	in	the	publication	of	Méchroutiette	(1909-1914),	the	organ	of	the	opposition	Parti	
Radical	Ottoman,	relocated,	or,	in	some	cases,	returned,	to	Paris	in	order	to	raise	their	questions	and	concerns	about	the	new	regime	for	a	European	audience.	
Méchroutiette	became,	in	the	post-1908	period	one	of	the	more	stable	anti-																																																								387	Arai,	46.		
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regime	newspapers	to	still	maintain	an	avowedly	Ottomanist	line.	The	Parti	
Radical	Ottoman	or	Islahat-i	Esasiye-i	Osmaniye	Fırkası	was	based	in	Paris	and	was	headed	by	the	former	Ottoman	Ambassador	to	Stockholm	Şerif	Paşa.388	This	party	ostensibly	contained	Ottoman	of	multiple	nationalities,	but	was	largely	dominated	by	Şerif	Paşa	and	Mevlanzade	Rifat	who	were	both	Kurdish.389	Both	would	go	on	to	lobby	for	Kurdish	interests	following	the	end	of	the	First	World	War	and	this	identity	coloured	their	approach	to	Ottomanism	and	Ottoman	identity	as	it	was	expressed	in	the	pages	of	their	journal.390		It	is	useful	to	contrast	these	two	publications,	Méchroutiette	and	L’Orient,	for	their	assessments	and	interpretations	of	Ottoman	identity	following	the	Young	Turk	Revolution.	Both	papers	ran	for	approximately	the	same	length	of	time	following	the	revolution	and	both	were,	at	least	on	paper,	strongly	committed	to	the	preservation	of	the	Ottoman	state	and	the	idea	of	equality	expressed	through	a	common	Ottoman	citizenship	and	identity	and	both	were	headed	by	non-Turks.	These	publications	offer	a	glimpse	of	the	flexibility	and	diversity	of	Ottomanism	as	it	was	to	be	presented	to	the	intellectual	community	in	France	in	the	aftermath	of	the	1908.			
																																																								388	Tunaya,	Tarık	Zafer.	Türkiye’de	Siyasal	Partiler:	Cilt	1	İkinci	Meşrutiyet	Dönemi	
1908-1918.	Istanbul:	Huriyet	Vakfı	Yayınları,	1984,	219.		389	Alakom,	Rohat.	Şerif	Paşa:	bir	Kürt	diplomatının	fırtınalı	yılları,	1865-	1951.	Istanbul:	Avesta,	1998,	59.	Members	of	the	party	also	included	the	journalist	Ali	Kemal	and	the	former	Jewish	Young	Turk	and	contributor	to	the	Mechveret,	Albert	Fua.		390	Özoǧlu,	Hakan.	Kurdish	Notables	and	Ottoman	State:	Evolving	Identities,	
Competing	Loyalties	and	Shifting	Boundaries.	Albany,	NY:	SUNY	Press,	2004,	16.			
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Other	‘Young	Turk’	authors,	such	as	Yusuf	Fehmi,	remained	in	Paris	and	continued	to	publish	books	offering	additional	insights	into	identity	and	belonging	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	These	works,	while	by	no	means	exhaustive,	will	hopefully	provide	an	indication	of	the	ways	in	which	a	diverse	collection	of	the	Empire’s	subjects	hoped	to	present	their	vision	for	an	Ottoman	identity	to	Europe.			Non-Muslim	Ottomans	were	especially	occupied	with	the	shape	that	the	new	constitutional	regime	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	taking.	This	section	is	only	concerned	with	those	writers	who	expressed	in	their	publications	a	clear	desire	to	maintain	the	territorial	and	political	integrity	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	It	will	not	look	at	the	many	non-Muslim	writers	who	were	advocating	for	political	independence	based	on	a	common	ethno-religious	identity.			In	the	wake	of	the	1908	revolution	Nicolas	Nicholaides	through	his	long-running	publication	L’Orient,	sought	to	articulate	a	renewed	allegiance	to	the	Ottoman	Sultan,	at	this	point	still	Abdülhamid	II,	as	the	basis	for	the	successful	construction	and	maintenance	of	Ottomanism.	He	writes:			
Oui,	l'Autorité	Souverain	doit	etre	tenue	au-dessus	de	nos	différends	politiques,	comme	de	nos	
différends	de	nationalités,	elle	doit	être	le	trait-d'union	indispensable	pour	rendre	possible	et	
maintenir	l'union	des	races	et	des	nationalités	de	l'Empire.			(Yes,	the	Sovereign	Authority	must	be	held	above	our	political	differences,	our	differences	of	nationality,	it	must	be	the	special	bond	necessary	to	enable	and	maintain	the	union	of	races	and	nationalities	of	Empire.)391																																																										391	N.	Nicolaides,	“Travaille	a	l’Union	de	Tous!”,	L’Orient,	15	February,	1909.		
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Even	at	this	early	stage	there	is	a	clear	reluctance	to	acknowledge	the	CUP	or	even	the	newly	reconstituted	Ottoman	Parliament	as	a	focal	point	for	Ottoman	unity.	The	Sultan	remained,	in	Nicolaides	opinion,	the	best	source	for	communal	loyalty	and	sees	the	work	of	creating	a	union	de	tous	as	something	only	he	has	the	moral	authority	to	accomplish.392			Nicolaides	too	praised	the	apparent	goal	of	the	CUP,	although	he	doesn’t	mention	them	by	name,	to	“proclaim	all	Ottomans	brothers	united	without	any	distinction	of	race	or	religion”,	but	was	well	aware	of	the	discrepancy	between	the	claims	of	the	CUP	and	the	reality:			
Nous	sommes	absolument	du	même	avis,	et	il	ne	vient	à	notre	esprit,	d’exclure	qui	se	soit	de	cette	
union.		(We	are	absolutely	of	the	same	view,	and	it	does	not	occur	to	us,	to	exclude	anyone	from	this	union.)393			In	this	case	Nicolaides	was	referring	to	the	Ottoman	Bulgarians	whom	he	was	confident	would	choose	to	retain	their	Ottoman	nationality	if	given	the	choice.	Like	his	contemporaries	at	Méchroutiette,	Nicolaides	sought	to	fill	in	the	gaps	between	rhetoric	and	reality	in	the	new	constitutional	regime	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	The	Ottomanism	of	Nicolaides	was,	like	that	of	Méchroutiette,	one	contingent	on	a	degree	of	decentralization	and	the	continuation	of	distinct	communities	with	the	Sultan	as	a	communal	focal	point	for	loyalty	and	patriotism.	In	his	position	as	an	Ottoman	Greek	Nicolaides	was	focused	primarily	
																																																								392	Ibid.		393	N.	Nicolaides,	“La	Situation	Exterieure	de	l’Empire	Ottoman”,	L’Orient,	15	April	1909.		
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on	the	role	and	place	of	Ottoman	Christians	in	the	empire.	He	views	Ottoman	Christians	as	partners	in	the	Ottoman	state	but	implicitly	acknowledges	the	particularity	of	their	position	vis-à-vis	the	governing	ideology.	He	insists	on	the	need	for	equality	and	the	ability	of	Ottoman	Christians	to	be	loyal	and	effective	Ottoman	citizens,	but	does	not	necessarily	see	them	as	having	an	active	role	in	determining	the	criteria	of	Ottoman	identity.	In	this	sense	Nicolaides	takes	a	much	more	classical	and	confessional	view	of	Ottomanism	in	which	the	Sultan	provides	the	locus	for	loyalty	and	citizenship	and	confessional	differences	and	privileges	form	an	integral	part	of	the	imperial	citizenry.			This	was	a	position	taken	by	other	Ottoman	Christian	émigrés	such	as	Farid	Kassab.	Kassab	was	Greek	Orthodox	Christian	from	Palestine	who	spent	time	studying	in	Paris	and	also	published	a	pamphlet	refuting	the	proto-Arab	nationalist	and	anti-Turkish	1905	work	La	Réveil	De	La	Nation	Arabe	by	Negib	Azoury.394	Like	Nicolaides	Kassab	envisioned	a	communal	Ottoman	identity	rooted	in	loyalty	to	the	Sultan	and	the	maintenance	of	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	empire.395	This	refutation	took	place	in	a	French-language	context	and	was	addressed	not	so	much	to	Azoury	himself,	but	to	a	European	reading	public.	Both	Nicolaides	and	Kassab	were	concerned	with	legitimizing	the	Sultan	as	the	head	of	state	to	their	European	audience.			Nicolaides	writes	that	it	is	the	sincere	wish	of	all	Ottoman	patriots	to	work	according	to	the	beliefs	and	wishes	of	the	Sultan	and	that	within	the	framework																																																									394	Wild,	Stefan,	“Ottomanism	versus	Arabism.	The	Case	of	Farid	Kassab	(1884-1970)”,	613.		395	Ibid,	614.		
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of	the	constitution	Ottoman	citizens	are	able	to	do	good	and	useful	work	under	the	Sultan’s	direction.396	In	Nicolaides	writings	in	1909	the	CUP	was	not	even	mentioned	as	a	potential	source	of	or	focus	for	loyalty	or	devotion	to	the	Ottoman	nation.	The	new	government	was	only	mentioned	obliquely	and	Nicolaides	takes	great	care	to	emphasize	the	connection	between	the	Sultan	and	the	CUP.	The	CUP	is	framed	as	willing	agent	and	collaborator	of	the	Sultan	rather	than	a	reactionary	or	revolutionary	force:			
Par	le	choix	de	ses	mandataires,	la	Nation	Ottomane	a	montré	qu'elle	entend	poursuivre	avec	le	
Souverain,	l'oeuvre	si	bien	commencée	par	Lui.	Ainsi	l'Empire	Ottoman	continuera	de	se	développer	
et	de	s'avancer	dans	la	voie	du	Progres.		(By	the	choice	of	its	representatives,	the	Ottoman	Nation	has	shown	it	intends	to	pursue	with	the	Sovereign,	the	work	so	well	begun	by	him.	Thus	will	the	Ottoman	Empire	continue	to	grow	and	advance	on	the	path	of	Progress.)397		The	Sultan-led	process	of	Ottomanization	favoured	by	Nicolaides	was	tested	in	April	of	1909	following	the	deposition	of	Abdülhamid	by	the	CUP	and	his	replacement	by	Mehmed	V.398	This	action	was	seen	as	unacceptable	by	Nicolaides	and	pushed	L’Orient	towards	a	more	explicitly	anti-CUP	and	anti-Turkish	(as	opposed	to	anti-Ottoman)	position.399	Nicolaides	was	well	aware	of	the	other	post-1908	émigré	publications	that	had	emerged	and	sought	to	measure	the	impact	of	these	publications	based	on	their	approach	to	Ottoman	identity.	In	the	May/June	1909	issue	of	L’Orient	he	discusses	the	founding	of	the																																																									396	Ibid.		397	Ibid.		398	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	A	Brief	History	of	the	Late	Ottoman	Empire.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2008,	162.			399	Arai,	Masami.	“Citizen,	Liberty	and	equality	in	Late	Ottoman	Discourse”,	in	Nathalie	Clayer	and	Erdal	Kaynar	eds.	Penser,	agir	et	vivre	dans	l’Empire	ottoman	
et	en	Turquie.	Paris:	Peeters,	2013.		
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Ottomanist	opposition	paper	La	Turquie	Nouvelle,	founded	in	1909,	and	published	in	Paris.	Nicolaides	admires	the	paper’s	mission	and	says	that	they	share	the	same	goal	of	grouping	together	all	those	who	have	an	interest	in	the	preservation	and	advancement	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	for	the	benefit	of	all	of	it	subjects.400	He	writes	then	that	the	sole	difference	between	L’Orient	and	La	
Turquie	Nouvelle	is	the	latter’s	lack	of	respect	for	the	recently	deposed	Sultan,	Abdulhamid.	Nicolaides	still	very	much	links	the	Sultanate	to	the	stability	of	the	empire	and	the	possibility	for	any	sort	of	acceptable	Ottomanism.			The	deposition	of	the	Sultan	by	the	CUP	also	allowed	Nicolaides	to	take	a	more	explicitly	anti-government	line	and	to	change	the	focus	of	his	paper	once	again.	On	the	front	page	of	the	July	1909	issue	of	L’Orient	he	writes:			
Jusqu’à	présent	“L’Orient”	s’était	consacré	à	la	défense	des	intérêts	généraux	de	l’Empire	Ottoman.	
En	le	faisant,	il	accomplissait	son	devoir	patriotique	envers	l’Empire,	dont	son	Directeur	est	citoyen,	
et	envers	la	nation	grecque,	dont	il	se	flatte	d’etre	un	des	fils	les	plus	sincèrement	dévoués.		(Until	now	L’Orient	was	dedicated	to	the	defense	of	the	general	interests	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	In	doing	so,	it	fulfilled	its	patriotic	duty	to	the	Empire,	of	which	its	Director	is	a	citizen,	and	to	the	Greek	nation,	which	he	boasts	of	being	one	of	its	most	sincerely	devoted	sons.)401		It	is	clear	from	this	change	that	Nicolaides’	conception	of	Ottomanism	and	Ottoman	Christian	identity	is	firmly	rooted	in	the	historical	tradition	of	loyal	and	tolerated	minority.	Loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	state	must,	as	he	declares,	be	demonstrated	and	is	not	taken	as	a	given.	It	is	important	for	Nicolaides,	however,	that	this	sacrifice	and	communal	effort	take	a	particular	shape.	In	many	ways	he	is	communicating	to	his	European	audience	that	Ottoman	identity	and	allegiance																																																									400	N.	Nicolaides,	“Les	Fetes	de	“L’Orient””,	L’Orient,	May/June	1909.			401	N.	Nicolaides,	“Ce	que	nous	voulons	faire”,	L’Orient,	15	July	1909.		
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to	La	Patrie	Ottomane	or	La	Nation	Ottomane,	as	he	calls	it,	should	not	be	viewed	as	similar	to	that	of	French	or	German	nationalism.	Despite	using	the	language	of	French	republicanism	Nicolaides	is	clear	that	the	future	he	envisions	for	the	Ottoman	Empire	is	not	that	of	France:			
Mais,	pour	que	l'union	de	tous	éléments	composant	l'Empire	Ottoman,	qu'ils	soient	Musulmans,	ou	
Chrétiens,	soit	réelle	et	profonde,	il	faut	bien	se	rendre	compte	qu'elle	ne	doit	pas	devenir	synonyme	
d'absorption	de	tel	ou	tel	élément	par	tel	autre.		(But,	for	the	union	of	all	components	of	the	Ottoman	Empire,	whether	Muslims	or	Christians,	to	be	real	and	profound,	we	must	realize	that	it	should	not	become	synonymous	with	absorption	of	such	and	such	an	element	by	another.402		Nicolaides	is	clear	that	his	version	of	Ottoman	patriotism	is	one	that	exists	as	an	amalgam	of	the	various	individual	patriotisms	of	the	Empire:			
Or,	il	ne	faut	pas	oublier	que	les	droits	et	caractère	sont	à	la	base	du	patriotisme	de	chaque	élément,	
et	que	c’est	la	réunion,	l’agrégut	de	ces	patriotismes	divers,	qui	constituent	le	patriotisme	Ottoman.	(However,	we	must	not	forget	that	rights	and	character	are	the	basis	of	each	element	of	patriotism,	and	that	it	is	the	meeting,	the	aggregate	of	these	various	patriotisms,	which	constitute	Ottoman	patriotism.)403		As	this	conception	of	Ottoman	identity	began	to	give	way	to	the	growing	Turkism	of	the	CUP	after	1908	new	publications	emerged	to	counter	this	trend	and	present	their	vision	of	Ottomanism	to	a	European	audience.				The	desire	to	explain	the	realities	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	a	European	audience	was	a	driving	motivation	behind	French-language	Ottoman	publications	from	the	
																																																								402	N.	Nicolaides,	“Travaille	a	l’Union	de	Tous!”,	L’Orient,	15	February,	1909.		403	Ibid.		
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beginning.	The	Young	Turk	revolution	of	1908,	however,	created	a	new	immediacy	for	many	émigrés	in	an	attempt	to	provide	a	counter-narrative	to	the	one	being	offered	by	the	CUP.	Like	Nicolaides,	the	contributors	to	the	Paris-based	paper	Méchroutiette	understood	the	pressing	need	to	provide	what	they	saw	as	accurate	information	to	Europe.	For	Méchroutiette	it	was	precisely	because	of	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	immense	diversity	that	European	commentators	were	unable	to	effectively	analyze	the	situation.	The	different	groups	are	so	separated	by	manners,	culture	and	religion	that	any	European	writer	finds	himself	unable	to	understand	them.404	They	accuse	European	writers	of	being	constantly	misled,	through	no	fault	of	their	own,	by	those	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	with	their	own	“premeditated	purposes”	and	“interests”.405	In	this	instance	Méchroutiette	emphasizes	the	immense	heterogeneity	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	order	to	affirm	to	their	European	audience	their	position	as	insiders	uniquely	positioned	to	present	the	truth.	Thus	the	paper	seeks	to	outline	the	realities	of	Ottomanism	for	its	European	audience.	To	this	end	the	paper	proclaimed	that:		
…c'est	uniquement	pour	élever	la	voix	en	faveur	de	tous	ceux	qui	n'ont	ni	la	liberté	d'exprimer	chez	
eux	leur	mécontentement,	ni	les	moyens	de	se	faire	entendre	ailleurs.		(…it	is	only	to	raise	the	voice	in	favour	of	all	those	who	have	neither	the	freedom	to	express	their	discontent	at	home,	nor	the	means	to	be	heard	elsewhere.)406		
Méchroutiette	provides	the	most	direct	claim	to	act	as	a	conduit	between	the	people	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Europe.	This	perceived	role	is	inextricably	linked	to	their	conception	and	promotion	of	an	Ottoman	identity.	A	firmly																																																									404	Chérif,	“Plus	de	Constitution	en	Turquie”,	Méchroutiette,	15	November	1909.		405	Ibid.		406	Chérif,	“La	Constitution	en	Turquie	et	les	Agissements	du	Comité”,	
Méchroutiette,	15	October	1909.		
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Ottomanist	stance	can	be	immediately	seen	in	the	subtitle	of	Méchroutiette,	which	declared	that	it	was	“dedicated	to	the	defence	of	the	political	and	economic	interests	and	equal	rights	of	all	Ottomans	regardless	of	race	or	religion.”407	While	Méchroutiette	decried	the	current	policies	of	the	CUP	government	in	Istanbul	in	the	aftermath	of	the	revolution	they	saw	its	main	events	as	positive	and	indeed	absolutely	necessary	preconditions	for	the	creation	of	a	durable	Ottomanism.	The	paper’s	editor	was	very	optimistic	about	the	potential	for	all	Ottomans	to	be	united	under	a	single	Ottoman	identity	and	uses	the	term	Patrie	Ottoman.	He	declared	that	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	a	respectable	and	viable	state	whose	diverse	population	would	respond	favourably	to	the	political	program	of	his	constitutional	league.	For	the	key	to	Ottomanism	was	inextricably	linked	to	constitutionalism.	For	an	Ottoman	Turkish	paper	Méchroutiette	is	noteworthy	for	their	promotion	of	a	certain	amount	of	decentralization.	This	may	be	because	they	were	already	seeing	the	negative	effects	of	increased	Turkish	nationalism	on	the	non-Turkish	populations	of	the	Empire.	Méchroutiette	continued	to	promote	it	vision	of	Ottomanism	until	1912,	but	to	no	avail.	The	disappointment	was	echoed	by	NIcholaides	in	L’Orient	when	he	stated	that	the	hopes	and	ideals	of	the	Empire’s	Christian	populations	had	been	shattered	by	the	Turkification	policies	of	the	CUP.408		At	this	point	Méchroutiette	was	firmly	opposed	to	the	nationalism	of	the	CUP	and	the	its	detrimental	impact	on	Ottoman	unity.	The	paper’s	editor	blamed	the																																																									407	Mécheroutiette,	15	October	1909.		408	N.	Nicholaides,	“L’Effondrement	du	Kalifat	de	Constantinople”,	L’Orient,	15	January	1912.		
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policies	of	the	CUP	government	for	fuelling	inter-ethnic	hatred	in	Anatolia.409	Like	Nicolaides	and	L’Orient,	Méchroutiette	praises	the	1908	revolution	and	the	bravery	of	the	soldiers	involved.	Unlike	L’Orient,	however,	the	Sultan	is	viewed	as	an	unambiguously	negative	figure	and	one	of	the	primary	obstacles	to	the	equality	of	all	Ottomans.410				The	paper	conceived	of	an	Ottomanism	that	conforms	to	the	principles	of	the	
Parti	Radical	Ottoman.	The	paper	writes	that:			
Pour	faire	aujourd'hui	de	l'Empire	ottoman	un	état	respecté	et	viable,	il	ne	suffit	pas	de	secouer	le	
joug	de	l'absolutisme	et	de	dissiper	le	terreur	qu'inspire	le	régime	de	la	dictature	occulte,	il	faut	
aussi	assurer	sincerement	et	loyalement	l’entente	entre	tous	les	éléments	musulmans	et	non-
musulmans,	ce	qui	répond	entièrement	au	programme	politique	de	notre	ligue	constitutionnelle.	(To	make	the	Ottoman	Empire	today	a	respected	and	viable	state,	it	is	not	enough	to	shake	off	the	yoke	of	absolutism	and	dispel	the	terror	the	rule	of	this	secretive	dictatorship	inspires,	there	must	also	be	sincere	and	honest	agreement	between	all	the	Muslim	and	non-Muslim	elements,	which	fully	meets	the	political	agenda	of	our	constitutional	league.)411		In	its	initial	issues	Méchroutiette	is	fairly	vague	as	to	how	exactly	it	hopes	to	create	and	sustain	a	common	Ottoman	identity.	While	it	claims	that	harmony	between	Muslims	and	non-Muslims	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	can	be	achieved	through	adherence	to	the	political	program	of	the	Parti	Radical	Ottoman	there	is	little	indication	of	what	this	program	entails.	What	emerges	in	the	early	issues	of	
Méchroutiette	is	a	firm	belief	in	the	existing	constitutional	basis	for	equality.	Like	
L’Orient	the	paper	supports,	at	least	conditionally,	the	continuation	of	the	religious	privileges	historically	enjoyed	by	the	empire’s	non-Muslim	subjects.																																																										409	Ibid.	See	also	“Pour	le	Pouvoir	et	l’Argent”,	Méchroutiette,	10	January	1910.		410	Ibid.		411	Ibid.		
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In	response	to	the	CUP	government’s	apparent	disregard	for	article	11	of	the	Ottoman	constitution	the	paper	writes:			
Etait-il	opportun	de	créer	des	incidents	de	nature	à	nous	aliéner	inutilement	la	confiance	de	nos	
compatriotes	non	musulmans,	alors	que	nous	avons	un	besoin	si	urgent	de	nous	unir?		(Was	it	appropriate	to	create	incidents	of	a	nature	unnecessarily	alienating	the	trust	of	our	fellow	non-Muslims,	when	we	so	urgently	need	to	unite?)412		It	is	clear	that	at	this	point	Méchroutiette	is	taking	a	fairly	pragmatic	approach	to	the	question	of	Ottoman	identity	and	citizenship.	It	is	also	clear	that	the	question	of	equality	for	all	Ottomans	is	one	that	is	conditional	and	not	inherent.	Not	unlike	Nicolaides,	Méchroutiette	appears	to	conceive	of	an	Ottoman	identity	that	largely	rests	with	the	empire’s	Muslim	population.	Ottoman	Christians	must	subscribe	to	this	Ottoman	identity	and	Ottoman	patriotism	that	they	themselves	are	not	responsible	for	creating.	In	this	sense	non-Muslims	must	become	Ottomans.	This	approach	can	be	seen	in	the	way	in	which	differences	are	reinforced	through	the	constant	reiteration	of	the	empire’s	diversity.	It	is	telling	that	Austria-Hungary	is	mentioned	as	an	example	of	a	diverse	and	multi-ethnic	empire	that	takes	a	favourable	approach	to	managing	this	fact.	Méchroutiette	openly	favours	the	type	of	balancing	act	that	they	seem	to	believe	the	Austro-Hungarians	have	managed:			
L'amalgame	dont	se	compose	notre	pays,	amalgame	de	races	si	différentes	par	la	religion,	les	
moeurs	et	le	langage,	impose	aux	gouvernants	le	devoir	impérieux	d'etablir	une	base	d'entente	qui	
concilie,	au	lieu	de	les	exclure,	les	intérets	de	chaque	partie	constitutive.		(The	amalgam	which	makes	up	our	country,	an	amalgam	of	races	so	different	by	religion,	customs	and	language,	requires	of	the	rulers	the	imperial	duty	to	establish	a	basic	agreement	that	balances	rather	than	excludes	the	interests	of	each	constituent	part.)413																																																									412	Chérif,	“Plus	de	Constitution	en	Turquie”,	Méchroutiette,	15	November	1909.		413	Chérif,	“L’égalité	des	races”,	Méchroutiette,	1	October	1910.		
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What	is	revealed	by	the	comparison	with	Austria-Hungary	here	is	that	it	seems	to	offer	a	conception	of	the	many	non-Muslim	elements	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	as	a	clear	minority	to	be	granted	and	guaranteed	equal	rights	rather	than	a	group	with	an	inherent	equal	share	in	the	Ottoman	state.			
Méchroutiette	claims	in	an	article	from	January	1910	entitled	Notre	Programme	that	in	their	view	the	application	of	an	education	sociale	appropriée	was	necessary	to	create	a	workable	fraternité	between	all	Ottomans.414	However	it	is	clear	that	this	education	program	was	to	be	more	specifically	aimed	at	non-Muslims	and	those	non-Turkish	Muslims,	such	as	the	Kurds.	In	this	way	while	
Méchroutiette	seeks	to	offer	a	more	egalitarian	view	of	Ottoman	citizenship	and	identity	than	the	CUP	it	is	clear	that	there	is	at	least	the	implicit	acknowledgement	that	certain	groups	more	than	others	are	responsible	for	determining	and	setting	out	the	parameters	of	Ottoman	identity.	This	position	was	more	openly	embraced	by	members	of	the	CUP	government	themselves	who,	in	the	pages	of	French	publications,	sought	to	assure	their	European	audiences	that	the	new	Ottoman	government	was	not	in	fact	anti-Christian.	Engagement	with	the	French-language	press	was	just	as	important	for	members	of	the	government	as	it	was	for	members	of	the	opposition	in	the	all-important	battle	for	public	opinion.	In	an	article	for	the	French	journal	L’Islam	an	Ottoman	deputy	named	Selim	Bey	outlines	his	view	of	the	future	of	parliamentarianism	in	Turkey.																																																												414	La	Direction,	“Notre	Programme”,	Méchroutiette,	1	January	1910.		
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He	claims	that	they,	meaning	in	this	case	the	CUP,	respect:			
…la	personne	du	souverain,	la	tradition	du	peuple	et	la	liberté	de	conscience,	dans	cet	amalgame	de	
nationalités	et	de	religions	qu’est	la	Turquie.		(…the	person	of	the	sovereign,	the	traditions	of	the	people	and	the	freedom	of	conscience,	in	this	mix	of	nationalities	and	religions	that	is	Turkey.)415		Despite	these	claims,	however,	it	is	clear	that	this	respect	is	conditional.	The	liberties	and	equality	granted	to	all	Ottomans	require	an	exhibition	of	loyalty	from	the	non-Muslim,	specifically	Christian,	subjects	of	the	empire.	For	Selim	Bey	Ottoman	Christians	must	demonstrate	that	they	are	willing	to	work	hand	in	hand	with	their	Muslim	brothers	for	the	prosperity	of	their	country.416	In	this	case	the	new	Ottoman	government	continued	to	find	utility	in	engagement	with	the	French-language	press.	These	“official”	texts	functioned	not	so	much	as	propaganda	for	the	new	regime	as	a	dialogue	with	the	French	reading	public.	The	journals	L’Islam	and	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman	provided	an	ideal	space	for	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	to	participate	in	a	conversation	about	identity	and	their	role	in	society.		It	is	possible	to	see	the	conception	of	non-Muslim	Ottomans	as	minority	partners	expressed	in	several	of	the	articles	of	the	manifesto	of	the	Parti	Radical	Ottoman,	which	appears	for	the	first	time	in	the	June	1910	issue	of	Méchroutiette.	It	is	an	essentially	liberal	manifesto,	calling	for,	among	other	things,	free	trade,	a	free	press,	equal	taxation,	mandatory	secular	primary	education	and	the	abolition	of	
																																																								415	Selime	Bey,	“L’avenir	du	parlementarisme	en	Turquie”,	L’Islam,	December	1909,	77.		416	Ibid,	79.		
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cruel	and	unusual	punishment.	The	office	of	the	Sultan	remains	very	much	a	part	of	the	political	future	envisioned	by	the	party,	but	he	is	to	take	the	form	of	constitutional	monarch.417	Islam	is	to	remain	very	clearly	the	religion	of	State,	but	Article	1	acknowledges	religious	freedom	and	equality	before	the	law.				There	is	a	clear	emphasis	on	the	adaptation	of	the	constitutionalism	on	“the	most	civilized	nations”	with	a	respect	for	the	specific	national	traditions	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.418	It	is	clearly	important	to	the	writers	of	Méchroutiette	to	provide	assurances	to	its	European	audience	that	equality	would	be	maintained	without	the	elimination	of	existing	privileges	for	the	Empire’s	non-Muslim	subjects.	The	newspaper	was,	at	this	time,	sharing	a	discursive	space	with	a	variety	of	French-language	publications	put	out	by	specific	ethnic	and	religious	groups	from	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Arabs,	Greeks	and	Armenians	all	competed	for	sympathy	and	engagement	within	the	French	political	and	intellectual	sphere.	
Méchroutiette	needed	to	insure	that	its	positions	were	not	seen	as	disadvantaging	non-Muslims.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	party	manifesto’s	emphasis	on	equal	taxation	and	also	its	position	on	education.	Méchroutiette,	and	by	extension,	the	Parti	Radical	Ottoman	saw,	like	many	of	their	contemporaries,	national	education	as	being	an	integral	part	of	the	process	of	forging	a	new	identity	or	patriotism.	Yet	in	their	position	as	a	French-language	publication	they	are	intently	aware	of	expressing	any	position	that	would	seem	to	advocate	for	the	assimilation	of	the	empire’s	non-Muslim	subjects.	Thus	their	position	emphasizes	the	need	for	primary	education	to	be	mandatory	but	makes	no	
																																																								417	Méchroutiette,	1	June	1910.		418	Ibid.		
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mention	of	the	language	of	instruction	or	questions	of	religious	affiliation.	This	can	be	contrasted	with	many	Algerian	writers	who	clearly	stated	that	while	Arabic	would	continue	to	be	taught	in	certain	contexts	secular	education	in	the	French	language	would	form	the	backbone	of	assimilationist	efforts.419			
Méchroutiette	in	a	later	issue	also	provides	the	party	manifesto	for	L’Entente	
Libérale,	the	primary	opposition	party	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	after	1908.	The	party	also	promoted	a	strongly	Ottomanist	agenda	and	put	an	enormous	amount	of	faith	in	both	the	constitution	and	the	Ottoman	parliament	as	the	primary	means	of	ensuring	and	promoting	equality	among	all	Ottoman	subjects.420	The	party,	however,	also	conceives	of	Ottomanism	in	majority/minority	terms.	Again	the	view	of	Ottomanism	being	presented	is	one	in	which	the	non-Muslim	and	especially	non-Turkish	elements	of	the	empire	are	minority	partners	in	a	communal	state.			One	of	the	primary	concerns	of	Méchroutiette	during	this	period	was	the	growing	ethno-nationalism	of	the	Turkish-led	CUP.	For	them	the	move	towards	equality	among	all	Ottomans	was	an	integral	aspect	of	a	teleological	progression	that	had	been	long	interrupted	by	Abdulhamid,	but	restored	by	the	1908	revolution.421	
Méchroutiette	calls	the	CUP	nationaliste	par	essence	and	claims	that	they	are	in	danger	of	once	again	interrupting	this	natural	progression.	The	paper	claims	that	the	nationalism	of	the	CUP	is	especially	dangerous	as	it	exploits	a	general	anti-
																																																								419	Both	Ismael	Hamet	and	Chérif	Benhabilés	held	this	belief.		420	“Le	programme	de	l’Entente	Libérale”,	Méchroutiette,	1912.		421	Chérif,	“Les	dangers	du	nationalisme	en	Turquie”,	Méchroutiette,	1	March	1910.		
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European	feeling	to	create	the	illusion	of	Ottoman	solidarity.422	Méchroutiette	also	attacks	the	idea	of	Turkish	supremacy	by	appealing	to	the	realities	of	racial	mixing	and	intermarriage	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	Here	the	paper	attempts	to	counter	the	concept	that	one	can	speak	of	a	definitively	‘Turkish’	race	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	counters	that	there	can	only	be	a	very	small	portion	of	the	population	that	could	be	considered	in	any	way	purely	Turkish.423		Additionally	the	author	questions	the	idea	of	the	inseparability	of	religion	from	nationality	among	many	of	the	Empire’s	non-Muslim	subjects.		In	many	ways	this	approach	to	race	reflects	the	position	outlined	by	the	Turkish	sociologist,	poet	and	political	activist	Ziya	Gokalp	in	his	1923	work	The	Principles	
of	Turkism.	In	this	work	Gokalp	argued	against	the	ethno-nationalist	Turks	who	claimed	racial	supremacy	over	the	other	groups	in	the	empire.424	He	criticized	these	individuals	for	both	assuming	a	relationship	between	racial	and	social	characteristics	and	for	confusing	the	idea	of	‘nation’	with	that	of	‘kinship’.425	What	Méchroutiette	and	others,	including	many	Algerian	émigrés,	did	not	believe	was	the	inability	of	cosmopolitanism	and	nationalism	to	co-exist.	Neither	did	they	believe,	as	Gokalp	did,	that	total	cultural	and	linguistic	unity	was	necessary	to	maintain	a	functioning	national	state.426		
																																																								422	Ibid.		423	“Tableau	des	éléments	constitutifs	de	l’Empire	ottomane”,	Méchroutiette,	1	December	1910.		424	Parla,	Taha,	“The	Social	of	Political	Thought	of	Ziya	Gokalp”,	in	Social,	
Economic	and	Political	Studies	of	the	Middle	East	Volume	XXXV.	Leiden:	Brill,	1985,	34.		425	Ibid.		426	Ibid,	35.		
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This	is	echoed	in	an	article	entitled	Les	Nationalites	Musulmanes	en	Turquie	the	author	looks	to	the	peculiar	ethno-confessional	situation	of	many	Ottoman	Christian	groups	and	contrasts	it	with	that	of	the	Kurds,	which	he	refers	to	as	a	
nationalité.	The	author	mentions	that	while	the	various	Christian	populations	of	the	empire	are	able	to	appeal	to	their	religious	leaders	in	order	to	redress	their	grievances	whereas	the	Kurds	are	afforded	no	such	option.427	The	conception	of	Ottoman	identity	reflected	in	this	article	is	one	that	is	heavily	cosmopolitan.	It	is	clear	that	a	grouping	of	ethno-linguistic	identities	were	meant	to	form	the	basis	of	a	shared	Ottoman	identity.	For	this	reason	Méchroutiette	took	great	care	to	present	the	diversity	of	the	Ottoman	population	in	its	pages	to	its	European	audience	as	a	means	of	countering	the	CUP’s	apparent	monopoly	on	Ottoman	identity.			The	restoration	of	the	constitution	was	meant	to	provide	an	avenue	for	the	recognition	of	Kurdish	national	identity	as	a	component	of	a	greater	Ottoman	identity.428	He	criticizes	the	attempts	by	the	CUP	to	Turkicize	the	Kurds	with	appeals	to	a	shared	Sunni	Muslim	religious	identity	and	states	that	a	people	can	change	their	religion	but	they	cannot	change	their	nationality.429	For	the	author	there	is	a	clear	emphasis	and	acknowledgement	of	nationalities	within	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	a	very	deliberate	opposition	to	any	sort	of	assimilationist	concept	of	shared	citizenship.	The	author	blames	the	promotion	of	this	idea	on	the	fact	that	many	of	the	leaders	of	the	CUP	had	studied	in	Paris,	where	they	came	under	the	belief	that	they	could	substitute	the	idea	of	nationality	for	that	of																																																									427	“Les	Nationalites	Musulmanes	en	Turquie”,	Méchroutiette,	1913.	428	Ibid.	429	Ibid.	
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religion.430	This	point	is	also	made	by	Nicolaides	in	L’Orient,	when	he	says	that:	“while	the	desire	for	union	among	all	Ottomans	is	real	and	profound	it	must	not	occur	with	the	absorption	of	one	element	by	another.”431	It	is	important	for	both	of	these	publications	to	convey	to	their	European	audience	that	the	common	Ottoman	identity	and	citizenship	they	envision	is	different	from	that	in	France.	It	is	possible	to	see	this	as	a	thinly	veiled	criticism	of	France’s	attempts	to	integrate	her	Muslim	subjects	into	a	common	French	identity.			For	many	Ottoman	writers	grappling	with	the	topics	of	loyalty	and	citizenship	during	the	Second	Constitutional	Period	the	question	of	who	belonged	to	the	Ottoman	nation	were	frequently	raised.	Méchroutiette	tended	to	approach	this	question,	as	stated	above,	by	including	exhaustive	lists	of	all	of	the	constitutive	elements	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	However,	both	L’Orient	and	Méchroutiette	struggled	with	the	question	of	the	role	that	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	Jewish	subjects	would	play	in	the	creation	of	a	new	communal	Ottoman	identity.432			The	role	that	Ottoman	Jews	played	in	the	1908	revolution	and	the	subsequent	CUP	government	was	one	that	caused	a	great	deal	of	speculation	and	suspicion.	Both	Ottoman	figures	themselves	and	foreign	governments	questioned	the	position	and	influence	that	Jews	played	in	the	new	governments	and	the	policies	that	it	was	pursuing.	This	was	driven	in	large	part	by	the	prominence	of	the	Jewish	population	in	Salonika,	which	was	a	major	centre	for	revolutionary	
																																																								430	Ibid.		431	N.	Nicolaides,	“Travaille	a	l’Union	de	Tous!”,	L’Orient,	15	February,	1909.		432	Cohen,	Julia	Phillips.	Becoming	Ottomans:	Sephardi	Jews	and	Imperial	
Citizenship	in	the	Modern	Era.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014,	156.		
	 170	
activity	prior	to	1908.	Additionally	the	role	played	by	Masonic	lodges,	most	of	which	had	sizable	Jewish	membership,	in	providing	meeting	space	for	revolutionaries	in	Macedonia	further	aroused	concern.	For	Ottoman	writers,	to	engage	with	the	European	intellectual	sphere	provided	the	possibility	for	engaging	with	European	anti-Semitism,	which	had	grown	more	intellectually	sophisticated	throughout	the	nineteenth	century.	The	common	themes	of	divided	loyalty,	profiteering	and	political	manipulation	all	emerged	in	these	publications	as	they	sought	to	reckon	with	the	place	of	the	Jews	in	La	Patrie	
Ottomane.433					The	established	connection	between	Freemasonry	and	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	of	1908	helped	to	further	fuel	the	narratives	of	anti-Semitic	conspiracy	that	were	swirling	around	this	event.	The	question	of	Freemasonry	and	anti-Semitism	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	the	wider	Muslim	world	has	been	studied	extensively.434	European	involvement	in	the	foundation	and	expansion	of	Masonic	lodges	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	made	them	inherently	suspect	in	the	eyes	
																																																								433	In	many	ways	this	mirrored	the	backlash	against	those	elite	Levantine	families	that	had	enjoyed	political	and	economic	power	during	the	Hamidian	period.	Both	groups	represented	something	was	seen	as	essentially	‘foreign’	and	potentially	unpatriotic	in	the	eyes	of	many	Ottoman	Muslims.	This	inherent	mistrust	of	‘cosmopolitanism’	would	be	reflected	back	at	the	CUP	by	opposition	groups	after	1908.	See	Hanssen,	Jens.	“Malhamé-Malfamé:	Levantine	Elites	And	Transimperial	Networks	on	the	Eve	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution”,	International	
Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies,	43	(2011),	25-48.		434	See	Kedourie,	Ellie,	“Young	Turks,	Freemasons	and	Jews”,	Middle	Eastern	
Studies,	7/1	(1971),	89-104,	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition,	and	Ozan	Arslan	and	Cinar	Ozen,	“The	Rebirth	of	the	Ottoman	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	in	Macedonia	Through	the	Italian	Freemasonry”,	Oriente	Moderno,	24/1	(2005)	93-115.		
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those	outside	their	membership.435	The	role	of	Masonic	lodges	as	meeting	spaces	and	was	in	many	ways	an	integral	part	of	the	success	of	the	revolution	and	after	the	revolution	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	began	to	establish	its	own	lodges	separate	from	the	main	European	obediences.436			This	expansion	of	Freemasonry,	however,	came	increasingly	to	color	the	opinion	of	the	CUP	and	of	the	revolution	itself.	While	Freemasonry	had	been	present	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	since	the	late	eighteenth	century,	focused	awareness	of	it	and	opposition	to	it	increased	markedly	in	post-1908	period.437	One	of	the	key	elements	of	this	opposition	to	Freemasonry	was	the	outsized	role	that	Jews,	both	foreign	and	Ottoman,	were	seen	to	have	played,	through	this	Masonic	network,	in	both	the	revolution	and	the	subsequent	government.	Foreign	governments	and	Ottoman	opposition	groups					Anti-Semitism	had	gripped	France	thoroughly	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	in	the	wake	of	the	Dreyfus	Affair,	which	lasted	from	1894	until	its	resolution	in	1906.	Dreyfus	was	a	French-Jewish	army	officer	from	Alsace	and	was	accused	of	passing	French	military	secrets	to	the	German	embassy	in	Paris	and	arrested	in	December	of	1894.	His	arrest	and	the	subsequent	revelations	that	the	real	culprit	was	a	Catholic	major	in	the	army	named	Ferdinand	Walsin	Esterhazy,	divided	French	society	into	Dreyfusard	and	anti-Dreyfusard	camps.438	
																																																								435	Dumont,	Paul,	“Freemasonry	in	Turkey:	a	by-product	of	Western	penetration”,	European	Review,	13/3	(2005),	481-493,	482-83.		436	Ibid,	489.		437	Landau,	Jacob	M.,	“Muslim	Opposition	to	Freemasonry”,	Die	Welt	des	Islams,	36/2	(1996),	186-203,	193.		438	Johnson,	Martin	P.	The	Dreyfus	Affair.	Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1999.		
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During	this	period	there	were	multiple	works	published	in	France	that	sought	to	address	the	question	of	anti-Semitism.	These	tended	to	mirror	the	broader	rift	in	the	population	and	included	pamphlets,	essays	and	articles.	It	was	within	this	literary	and	journalistic	space	that	ideas	about	Judaism	and	the	place	of	Jews	in	Western,	and	especially	French,	society	were	debated.	From	Emile	Zola’s	famous	
J’Accuse439	to	the	virulently	anti-Semitic	writings	of	figures	like	Ferdinand	Brunetiere,	competing	viewpoints	saturated	print	media	in	France	during	this	period.			It	was	in	this	context	that	Emile	Durkheim	published	his	Antisémitisme	et	crise	
sociale in	1899	as	part	of	a	larger	collection	on	anti-Semitism	compiled	by	Henri	Dagan.	This	work	laid	out	the	general	contours	of	French	anti-Semitism	and	to	distinguish	it	from	its	Russian	and	German	counterparts.	For	Durkheim	French	anti-Semitism	was	the	result	of	particular	events	and	the	passions	they	provoked,	in	contrast	to	the	more	stable	and	traditional	anti-Semitism	that	pervaded	German	and	Russian	society.440	Durkheim	in	part	blamed	social	malaise	and	the	decay	caused	by	the	economic	restructuring	and	specific	historical	crises	of	the	nineteenth	century,	such	as	the	events	of	1848	and	the	defeat	of	France	in	the	Franco-Prussian	War	in	1870.441	Anti-Semitism	emerged	in	response	to	these	crises	and	served	a	social	function	by	unifying	a	population	around	a	perceived	enemy.	It	was	in	this	environment	that	opposition	writers	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	published	their	journals	in	the	wake	of	the	1908	
																																																								439	Zola,	Emile,	“J’Accuse”,	L’Aurore,	January	13,	1898.		440	Goldberg,	Chad	Allen,	“Introduction	to	Emile	Durkheim’s	“Anti-Semitism	and	Social	Crisis”,	Sociological	Theory	26/4	(2008),	299-321,	301.		441	Ibid,	302.		
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revolution.	And	it	was	this	environment	that	they	took	advantage	of	and	spoke	to	through	their	French	language	writings.			For	the	Ottoman	writers	of	the	period	the	revolution	of	1908	represented	one	of	these	historical	crises	to	which	Durkheim	was	referring	and	which	resulted	in	an	acute	flare-up	of	anti-Semitism.	The	newspaper	Mechroutiette	provides	one	of	the	most	sustained	examples	of	an	anti-Semitic	response	to	the	CUP	government	and	its	actions.	Despite	having	Jewish	contributors,	Mechroutiette	continued	to	present	anti-Semitic	narratives	about	the	elite	of	the	new	government.			In	an	article	entitled	Un	avertissement	from	August	1911,	Méchroutiette	sought	to	address	what	it	saw	as	a	gap	in	its	analysis	of	the	Ottoman	Empire:		
Aux	nombreuses	questions	d’actualité	dans	l’Empire	Ottoman,	questions	albanaise,	arabe,	grecque,	
arménienne,	etc.,	pour	ne	citer	que	celles	qui	se	rapportent	aux	races,	il	faut	encore	en	ajouter	une	
autre,	la	question	juive.		(To	the	many	current	questions	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	the	Albanian,	Arabic,	Greek,	Armenian	questions,	etc.,	to	mention	only	those	that	relate	to	race,	it	is	still	necessary	to	add	another,	the	Jewish	question.)442		The	paper	is	very	quick	to	point	out	that	what	they	write	does	not	arise	out	of	hatred	and	they	reaffirm	their	commitment	to	equality	for	all	Ottomans.	
Méchroutiette’s	discussion	of	the	Jewish	question	begins	by	noting	that	the	Jews	have	historically	been	treated	very	liberally	by	the	Ottoman	Empire.	For	
Méchroutiette	the	concern	is	that	certain	Ottoman	Jews	are	committed	to	taking	revenge	on	the	empire	for	humiliations	visited	against	their	co-religionists	in																																																									442	“Un	avertissement”,	Méchroutiette,	August	1911.		
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other	countries.443	There	is	a	clear	sense	that	Ottoman	Jews	do	not	necessarily	fit	with	the	idea	of	Ottoman	nation	expressed	by	Méchroutiette.			Much	of	this	had	to	do	with	the	question	of	Zionism	and	the	role	of	the	Empire’s	Jewish	population	in	that	particular	enterprise.	In	another	article	from	October	1911	entitled	Les	dangers	des	virtus	negatives,	the	author	states	that	it	would	be	foolish	and	irresponsible	to	close	ones	eyes	to	the	Jewish	question	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.444	The	article	begins	by	laying	out	the	contours	of	the	Jewish	population	in	the	Empire	and	dividing	it	into	Sephardim,	Ashkenazim	and	the	Dönme.445	This	inclusion	of	the	Dönme	in	the	Jewish	population	was	very	strategic	and	no	doubt	was	calculated	to	appeal	to	Western	European	fears	of	crypto-Jews	and	the	popular	narrative	of	Jews	as	a	fifth	column	within	Christian	societies.			Again	the	article	stresses	the	fact	that	the	Jews	in	the	Ottoman	had	always	been	treated	very	well,	especially	as	compared	to	their	co-religionists	in	Christian	countries.446	The	article	follows	the	standard	anti-Semitic	tropes	that	were	common	in	France	at	the	times	and	accuses	those	Jews	and	Dönme	who	now	
																																																								443	Ibid.		444	“Les	dangers	des	virtus	negatives”,	Méchroutiette,	October	1911.		445	The	Dönme	were	Jews	who	had	converted	to	Islam	at	the	end	of	the	17th	century	at	the	behest	of	their	leader	Sabbatai	Zevi.	They	were	officially	considered	Muslims	by	the	Ottoman	State,	but	retained	their	own	particular	customs	and	religious	practices	and	remained	a	relatively	closed	community.	Popular	mistrust	and	suspicion	of	this	community	increased	markedly	in	the	post-1908	period	due	to	the	participation	of	many	Dönme	in	the	revolution	and	their	subsequent	role	in	the	CUP	government.	See	Baer,	Marc	David.	The	Dönme:	
Jewish	Converts,	Muslim	Revolutionaries	and	Secular	Turks.	Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	2010.		446	Ibid.		
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occupy	positions	in	the	government	of	acquiring	them	dishonestly.	These	tactics	would	seem	to	conform	to	Durkheim’s	idea	of	anti-Semitism	creating	unity	though	the	creation	of	a	common	enemy,	and	that	is	precisely	what	the	contributors	to	Méchroutiette	sought	to	do.			Ultimately,	however,	Méchroutiette	was	forced	to	respond	to	perceived	accusations	of	anti-Semitism	and	address	its	readership	directly	on	the	subject.	In	a	March	1914	article	entitled	Le	Comité	Union	et	Progre	Contre	Les	Juifs,	the	author	informs	his	readers	that	they	are	sincerely	committed	to	the	principle	of	total	equality	among	all	Ottomans	and	in	fact	attempts	to	specifically	distance	their	use	of	the	term	Juif	as	a	negative	term	to	describe	members	of	the	CUP	with	the	way	it	is	used	in	French	anti-Semitic	publications.447	It	goes	on	to	differentiate	again	between	Jews	and	the	Dönme,	who	are	the	real	object	of	the	paper’s	antipathy.	When	they	use	the	term	Juif	they	are	referring	to	the	Dönme	and	not	to	Ottoman	Jews.	It	is	the	Dönme	who,	according	to	the	article,	seek	to	quickly	enrich	themselves	before	the	collapse	of	the	Empire.448			These	articles	touch	on	many	of	the	more	common	themes	associated	with	anti-Semitism,	including	questions	of	loyalty	and	a	belief	in	racial	supremacy.	The	influence	of	Jews	outside	the	Ottoman	Empire	is	also	raised	and	the	paper	asks	if	there	can	be	any	greater	humiliation	for	the	other	races	of	the	empire	to	have	their	future	decided	by	negotiations	between	foreign	Jews	and	Ottoman	Jews.449	
																																																								447	“Le	Comité	Union	et	Progres	Contre	Les	Juifs”,	Méchroutiette,	March	1914.		448	Ibid.		449	Ibid.		
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L’Orient	also	raised	the	idea	that	Ottoman	Jews	were	an	obstacle	to	the	stability	and	progress	of	the	empire.	In	a	1912	article	Nicolaides	writes	that:			
A	tord	ou	à	raison	–	nous	ne	voulons	pas	entamer	ici	une	discussion	sur	ce	point	–	l’élément	Juif	
apparait	à	beaucoup,	dans	nombre	de	pays,	comme	un	ferment	de	division	et	de	désagregation.	(Rightly	or	wrongly	-	we	do	not	want	to	start	a	discussion	here	on	this	point	-	the	Jewish	element	appears	to	many,	in	many	countries,	as	a	source	of	division	and	disintegration.)450		Like	Méchroutiette,	L’Orient	attempts	to	protect	itself	from	accusations	of	anti-Semitism	by	trying	to	focus	on	a	specific	case.	One	of	the	Ottoman	Jews	mentioned	by	name	in	both	articles	is	Emmanuel	Carasso,	the	deputy	for	Salonika	and	an	important	figure	in	the	lead	up	to	the	revolution.	He	is	described	in	L’Orient	as	being	responsible	for	the	current	disunion	and	discord	in	the	empire.	Nicolaides	also	accuses	him	of	actively	diminishing	the	role	and	dignity	of	the	office	of	Caliph	and	Sultan.451	Likewise	Méchroutiette	accuses	Carasso	of	viewing	himself	as	a	successor	to	the	power	of	Abdülhamid	and	asks	if	he	now	believes	that	his	race	should	have	absolute	power.452	This	view	of	Carasso	was	also	shared	by	the	British	consul	in	Salonika,	who,	in	his	1910	report,	portrayed	Carasso	as	an	ardent	Freemason	intent	on	“exercising	Jewish	influence	over	the	new	dispensation	in	Turkey.”453	For	both	L’Orient	and	Méchroutiette	it	is	clear	that	there	were	limits	and	boundaries	to	Ottoman	identity.	From	both	the	Christian	and	Muslim	perspective	Ottoman	Jews	still	represented	something	outside	their	conception	of	a	common	Ottoman	identity.		
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Following	the	Young	Turk	revolution	of	1908	there	was	a	great	deal	of	excitement	and	anticipation	that	the	restoration	of	the	Ottoman	constitution	and	parliament	would	result	in	political	unity	in	the	Empire	under	a	vigorous	and	inclusive	Ottoman	identity.	This,	sadly,	was	not	to	be	and	it	led	to	new	publications	emerging	to	attempt	to	speak	on	behalf	of	all	Ottomans	or	to	lobby	on	behalf	of	their	own	group.	These	included	papers	that	identified	with	specific	ethnic	groups	as	well	as	collaborative	papers	involving	Ottomans	of	multiple	ethnicities.			This	chapter	has	shown	that	the	question	of	identity	was	a	common	thread	that	ran	through	the	writings	of	both	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers.		Ottoman	writers,	both	Muslim	and	non-Muslim	strove	to	define	and	catalogue	the	various	groups	that	made	up	the	empire	in	an	effort	to	give	legitimacy	to	concept	of	Ottomanism	as	the	basis	for	the	citizenship	with	the	empire.	Ethnic	identity	for	many	of	them	remained	inherent,	but	the	hope	that	an	overarching	source	of	loyalty	and	belonging	could	be	created	was	a	regular	feature	of	their	writings.	For	the	Algerians	like	Ismael	Hamet,	identity	was	largely	subjective.	This	fit	with	his	overall	goal	of	working	to	convince	his	readers	that	‘Muslim’	and	‘Algerian’	were	not	fixed	or	immovable	categories	that	were	opposed	to	‘French’	or	‘European’.	What	both	of	these	groups	did	through	their	writings	on	the	subject	of	identity	was	to	be	part	of	a	dialogue,	one	that	combined	theories	of	migration,	citizenship	and	loyalty	to	achieve	their	goals.				 	
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Chapter	4			
Reshaping	the	State:	Questions	of	Reform	and	
Development		In	June	of	1911	the	former	Young	Turk	and	now	member	of	the	Parti	Radical	
Ottoman	wrote	in	the	pages	of	that	party’s	journal	Mechroutiette:		Pour	conserver	la	Constitution,	on	ne	peut,	on	ne	doit	éternellement	compter	sur	la	seule	force	de	
l’armée	pourra,	pendant	un	certain	temps,	monter	la	garde	autour	de	la	Constitution;	mais	il	faudra	
bien	qu’un	jour	ou	l’autre,	son	action	passe	au	second	plan	et	qu’elle	cède	la	place	à	un	
gouvernement	civil,	indépendant	d’elle.	(To	preserve	the	Constitution,	we	cannot,	we	must	not	ever	rely	solely	on	the	strength	of	the	army.	The	real	guarantee	of	maintaining	the	Charter	is	popular	force.	The	army	may,	for	a	time	stand	guard	around	the	Constitution,	but	it	will	someday	or	other,	as	it’s	action	is	secondary,	give	way	to	a	civilian	government,	independent	of	it.)454		On	one	level	this	statement	reflects	the	growing	disillusionment	among	former	supporters	of	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	and	the	restoration	of	the	Constitution	of	1876,	but	it	is	also	indicative	of	the	way	that	the	production	of	discourse	on	reform	continued	within	the	linguistic	and	intellectual	space	of	France	through	the	1890s	up	until	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War.	Within	this	space	the	idea	of	the	constitution,	as	a	central	plank	of	the	reform	program	of	many	Ottoman	writers,	was	discussed,	debated	and	reflected	to	a	European	audience.	In	many	ways	this	reflected	the	continuing	importance	and	relevance	of	the	practice	of	involvement	within	this	cultural	and	linguistic	space.	The	
																																																								454	Fua,	Albert.	“Vers	la	Dictature	et	les	Coups	d’Etat”,	Mechroutiette,	June	1911.		
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success	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	of	1908	reinforced	the	idea,	however	misguided,	that	the	press	had	a	vital	role	to	play	in	fomenting	change	and	reform	in	the	Empire.	On	a	more	general	level,	however,	and	one	more	relevant	to	the	aims	of	this	chapter,	it	reflected	the	relevance	of	the	practice	itself,	of	being	part	of	this	particular	process	of	intellectual	engagement	that	had	defined	these	groups	since	the	nineteenth	century.	To	continue	this	practice	was	to	continue	to	be	part	of	a	particular	group	that	was	larger	than	the	narrowly	factional	or	ideological.	This	group	was	part	of	a	press	culture	that	was	both	oppositional	and	cooperative.		What	the	discussions	of	reform	in	these	texts	show	is	that,	while	part	of	the	broader	process	of	Ottoman-Algerian	reform	discourse,	the	writers	who	published	primarily	in	French	wanted	their	readers	to	see	them	as	uniquely	positioned	to	interpret	and	reflect	the	realities	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria.	
	
Intellectuals	and	Reform	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	Reform	and,	as	importantly,	the	perceived	need	for	reform,	that	occupied	conversation	within	and	about	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	French	Algeria	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	was,	as	could	be	expected,	a	central	feature	of	this	type	of	writing	both	in	France	and	elsewhere.	In	France	and	Geneva	French	language	publications	across	the	political	spectrum	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	grappled	with	specific	questions	of	authority,	social	and	political	organization,	assimilation	and	others,	as	well	as	the	more	general	question	of	what,	if	anything,	was	required	to	improve	the	position	of	their	
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respective	countries.455		This	was	a	preoccupation	of	intellectuals	and	writers	from	both	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	throughout	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.456	The	question	of	how	to	improve	the	position	of	their	own	societies	was	a	pressing	weight	that	filled	the	pages	of	newspapers,	books	and	official	reports.	The	previous	chapters	of	this	dissertation	have	dealt	largely	with	the	less	practical	and	pragmatic	topics	of	these	writings.	Discussions	of	history,	religion	and	identity	could	of	course	be	extrapolated	to	encompass	more	concrete	policy	changes	and	prescriptions,	but	in	the	cultural	and	linguistic	context	of	this	thesis	I	have	argued	that	they	were	more	concerned	with	implanting	themselves	into	a	particular	debate	than	with	creating	a	necessarily	coherent	political	or	ideological	program.			It	is	with	the	question	of	reform	that	we	see	perhaps	the	widest	gulf	appearing	between	Ottoman	and	Algerian	participation	in	this	French-language	intellectual	space.		Algerian	writers	sought	largely	to	address	the	question	of	reform	as	it	
																																																								455	All	of	the	publications	discussed	in	this	thesis	dealt	on	some	level	with	the	question	of	reform.	Its	radicalism	and	level	of	specificity	often	depended	on	how	the	particular	individual	or	newspaper	positioned	themselves	vis-à-vis	the	government	of	their	homeland.	Thus	Nicolas	Nicolaides	wrote	extensively	on	the	state	of	foreign	investment,	agriculture	and	finance	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	
L’Orient.	Likewise,	Ismael	Hamet	and	others	wrote	in	much	more	detail	about	these	topics	than	many	of	their	more	openly	activist	contemporaries.	Yusuf	Fehmi,	Ahmed	Riza,	and	Albert	Fua,	and	others	for	instance	favoured	the	manifesto	and	the	numerated	party	program	and	their	discussions	of	reform	tended	toward	the	more	polemical	side.		456	See	for	example	Çiçek,	Nazan.	The	Young	Ottomans:	Turkish	Critics	of	the	
Eastern	Question	in	the	Late	Nineteenth	Century.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2010,	Ageron,	Charles.	Les	Algeriens	Musulmans	et	la	France	(1871-1919).	Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	de	France,	1968	and	Grant,	Jonathan.	“Rethinking	the	Ottoman	“Decline”:	Military	Technology	Diffusion	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	Fifteenth	to	Eighteenth	Centuries”,	Journal	of	World	History,	10/1	(1999),	179-201.		
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related	to	specific	issues	within	the	pre-existing	colonial	political	context.457	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter	it	is	important	to	stress	the	continuity	of	intellectual	production	on	the	topic	of	reform.	This	phenomenon	was	one	of	relative	consistency.	Although	the	exigencies	of	certain	events	necessitated	a	degree	of	specificity	when	it	came	to	the	question	of	reform,	the	basic	shape	of	the	debates	remained	more	or	less	the	same.	While	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	of	1908	undoubtedly	altered	the	way	in	which	power	was	concentrated	and	exercised	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	it	did	not,	as	we	shall	see,	drastically	alter	the	practice	of	writing	and	engaging	within	a	French-language	environment.			The	growth	of	indigenous	proponents	of	reform	in	the	model	of	the	Young	Ottomans,	Young	Turks	and	others	among	the	Algerian	elite	was	a	much	slower	process.	However	they	shared	a	similar	professional	origin	and	elitist	worldview	with	their	Ottoman	counterparts.	Both	of	these	groups	were	convinced	that	reform	needed	to	be	something	that	was	articulated	and	enacted	by	an	educated	elite.	For	these	writers	the	press	was	seen	as	the	most	logical	vehicle	for	disseminating	these	ideas.458	Likewise	this	belief	in	the	utility	of	the	press	and	the	written	word	transcended	the	boundaries	of	opposition	groups	and	parties.	The	French-language	allowed	access	into	larger	discussions	and	debates	that	encompassed	both	East	and	West.	Ottomans	and	Algerians	shared	the	pages	of	French	language	publications	such	as	L’Islam,	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman	and	the	
																																																								457	Ruedy,	John.	“Cherif	Benhabyles	and	the	Young	Algerians”,	in	Franco	Arab	
Encounters.	Carl	L.	Brown	&	Matthew	S.	Gordon	eds.	Beirut:	American	University	of	Beirut	Press,	1996,	350.		458	Ayalon,	67.		
	 182	
Revue	Occidentale.459	This	breadth	of	interaction	allowed	these	writers	to	frame	their	reform	discussions	to	suit	their	needs.	They	stretched	from	the	party	platform	to	the	academic	analysis	offering	a	range	of	possibilities	for	influence	and	discourse.			
Sources	of	Power,	Sources	of	Change:	Theories	and	Models		The	question	of	where	authority	was	to	be	located	and	how	it	was	to	be	exercised	as	explored	by	Ottoman	and	Algerian	intellectuals	is	by	no	means	one	that	was	unique	to	the	time	period	under	investigation.	These	questions	had	been	under	consideration	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	since	at	least	the	seventeenth	century.460	Many	Algerian	writers	for	the	most	part	accepted	the	legitimacy	of	the	French	state,	at	least	as	far	as	it	could	be	conceived	of	as	a	legal-constitutional	entity.461	In	this	section	I	will	focus	on	how	change	and	reform	outside	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria	were	presented	within	their	writings.	It	will	include	both	the	historical	and	the	contemporary	and	place	them	in	the	context	of	a	more	general	conversation	about	political	development	in	both	the	East	and	the	West.	In	many	cases	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	looked	to	examples	closer	to	home	in	order	to	bring	home	their	points	on	ruler-ship	and	statecraft.				
																																																								459	L’Islam	especially	offered	a	forum	for	both	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	to	engage	with	both	the	French	and	each	other.		460	See	for	instance:	Sariyannis,	Marinos.	“Ruler	and	state,	state	and	society	in	Ottoman	political	thought”,	Turkish	Historical	Review,	4	(2013),	83-117.		461	See	L’Anticoloniamisme	en	France	de	1871a	1914.	Paris:	Presses	Universitaires	Francaise,	1973.	
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Pro-palace	newspapers	such	as	Nicolas	Nicolaides’	L’Orient	frequently	looked	to	Russia	as	a	model	for	the	structure	of	the	Ottoman	State	and	how	executive	power	should	be	conceived	of	and	exercised.	Russia	had	also	provided	inspiration	for	opposition	groups	in	the	wake	of	the	1905	revolution.	This	revolution,	along	with	the	constitutional	revolution	in	Iran	the	following	year,	reaffirmed	these	groups’	commitment	to	constitutionalism	as	a	political	goal.462	The	events	of	1905	demonstrated	the	viability	of	constitutional	reform	within	an	autocratic	and	multiethnic	power	not	unlike	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	was	thus	of	great	interest	to	writers	across	the	political	spectrum.		Assessments	of	the	revolution	appeared	across	the	Turkish	language	Young	Turk	journals	Şura-yı	
Ümmet	and	Türk,	which	took	information	largely	gathered	from	the	foreign	press;	both	western	European,	Russian	and	non-Ottoman	Turkic,	and,	using	clandestine	means,	transferred	it	back	to	an	Ottoman	reading	public.463	These	journals	focused	on	the	similarities	between	the	Ottoman	and	Russian	states	and	the	ability	of	the	people	to	force	the	Tsar	to	make	liberal	reforms.464	The	revolution	also	reinforced	the	Young	Turk’s	contention	that	intellectuals	were	the	key	to	any	successful	revolutionary	movement.465	Russia’s	success	in	the	face	of	Ottoman	failure,	or	inaction	at	least,	was	interpreted	as	a	failure	of	Ottoman	
																																																								462	Sohrabi,	Nader.	“Global	Waves,	Local	Actors:	What	the	Young	Turks	Knew	about	Other	Revolutions	and	Why	It	Mattered”,	Comparative	Studies	in	Society	
and	History	44/1	(2002),	45-79,	46.	See	also	Berberian,	Houri.	“Connected	Revolutions:	Armenians	and	the	Russian,	Ottoman,	and	Iranian	Revolutions	in	the	early	Twentieth	Century”,	in	Georgeon,	François	ed.	“Livresse	de	la	liberté”	La	
révolution	de	1908	dans	l’Empire	ottoman.	Paris:	Peeters,	2012	for	a	discussion	of	how	these	alternative	revolutions	influenced	Armenian	émigrés	and	intellectuals.		463	Yaşar,	Murat.	“Learning	the	Ropes:	The	Young	Turk	Perception	of	the	1905	Russian	Revolution”,	Middle	Eastern	Studies	50/1	(2014),	114-128,	115.		464	Ibid,	116.		465	Sohrabi,	58.		
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intellectuals	to	effectively	inspire	the	masses.466	The	Young	Turk	journals	drew	great	inspiration	from	the	1905	revolution,	but	it	is	unclear	how	much	impact,	if	any,	it	had	on	actual	policy	or	the	unrest	that	erupted	in	Eastern	Anatolia	in	1905-07.467			Much	of	this	analysis	focuses	only	on	the	articles	appearing	in	Ottoman	Turkish	journals,	primarily	Şura-yı	Ümmet,	published	by	the	Young	Turks.	Thus,	they	inevitably	are	concerned	with	locating	specific	ideological	influences	and	positions	that	can	be	found	in	Young	Turk	and	CUP	programs	and	policies,	especially	after	1908.	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	however,	I	am	more	interested	in	how	the	revolution	appeared	across	the	spectrum	of	French-language	publications.	For	these	writers’	largely	European	audience	the	Russian	revolution	of	1905	offered	an	opportunity	to	discuss	political	authority	and	the	nature	of	revolutionary	change.	They	were	not	much	interested	in	using	their	journals	to	stir	up	the	masses	or	to	rally	the	populace	on	behalf	of	the	Sultan.	Neither,	however,	can	the	flurry	of	commentary	on	the	events	of	1905	be	dismissed	as	just	a	case	of	propaganda	spreading	amongst	their	European	readership,	whether	on	behalf	of	opposition	groups	or	the	palace.	Unlike	as	was	often	the	case	in	their	Ottoman	language	counterparts,	the	discussion	of	Russia	in	their	French	language	writings	was	about	reflecting	a	particular	conception	of	authority	back	to	their	European	reading	public.		
																																																								466	Ibid,	58.		467	Hanioğlu,	Preparation	for	a	Revolution:	The	Young	Turks,	1902-1908,	123.		
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One	of	the	important	things	about	the	use	of	the	Russian	Revolution	of	1905	as	an	example	for	reform	within	Ottoman	Empire,	as	Sohrabi	makes	clear,	is	its	proximity	to	the	Russo-Japanese	War.	Here	we	had	a	constitutional	revolution	in,	“…an	old,	civilized,	Western	empire	thrown	into	disorder	and	decay	under	the	weight	of	a	despotic	monarch	opposed	to	the	constitutionalist	yearnings	of	his	own	people”,	coming	right	on	the	heels	of	an	“ancient,	backward	Asian	nation”	that	had	used	a	combination	of	constitutionalism	and	nationalism	to	defeat	that	same	European	power.468	The	implications	of	this	defeat	on	European	notions	of	racial	hierarchy	and	what	this	meant	for	the	Ottoman	elite	were	immense.			We	can	trace	the	contours	of	this	progression	within	commentary	given	in	the	French-language	Ottoman	press	as	well.	In	L’Orient	Nicolas	Nicolaides	was	able	to	use	the	Russo-Japanese	War,	not	as	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	the	absurdity	of	Western	theories	of	racial	hierarchy	as	most	of	his	contemporaries	did,	but	rather	to	reaffirm	the	position	of	the	Sultan	as	a	leader	who	possessed	great	emotional	power	and	importance.	Nicolaides	emphasises	that	the	Russian	war	dead	are	to	be	pitied,	but	their	patriotism	and	devotion	to	their	sovereign	is	to	be	greatly	admired.469	He	strives	to	link	the	figure	of	the	Sultan	directly	to	the	army	as	mutually	reinforcing	symbols	of	the	strength	of	the	Ottoman	State.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	praise	for	Japan	is	completely	absent	from	this	article,	despite	Abdülhamid	II’s	admiration	for	the	non-Western	nation’s	success	in	its	modernization	and	reform	program.	The	Sultan	was	especially	interested	in	the	way	that	the	Japanese	Emperor	has	managed	to	assimilate	a	modernist	reform	
																																																								468	Sohrabi,	56.		469	Nicolaides,	N.	“Le	Souverain	et	le	Peuple”,	L’Orient,	May	1,	1904.		
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program	into	the	state	without	sacrificing	his	own	status	as	ruler	or	ignoring	indigenous	tradition.470	This	aspect	of	the	conflict,	however,	is	suppressed	in	favor	of	the	relationship	between	ruler	and	army.			It	is	possible	that	Nicolaides	focuses	on	this	particular	relationship	as	a	way	of	engaging	within	a	larger	European	conversation	about	the	role	of	the	military	as	a	means	of	legitimating	the	authority	of	the	state	and	a	source	of	patriotism	and	national	feeling.	He	disputes	the	notion	that	solidarity	and	brotherhood	are,	as	he	says:	“…the	prerogative	of	democracies.”471	By	linking	the	Ottoman	and	Russian	Empires	through	the	solidarity	of	the	army	Nicolaides	is	both	comparing	the	two	states	and	also	attaching,	in	his	mind,	a	somewhat	more	inclusive	source	of	loyalty	to	the	Ottoman	state,	the	army,	to	the	figure	of	Abdülhamid	II.	In	view	of	his	intended	audience	this	effort	is	not	a	foolish	as	it	might	seem	and	to	drive	home	the	point	he	writes:				
Le	Padichah	récompensant,	comme	ils	le	méritent,	les	serviteurs	du	pays	et	compatissant	à	la	
douleur	des	plus	humbles	de	Ses	sujets,	fait	plus	pour	le	bien-être	des	populations	que	tous	les	
règlements	qu’élaborent	pendant	des	décades	les	assemblées	prétendûment	démocratiques.	(The	Padishah	rewarding,	as	they	deserve,	servants	of	the	country	and	compassionate	to	the	pain	of	the	humblest	of	His	subjects	did	more	for	the	welfare	of	the	people	that	all	regulations	being	elaborated	for	decades	in	the	allegedly	democratic	assemblies.)472		In	the	wake	of	the	actual	revolution	of	1905	Nicolaides	took	the	opportunity	to	shift	the	focus	from	those	involved	in	orchestrating	the	revolution	itself	to	again	the	figure	of	the	Tsar.	While	the	Ottoman	language	Young	Turk	journals	in	Cairo																																																									470	Worringer,	214.		471	Nicolaides,	“Le	Souverain	et	le	Peuple”.	472	Ibid.		
	 187	
engaged	in	endless	hyperbole	about	the	impact	and	significance	of	the	1905	revolution473,	in	French	the	reaction	was	decidedly	more	muted.	The	Young	Turks	interpreted	the	revolution	as	a	violent	change	in	the	structure	of	Russian	society.	They	saw	it	as	indicative	of	their	own	passivity	and,	therefore,	as	a	call	to	action.474	What	Nicolaides	was	able	to	do,	however,	in	the	pages	of	L’Orient	was	to	shift	the	events	of	the	revolution	away	from	the	antagonistic	and	toward	the	cooperative.	The	revolution	and,	more	importantly,	its	aftermath	became	less	an	example	of	the	will	of	the	people	and	more	an	example	of	the	benevolence	of	the	sovereign.			In	an	article	entitled	Le	pouvoir	absolu	et	le	peuple	Nicolaides	stresses	the	Tsar’s	active	role	in	the	reform	document	that	emerged	as	a	result	of	the	revolution.	He	mentions	that	some	of	the	promised	improvements	were	already	under	investigation	by	the	Tsar	prior	to	the	revolution.475	He	focuses	on	the	fact	of	the	Tsar’s	generosity	rather	than	the	will	of	the	people.	This	obviously	reflected	Nicolaides’	pro-palace	stance	with	his	newspaper	and	reaffirmed	to	his	French	audience	the	mantra	of	caution	when	dealing	with	Eastern	states.	Nicolaides	counsels	against	giving	a	people	too	much	power	when	they	are	not	ready	for	it	and	points	to	the	difficulties	being	faced	by	the	Greeks	and	the	Bulgarians	in	this	respect.476	As	with	many	other	comparisons	with	the	Russian	Empire	he	emphasizes	its	vast	and	diverse	nature	as	being	a	barrier	to	the	type	of	democratic	reform	that	the	people	were	seeking	and	he	blames	this	fact	for	the																																																									473	Yaşar,	123.		474	Sohrabi,	58.		475	Nicolaides,	Nicolas.	“Le	pouvoir	absolu	et	le	people”,	L’Orient,	February	25,	1905.		476	Ibid.	
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harsh	response	to	the	crisis,	especially	among	the	minority	populations	such	as	the	Armenians.477		In	Nicolaides’	view	it	is	the	sovereign	who	must	determine	the	course	of	reform.	This	viewpoint	is	exactly	in	line	with	that	of	Abdülhamid	II	and	he	states	that	it	is	the	sovereign	alone	who	is	able	to	judge	when	the	best	opportunity	to	implement	these	reforms	so	as	to	not	disrupt	or	shock	the	population.	For	Nicolaides	it	is	important	to	emphasize	the	stability	of	regimes	and	styles	of	ruler-ship.	States	become	tied	to	their	inherent	characteristics	and	he	compares	advocating	for	the	separation	of	church	and	state	in	Russia	to	the	creation	of	a	republic	in	England	or	a	monarchy	in	Switzerland.478	The	lesson	that	he	takes	away	form	the	Russian	revolution	of	1905	and	the	one	that	he	aims	to	impart	to	his	French	audience	is	that	the	application	of	reforms	which	will	produce	sustainable	results	are	best	when	they	come	from	the	supreme	power.	This	is	in	quite	clear	contrast	to	the	lessons	gleaned	and	reproduced	in	the	Ottoman	language	newspapers	of	the	Young	Turks	in	Cairo	and	elsewhere.479	They	were	far	more	concerned	with	the	power	of	revolutionary	organizations	and	the	power	of	the	press	and	how	to	spread	their	message	of	reform.	The	question	of	how	these	ideas	and	concepts	were	to	be	disseminated	among	the	general	population	and	those	that	were	to	be																																																									477	Ibid.		478	Ibid.		479	Following	the	Young	Turk	revolution	of	1908	another	less	common	comparison	was	made	between	the	Ottoman	and	the	Portuguese	Revolution	in	
Mechroutiette.	In	it	the	author,	one	Osman	Fetret,	stressed	that,	unlike	in	1908,	the	Portuguese	had	actually	managed	to	replace	the	monarchy	with	a	true	republican	government.	And	in	perhaps	a	nod	to	the	futility	of	mere	intellectual	engagement	with	revolutionary	ideas	he	states	that	they	Portuguese	revolutionaries	have	proven	their	intellectual	value	through	their	writings	and	their	moral	value	through	their	actions.	See	“La	Révolution	Portugaise	et	la	Révolution	Turque”,	Mechroutiette,	1	November	1901.		
	 189	
at	the	forefront	of	this	new	society	would	also	prove	to	be	an	important	aspect	of	the	émigré	dialogue.	For	this	we	need	to	turn	to	the	question	of	education		
Education	and	the	Health	of	the	Body	Politic		
Par	contre,	les	avantages	que	le	pays	retirerait	de	la	réforme	de	l'éducation	de	ses	princes	sont	
incalculables:	Détruire	toute	tendance	au	despotisme	et	à	l'arbitraire,	éviter	les	révolutions,	
supprimer	les	complots,	améliorer	les	institutions	en	y	introduisant	un	principe	de	liberté,	diminuer	
les	abus,	transformer	et	métamorphoser	le	régime	actuel,	réformer	l'éducation	du	peuple	en	faisant	
disparaître	jusqu'aux	dernière	traces	du	fanatisme,	fortifier	l'autorité	morale	du	gouvernement	en	y	
ajoutant	toutes	les	acquisitions	de	la	science,	etc.,	etc.		
(By	contrast,	the	benefits	that	the	country	would	draw	from	the	reform	of	the	education	of	its	princes	are	incalculable:	Destroy	any	tendency	to	despotism	and	arbitrariness,	avoid	revolutions,	remove	plots,	improve	institutions	by	introducing	a	concept	of	freedom,	reduce	abuse,	transform	and	alter	the	current	system,	reform	the	education	of	the	people	by	removing	the	last	traces	of	fanaticism,	strengthen	the	moral	authority	of	the	government	by	adding	all	the	achievements	of	science,	etc.,	etc.)480			Education	reform	had	been	at	the	forefront	of	the	reform	movement	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	from	the	start	of	the	nineteenth	century.481	It	was	through	the	gradual	introduction	and	integration	with	Western-style	education	that	the	majority	of	new	scientific,	philosophical	and	political	concepts	were	introduced	into	the	Empire.482	Education	reform	had	been	the	gateway	to	modernization	and	westernization	within	the	Ottoman	Empire	from	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	
																																																								480	Ganem,	Education	des	Princes	Ottomans,	21.	481	See	Zürcher,	Erik-Jan.	Turkey:	A	Modern	History.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	1993,	Mardin,	Şerif.	The	Genesis	of	Young	Ottoman	Thought	and	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	A	Brief	
History	of	the	Late	Ottoman	Empire.		482	See	Fortna,	Ben.	Imperial	Classroom:	Islam,	the	state	and	education	in	the	late	
Ottoman	Empire.		
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century.483	For	the	Algerian	writers	as	well	education	was	seen	as	the	primary	driver	of	cultural	renewal.484	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	3,	a	clear	linguistic	hierarchy	was	understood	as	underpinning	Algerian	society	and	that	education	would	ease	the	transfer	through	Berber	to	Arabic	and	then	ultimately	to	French.	Ismael	Hamet	took	education	as	a	fundamental	element	of	Algerian	reform.	In	his	book,	
Les	Musulmans	français	dans	le	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	he	takes	several	pages	to	outline	the	inadequacies	of	education	during	the	pre-colonial	period.485	He	framed	education	not	only	as	something	that	could	raise	a	sizable	Muslim	Algerian	middle	class	to	something	approaching	parity	with	their	European	counterparts.	He	also	saw	schools	as	vital	to	ensure	the	security	of	France’s	Algerian	possessions.			Hamet	firmly	believed	in	the	progression	of	development,	both	cultural	and	linguistic,	that	represented	for	him	the	timeline	of	Algerian	development.	Thus	he	is	keen	to	point	out	the	role	that	the	opening	of	Arab	schools	had	had	on	the	unruly	Berber	populations	in	the	pre-colonial	and	early	colonial	periods.	For	Hamet	the	spread	of	the	Arabic	language	through	schooling	was	the	first	step	in	the	intellectual	development	of	he	Berbers	and	provided	a	necessary	preparation	for	the	introduction	of	French	schools	in	the	later	nineteenth	century.486	He	acknowledges	the	need	for	mixed	Arabic-French	schools	but	mentions	that	their	system	of	handing	out	scholarships	was	haphazard	and	executed	without	the	
																																																								483	See	for	instance	Shaw,	Stanford.	Between	Old	and	New:	The	Ottoman	Empire	
Under	Sultan	Selim	III,	1789-1807.	Cambridge	MS:	Harvard	University	Press,	1971.		484	Ruedy,	John.	“Cherif	Benhabyles	and	the	Young	Algerians”,	364.		485	Hamet,	Ismael.	Les	Musulmans	français	dans	le	Nord	de	l’Afrique,	182.		486	Ibid,	183.		
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proper	consideration	of	the	stage	of	development	or	natural	ability	of	the	recipients.487	This	represents	clearly	Hamet’s	affinity	for	elite-led	reform	efforts.	In	his	mind	the	best	option	would	be	for	the	French	state	would	be	to	focus	their	efforts	on	only	the	most	prepared	students	in	order	to	create	the	necessary	indigenous	educated	class	that	could	then	work	to	improve	the	position	of	the	remainder	of	the	population.			One	institution	that	Ismael	Hamet	believed	would	complement	the	spread	of	French	education	and	indeed	had,	in	his	mind,	always	been	aware	of	this	fact	was	the	army.488	Its	need	for	properly	educated	recruits	provided	a	useful	template	for	the	more	general	organization	approach	to	the	organization	of	Algerian	society.	The	emphasis	on	the	benefits	and	utility	of	education	my	also	have	been	an	attempt	to	gloss	over	some	of	the	more	negative	aspects	that	surrounded	Muslim	Algerian	service	in	the	French	military.	Connected	to	the	army’s	need	for	well-educated	recruits	who	were	fluent	in	French	was	their	need	for	soldiers	who	could	understand	the	basics	of	ballistics	and	artillery	usage.	In	Hamet’s	opinion	this	represented	part	of	the	natural	evolution	of	Algerian	society	from	Berber	to	Arabic	to	French,	with	each	language	unlocking	a	new	tier	knowledge	and	ability.	He	writes:			
Nous	avons	exposé,	plus	haut,	comment	la	langue	arabe	et	les	méthodes	scientifiques	des	
Musulmans	se	trouvent	dans	un	état	d’infériorité	manifeste	vis-à-vis	des	méthodes	et	des	langues	
modernes.	
																																																								487	Ibid,	184.		488	Ibid,	185.		
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(We	explained	earlier	how	the	Arabic	language	and	the	scientific	methods	of	the	Muslims	were	found	to	be	in	a	state	of	inferiority	when	compared	to	modern	methods	and	languages.)489			Education	as	a	centrally	directed	state	institution	would	be	able	to	move	both	Arab	and	Berber-speaking	Algerians	to	a	level	comparable	to	their	European	counterparts.	However,	Hamet	doesn’t	completely	dismiss	the	utility	of	Arabic	instruction.	Related	to	his	theories	of	how	various	conquering	elements	enriched	Algerian	society	and	culture	before	being	largely	absorbed	into	it	was	his	belief	that	language	learning	in	general	is	a	hallmark	of	progress.	He	mentions	efforts	to	reform	and	modernize	the	Arabic	script	led	to	an	increased	interest	in	the	French	language	among	the	natives.490	He	also	points	out	that	even	if	formal	instruction	in	Arabic	may	be	decreasing	among	certain	indigenous	groups,	its	increase	among	Europeans	is	beneficial	as	it	works	to	bring	both	populations	closer	together.	However,	he	still	feels	that	it	is	more	important	for	Algerian	Muslims	to	learn	French	due	to	the	difficulty	of	effectively	assimilating	modern	scientific	concepts	into	Arabic.491			The	question	of	women’s	education	was	also	of	vital	importance	to	Ismael	Hamet	when	it	came	to	the	issue	of	reform	in	Algeria	and	North	Africa	more	broadly.	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	2,	it	was	the	corruption	of	Islam	with	superstition	that	led	to	its	role	in	suffocating	the	potential	of	France’s	Algerian	subjects.	In	an	article	in	the	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman	he	stresses	the	point	that	a	society	cannot	
																																																								489	Ibid,	187.		490	Ibid.	And	also	see	Benrabah,	Mohamed.	Language	Conflict	in	Algeria:	From	
Colonialism	to	Post-Independence.	Bristol:	Multilingual	Matters,	2013.		491	Ibid.		
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advance	without	the	development	of	women.492	This	thinking	mirrored	in	many	ways	the	debates	that	had	been	held	in	France	throughout	the	nineteenth	century	and	represented	a	clear	attempt	to	engage	with	those	ideas	through	the	French-langauge	press.493	Hamet	makes	clear	that	he	regards	the	policies	of	
education	and	association	as	being	inextricably	linked.	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	1	much	of	the	blame	for	the	backwardness	of	Algerian	society	can	be	laid	at	the	feet	of	the	long	periods	of	tyrannical	and	anarchic	rule	that	the	North	Africa	suffered.	Education,	for	Hamet,	is	the	key	to	erasing	the	negative	consequences	of	this	history.	For	Hamet	it	was	crucial	that	education	be	extended	and	promoted	to	both	sexes	equally	and	he	points	to	similar	reform	efforts	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Qajar	Iran	and	even	Russia	as	recognizing	this	fact.494				The	achievements	of	that	nation	were	also	emphasized	in	the	wake	of	the	Young	Turk	revolution	of	1908.495	Discussion	of	education	thus	became	an	integral	part	of	the	practice	of	engagement	because	it	reflected	a	more	broadly	held	belief	in	the	role	that	intellectuals	and	the	state	played	in	shaping	society.	For	these	writers	education	was	a	means	to	propel	reform	efforts	forwards	by	instituting	the	necessary	cultural	and	social	changes.	In	many	ways	a	faith	in	the	utility	of	education	to	reshape	society	was	vital	to	the	raison	d’etre	of	nearly	all	reformers	during	this	period.496	Both	Algerian	and	Ottoman	writers	dealt	with	education	
																																																								492	Hamet,	Ismael,	“Les	Musulmanes	de	l’Afrique	du	Nord”,	Revue	du	Monde	
Musulman,	1913,	281.		493	See	for	instance:	Margandant,	Jo	Burr.	Madame	le	Professeur:	Women	
Educators	in	the	Third	Republic.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1990.	494	Hamet,	“Les	Musulmanes	de	l’Afrique	du	Nord”,	291.		495	See	for	instance	Mechroutiette	February	1910	and	March	1912.		496	See	for	instance	Ayadi	(Taoufik).	Mouvements	Reformiste	et	Mouvements	
Populaires	a	Tunis	(1906-1912).	Tunis:	Publications	de	l’Universite	de	Tunis,	
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both	as	a	pragmatic	issue	of	institutional	and	policy	reform	and	as	a	more	abstract	question	of	progress	and	rulership.	This	reflected	the	balance	between	formal	declarations	of	political	positions	and	a	desire	to	be	part	of	a	French	intellectual	space.		In	1895	Halil	Ganem	published	a	book	concerning	the	education	of	Ottoman	Sultans	that	was	meant	to	outline	a	program	of	educational	reform	for	princes	within	the	Ottoman	royal	family.497	In	this	work	Ganem	goes	over	the	primary	reasons	for	Ottoman	decline	and	how	a	radical	reworking	of	the	way	in	which	Ottoman	princes	were	educated	was	a	vital	part	of	the	reform	and	renewal	process.	He	dismisses	claims	that	en	overhaul	of	the	education	system	would	result	in	a	lessening	of	respect	for	religion.	He	states	philosophical	teaching,	properly	understood	and	managed	is	not	at	all	harmful	to	religion	and	points	to	the	fact	that	the	ulema	are	considered	one	of	the	most	educated	groups	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.498	He	goes	on	to	point	to	specific	examples	of	Western-educated	Ottomans,	such	as	Abbas	Pasha,	who	received	a	Western	education	in	Vienna	from	Christian	teachers	and	remained	loyal	to	the	Caliphate	and	a	good	Muslim.499			
																																																																																																																																																														1986,	Cabanel,	Patrick.	“L’ecole	laique	francaise	en	Tunisie	(1881-1914):	la	double	utopie”,	in	La	Tunisie	mosaique.	Alexandropoulos,	Jacques	&	Patrick	Cabanel	eds.	Toulouse:	Presses	Universitaires	du	Mirail,	2000,	and	Evered,	Emine	Ö.	Empire	and	Education	Under	the	Ottomans:	Politics,	Reform,	and	the	
Resistance	from	the	Tanzimat	to	the	Young	Turks.	London:	I.B.	Tauris,	2012.		497	Ganem,	Halil.	Education	Des	Princes	Ottomans.	Bulle:	Impr.	Émile	Lenz,	1895.			498	Ibid,	5.		499	Ibid,	6.	
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For	Ganem	the	question	of	education	reform	is	restricted	solely	to	the	Ottoman	royal	family.	This	is	largely	because	as	an	Ottoman	Christian	he	would	have	had	access	to	a	modern	education	already	through	the	missionary	schools	and	other	educational	institutions	available	to	non-Muslims	during	this	period.	He	also	uses	this	approach	to	educational	reform	to	acknowledge	to	his	French	audience	the	limitations	to	his	reform	ideas.	He	talks	about	the	worry	that	Western	education	could	cause	liberal	ideas	to	enter	the	palace	by	pointing	to	Peter	the	Great,	whose	desire	to	know	everything	in	no	way	lessened	his	despotic	tendencies.500	For	Ganem	it	is	the	moral	aspect	of	education	that	will	be	the	best	defesne	against	the	growth	of	despotism.501	The	rise	of	Japan	also	provided	a	strong	educational	example	for	the	Ottoman	Empire	under	both	Abdülhamid	and	the	CUP.502		Ganem	locates	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	Japan’s	superiority	in	the	modern	education	of	its	princes.503	Here	again	Halil	Ganem	chooses	to	focus	on	the	education	of	the	ruling	classes	as	opposed	to	the	masses	as	the	best	avenue	for	progress	and	advancement.			Halil	Ganem	and	Ismael	Hamet	both	provide	differing	but	ultimately	elitist	views	of	education	in	their	French-language	writings.	For	Hamet	educational	reform	would	provide	the	necessary	enlightened	class	that	will	be	able	to	speed	a	more	general	integration	of	Muslim	Algerians	into	the	larger	French	body	politic.504	Ganem	on	the	other	hand	saw	educational	reform	as	means	to	improve	Sultanic	
																																																								500	Ganem,	7.		501	Ibid.		502	See	Worringer,	214.		503	Ganem,	16.		504	Hamet,	Ismael,	“Les	Musulmanes	de	l’Afrique	du	Nord”,	295.	
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governance	that	will	then	lead	to	broader	reforms.	Both	of	these	figures	largely	accepted	the	status	quo	and	both	looked	abroad	to	bolster	their	proposals.			
External	Examples:	Ismael	Hamet	and	the	Universal	Muslim	Congress		In	January	of	1908	Ismael	Hamet	published	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	Universal	Muslim	Congress	that	had	been	recently	held	in	Cairo	under	the	direction	of	the	Russian	Turkic	Muslim	reformer	Ismail	Bey	Gasprinskii.505	In	it	Hamet	outlined	the	major	goals	of	the	conference,	both	practical	and	unrealistic,	and	worked	in	his	role	as	authentic	observer	to	offer	a	detached	analysis	of	the	proceedings.	This	analysis	functioned	both	as	a	piece	of	rather	traditional	reporting,	but	also	as	part	of	the	network	of	journalistic	dissemination	that	moved	information	from	Arabic	and	Turkish	language	sources	into	the	a	French-language	environment.			Hamet	begins	his	analysis	by	stressing	the	role	of	the	conference	in	facilitating	the	movement	of	ideas	among	the	educated	classes	in	the	Muslim	world.506	He	also	recognizes	the	importance	of	the	congress	for	non-Muslims	and	positions	himself	as	an	ideal	intermediary	between	his	French	audience	and	the	reform	conversations	of	the	Muslim	world.	Hamet	was	also	clearly	conscious	of	the	parallels	to	the	growing	Young	Algerian	movement	and	its	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	an	educated	elite	and	the	press	as	a	vehicle	for	the	movement	of	
																																																								505	Gasprinksii	published	a	newspaper	called	Tercüman	in	that	dealt	with	the	question	of	reform	in	Central	Asia	and	the	Muslim	world	more	broadly.	See	Ortayli,	Ilber.	“Reports	and	Considerations	of	Ismail	Bey	Gasprinskii	in	“Tercüman”	on	central	asia”,	Cahiers	du	Monde	russe	et	soviétique	32/1	(1991),	43-46.			506	Hamet,	Ismael.	“Le	Congrès	musulman	universel”,	Revue	du	Monde	Musulman	4/1	January	1908,	100.		
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ideas.507	In	fact	the	press,	in	both	French	and	Arabic,	forms	the	introduction	to	his	discussion	of	the	congress.	For	Hamet	the	reporting	on	the	congress	that	appeared	in	various	Cairo	newspapers,	including	al-Liwa,	founded	by	the	Egyptian	nationalist	Mustafa	Kamil	Pasha,	was	worth	transmitting	to	his	French	readers.508	This	reflected	Hamet’s	overall	approach	to	reform,	which	was	rooted	in	intellectual	and	journalistic	engagement	rather	than	direct	action.			Hamet	did	not	frame	Gasprinskii’s	discussion	of	reform	in	overtly	oppositional	terms	as	he	did	for	many	of	his	Ottoman	counterparts.	He	was,	for	instance,	not	openly	opposed	to	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	and	found	much	to	admire	in	his	educational	reforms.509	He	was	however	opposed	to	direct	Russian	rule	over	the	populations	of	Central	Asia,	a	point	that	Hamet	chose	to	largely	conceal	from	his	interpretation	due	to	the	fact	that	it	conflicted	with	his	own	ideas	of	how	Algerian	Muslims	would	function	within	the	French	state	system.	Like	his	Ottoman	and	Algerian	counterparts,	however,	Gasprinskii	believed	firmly	in	the	role	that	state	institutions,	especially	education,	needed	to	play	in	any	advancement	that	was	to	occur	in	the	Islamic	world.510	Gasprinksii	was	also	committed	to	using	journalism	as	the	primary	means	of	spreading	his	ideas	throughout	the	Turkic	speaking	world.	His	ideas,	as	outlined	in	his	Turkic-
																																																								507	Gasprinskii	was	also	a	keen	commenter	on	the	outcome	of	the	Russo-Japanese	War	and	its	implications	for	racial	theory.	See	Worringer,	Renée,	Rising	Sun	Over	
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language	newspaper	Tercüman	had	great	resonance	throughout	Central	Asia,	but	also	among	Turkic	populations	in	Southeastern	Europe,	particularly	Bulgaria.511						Hamet	begins	by	outlining	the	main	aims	of	the	congress,	the	first	of	which	is	to	rescue	and	heal	the	Muslim	world	from	the	damage	that	has	been	done	to	it	over	the	years.	Importantly	the	first	part	of	this	assessment	stresses	that	many	of	the	harmful	developments	that	have	been	brought	into	the	Islamic	world	were	done	so	under	the	false	cover	of	religion.512	The	second	goal,	as	stated	by	Hamet,	is	to	then	root	out	and	remove	or	reform	these	harmful	elements.	For	Gasprinskii	the	problem	lies	with	a	lack	of	access	to	the	tools	of	progress.	This	is	something	that	would	have	resonated	deeply	with	Hamet,	along	with	Gasprinskii’s	faith	in	education	and	other	state	institutions	to	enable	this	access.513	Hamet	concurs	with	Gasprinskii’s	belief	that	the	blindness	and	selfishness	of	the	ruling	classes	throughout	the	Islamic	world	is	responsible	for	their	current	state	of	decline.	He	mentions	that	the	Russian	Muslims	understand	the	importance	of	“the	diffusion	of	knowledge”	and	its	role	in	the	recovery	of	the	Islamic	world.514		He	writes:		
Il	faut,	à	l'ensemble	de	ces	peuples,	qui	poursuivent	un	même	idéal,	un	centre	d'attraction	et	une	
force	impulsive	capables	d'agir	à	la	fois	sur	toutes	les	masses,	de	reserrer	leurs	rangs	et	d'éveiller	
fortement,	parmi	elles,	le	sentiment	de	l'union.																																																											511	Evered,	Kyle	T.	and	Ömer	Turan.	“Jadidism	in	South-eastern	Europe:	The	Influence	of	Ismail	Bey	Gaspirali	Among	Bulgarian	Turks”,	Middle	Eastern	Studies	41/4	(2005),	481-502,	482.			512	Hamet,	100.		513	Ortayli,	43.		514	Hamet,	100.		
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(It	is	necessary	for	all	of	these	people	who	pursue	the	same	ideal,	a	center	of	attraction	and	an	impulsive	force	capable	of	acting	both	on	all	masses	to	tighten	their	ranks	and	greatly	arouse	among	them	the	feeling	of	union.)515		This	point	is	important	for	Hamet	because,	as	in	much	of	his	other	works,	unity	within	certain	social	and	political	structures	is	a	major	plank	of	his	own	philosophy	of	reform.	The	necessity	of	working	within	the	framework	provided	by	the	existing	state	and	of	using	the	institutions	of	the	state	to	create	an	educated	class	that	would	be	able	to	integrate	effectively	into	French	society	was	something	that	could	be	obliquely	referenced	in	his	commentary	on	the	Congress.	He	goes	on	to	say	that	both	the	ruling	and	educated	classes	have	a	duty	to	address	the	concerns	of	the	larger	population.516	As	an	ostensible	member	of	this	ruling	class	Hamet	understand	clearly	the	role	that	he	is	to	play	as	both	a	Muslim	reformer	and	one	who	will	influence	the	French	to	support	him.		
	
Party	Politics,	Reform	Platforms	and	the	Young	Turk	Revolution		The	success	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	in	1908	had	a	substantial	impact	on	the	questions	of	reform	that	were	circulating	within	Ottoman	and	Algerian	intellectual	circles.	The	aftermath	of	this	reorganization	of	the	Ottoman	political	sphere	created	new	motivations	and	material	for	those	in	the	community	to	make	use	of	and,	most	importantly,	a	renewed	opportunity	to	act	as	intermediaries	and	interpreters	between	Ottoman	or	Algerian	society	and	their	European	readers.	New	Ottoman	opposition	newspapers	and	political	organizations	emerged	in	the	wake	of	the	revolution	as	the	promise	of	real	
																																																								515	Ibid,	101.		516	Ibid.		
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political	reform	was	broken	by	the	increasing	authoritarianism	of	the	C.U.P.	government	after	1909.			Journalistic	reactions	to	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	came	quickly,	as	European	commentators	strove	to	understand	and	explain	the	nature	of	the	political	changes	occurring	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.	More	substantial	reflections	on	the	aftermath	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	came	in	the	wake	of	the	counterrevolution	of	1909	and	the	increasing	authoritarianism	of	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	government.517			One	of	the	first	and	most	important	Ottoman	émigré	opposition	newspapers	to	appear	in	the	post-1908	period	was	the	journal	Mechroutiette	(Meşrutiyet),	or	
Constitution,	founded	by	former	Ottoman	Ambassador	to	Stockholm	Şerif	Paşa.518	This	paper	was	also	the	French	language	companion	to	Serbest,	published	in	Istanbul,	and,	as	was	mentioned,	the	official	publication	of	the	Parti	
Radical	Ottoman.519	As	the	Ottoman	community	increasingly	became	or	remained	divided	along	ethnic	lines520,	Mechroutiette	remained	committed,	at	
																																																								517	See	for	instance	Cobb,	Stanwood.	“The	Difficulties	of	the	Young	Turk	Party”,	
The	North	American	Review	195/674	(1912),	103-107.		518	The	paper	was	published	in	Paris	and	ran	from	October	1909	until	April	1914.		519	This	party	remained	committed,	at	least	on	paper,	to	Ottomanism	as	the	basis	for	any	future	workable	Ottoman	State	and	saw	full	equality	as	absolutely	vital	to	the	Empire’s	survival.		520	For	example	see	the	post-1908	Europe-based	publications	L’Orient	(Greek),	
La	Jeune	Turquie	(Armenian)	and	Pour	les	Peuples	d’Orient	(Armenian).	Both	of	the	Armenian	publications	mentioned	above	were	produced	with	the	active	participation	of	European	journalists,	which	allowed	for	greater	integration	into	the	European	intellectual	milieu.				
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least	on	paper,	to	the	ideal	of	Ottomanism	and	Ottoman	equality.521	In	contrast	to	many	of	the	earlier	Young	Turk	opposition	papers	Mechroutiette	offered	a	much	more	detailed	critique	of	the	policies	of	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress.	This	can	perhaps	be	partially	explained	by	the	sense	of	urgency	created	among	those	new	members	of	the	opposition	to	provide	commentary	about	the	current	state	of	affairs	in	the	Ottoman	Empire.522			The	events	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	provided	a	clear	case	study	for	many	Algerian	writers	to	integrate	into	their	own	writings.	In	the	pages	of	French	journals	Algerian	authors	pursued	the	question	of	reform	with	renewed	vigor	following	the	events	of	1908.	Many	of	these	later	works	by	Western	commentators	had	replaced	the	initial	enthusiasm	for	the	Ottoman	experiment	in	parliamentary	democracy	and	constitutional	monarchy	with	a	much	clearer	understanding	of	the	revolution’s	militaristic	and	nationalistic	underpinnings.523			In	the	wake	of	the	revolution,	however,	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	were	given	a	new	impetus	to	react	to,	explain	and	critique	the	changes	that	were	occurring	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and,	in	the	Algerian	case,	approach	these	
																																																								521	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3	the	journal’s	subtitle	proclaimed	that	it	was	a	journal	consacré	à	la	Défense	des	Intérêts	Politiques	et	Économique	et	des	Droits	
égalitaires	de	tous	les	Ottomans,	sans	distinction	de	race	et	de	religion	and	would	retain	this	stance	throughout	its	publication	run.		522	See	for	instance	“L‘évolution	de	la	Jeune	Turquie	Gouvernmentale”	in	the	June	1911	issue	and	also	“Le	Comité	Union	et	Progrès	contre	la	Constitution”	by	Albert	Fua,	in	which	he	urges	all	Ottomans	to	return	to	the	principles	of	1908	and	to	create	a	general	amnesty	for	all	Hamidian	civil	servants.		523	See	for	instance	Pinon,	René.	L’Europe	et	le	Jeune	Turquie:	Les	Aspects	
Nouveau	de	la	Question	d’Orient.	Paris:	Perrin	et	Co.,	1913	and	also	Cobb,	Stanwood.	“The	Difficulties	of	the	Young	Turk	Party”,	The	North	American	Review	195/674	(1912),	103-107.		
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changes	in	terms	of	their	own	experience	and	dialogue	surrounding	the	question	of	reform.	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	those	Algerian	reformers	attempting	to	engage	through	the	medium	of	the	French	language	press	were	encouraged	by	the	success	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution.	To	many	Algerian	writers,	the	success	of	the	CUP	in	1908	further	validated	this	practice	of	engagement	with	the	West	via	the	French	language	press.	For	these	individuals	one	of	the	most	visible	aspects	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	had	been	the	press.	With	the	success	of	the	revolution	the	possibility	of	creating	a	“liberal	public	opinion”	through	the	French	language	press			In	1911	the	self-proclaimed524	Young	Turk	Yusuf	Fehmi	published	a	work	on	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	entitled	La	Révolution	Ottomane.	This	work	was	intended	to	offer	an	analysis	of	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	of	1908	and	to	offer	an	insider’s	viewpoint	of	the	failings	of	the	revolutionary	government.	It	is	commonplace	nowadays	in	the	current	scholarship	to	see	the	Young	Turk	Revolution	as	more	of	a	coup	than	an	actual	revolution.525	It	did	not	represent	a	massive	re-ordering	of	society	nor	did	it	result	in	the	removal	of	the	head	of	state,	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II.	Constitutionalism	of	the	Young	Turks	was	more	of	a	romantic	fascination	than	a	concrete	political	ideology	and	this	continued	into	
																																																								524	While	Yusuf	Fehmi	consistently	referred	to	himself	in	his	writings	as	a	‘Young	Turk’	he	was	never	formally	involved	in	the	Young	Turk	opposition	movements	of	Ahmed	Riza	or	Prince	Sabahaddin.		525	See	A	Brief	History	of	the	Late	Ottoman	Empire	and	Zürcher,	Erik-Jan.	“Ottoman	Sources	of	Kemalist	Thought”,	in	Late	Ottoman	Society:	The	Intellectual	
Legacy.	Elisabeth	Özdalga	ed.	London:	Routledge,	2005.		
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the	post-1908	period	amongst	the	remaining	and	returning	Ottoman	émigrés	in	Paris.526			In	his	assessment	of	the	post-1908	period	and	the	government	of	the	CUP	Yusuf	Fehmi	is	unflinching.	He	moves	away	from	his	earlier	position	as	an	ardent	constitutionalist	who	worked	to	sustain	many	orientalist	fantasies	about	the	Ottoman	Royal	House	in	the	years	leading	up	to	1908.527	His	fundamental	problem	with	the	CUP	government	is	one	that	would	crop	up	among	a	variety	of	post-1908	publications.	This	was	that	the	CUP	represented	a	secret	society	with	possible	Masonic	connections	and	was	an	affront	to	both	the	Sultan	and	the	parliament.528	Fehmi	is	very	concerned	that	the	revolution	has	resulted	in	nothing	less	than	the	complete	destruction	of	the	institutional	hierarchy	of	the	Ottoman	state.	He	compares	the	Sultan	to	Louis	XVI	and	states	that	he	is	forced	to	submit	to	“the	whims	of	our	metaphysicians.”529	Like	Nioclaides	he	takes	a	very	Sultan-centric	view	of	power	in	the	Ottoman	state	and	acknowledges	that	the	Caliphate	is	the	foundation	of	Turkish	power.530	This	position	represents	a	marked	change	from	many	of	his	earlier	publications	in	which	he	stressed	his	
																																																								526	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995,	31.			527	See	for	instance	Le	Coulisses	Hamidiennes	Dévoilées	Par	Un	Jeune	Turc.	Paris:	A	Michalon,	1904.	In	this	work	Fehmi	spends	a	great	deal	of	time	outlining	the	sexual	deviancy	that	apparently	plagued	the	harem.		528	As	we	have	seen	accusations	of	Masonic	and	Jewish	influence	among	the	CUP	was	a	very	common	trope	among	Europeans	as	well	as	Ottomans	at	the	time.	See	Hanioğlu,	Şükrü.	The	Young	Turks	in	Opposition.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1995,	33-41	for	a	discussion	of	Masonic	groups	and	their	involvement	with	the	Young	Turks	and	also	Kedourie,	Elie.	“Young	Turks,	Freemasons	and	Jews”,	
Middle	Eastern	Studies	7/1	(1971),	89-104.			529	Fehmi,	Yusuf.	La	Révoluton	Ottomane.	Paris:	V.	Girad	&	E.	Brière,	1911,	21-22.		530	Ibid,	19.		
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hated	of	the	Sultan,	his	desire	for	equality	and	the	restoration	of	the	constitution.531			Fehmi	isn’t	opposed	to	constitutionalism.	Rather	he	simply	feels	that	the	methods	used	to	achieve	it	are	not	ideal.	He	accuses	the	Young	Turks	of	wanting	to	establish	a	sovereign	bourgeoisie	of	the	type	that	“Europe	gave	us	around	1830”	and	he	criticizes	them	for	rashly	discarding	tradition.532	Yusuf	Fehmi	was	in	no	way	a	supporter	of	Abdülhamid	II	and	he	had	a	close	relationship	with	the	editor	of	Mechroutiette,	but	yet	he	felt	compelled	not	only	to	criticize	the	aftermath	of	the	revolution,	but	also	to	question	the	utility	of	the	constitution,	parliament	and	the	idea	of	Ottomanism.533			What	drove	Yusuf	Fehmi’s	fears	surrounding	the	reforms	of	the	post-1908	period	were	much	the	same	as	those	entertained	by	those	in	the	Parti	Radical	
Ottoman	and	the	Liberal	Party	of	Prince	Sabahaddine.	It	seemed	to	them	that	one	dictatorship	had	been	replaced	by	another,	and	that	the	foundations	of	the	state	had	been	ripped	away	and	replaced	with	something	unsustainable	This	was	characteristic	of	much	of	the	writings	on	reform	in	this	period.	Caution	took	precedence	over	radicalism	and	subjects	were	discussed	with	a	deliberateness	that	suggested	a	fundamental	conservatism.	Reform	was	central	to	the	Ottoman	and	Algerian	experience	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.	It	held	enormous	potential	as	a	topic	that	could	be	translated	into																																																									531	See	for	example:	Tablettes	Révolutionnaires	d’un	Jeune	Turc.	Paris:	A	Michalon,	1903	and	Le	Coulisses	Hamidiennes	Dévoilées	Par	Un	Jeune	Turc.	Paris:	A	Michalon,	1904.		532	Ibid,	33.		533	Ibid,	219-220.		
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practical	transformation	in	both	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Algeria.	Yet	it	seemed	to	stay	within	the	same	sphere	as	the	other	topics	that	this	thesis	has	dealt	with.	Writing	for	an	audience	that	was	largely	removed	from	the	concerns	of	these	writers,	words	became	more	important	than	deeds	and	reform	became	an	exercise	in	abstraction	or	polemic.								 													
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Conclusion			The	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	saw	the	growth	of	popular	press	throughout	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	the	wider	Arab	world.	During	this	period,	the	press	became	the	preferred	medium	through	which	individuals	and	political	groups	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	North	Africa	conveyed	their	messages,	created	and	expanded	networks	across	the	region	and	beyond,	and,	ideally,	tried	to	create	change	within	their	own	societies.			This	thesis	has	examined	the	parallel	growth	of	printing	and	publishing	by	members	of	these	societies	in	the	French	language.	This	phenomenon	overlapped,	complemented	and,	in	many	ways,	was	inextricably	linked	to	publishing	in	Arabic	and	Ottoman	Turkish.	My	research	has	shown	that	by	stepping	away	from	specific	movements,	organizations	or	even	regional	or	linguistic	groups	as	a	category	for	analysis,	one	can	trace	the	role	of	French-language	publishing	as	a	means	of	engagement	that	went	beyond	specific	ideologies	or	political	programs.			Albert	Hourani	gave	a	prominent	place	to	the	press	in	his	work	on	intellectual	production	in	the	Arab	Middle	East.	The	expansion	of	the	popular	press	allowed	Arab	intellectuals	from	various	different	backgrounds	to	disseminate	their	ideas	amongst	their	countrymen	both	at	home	and	in	the	diaspora.534	For	Hourani,	the	popular	press	was	instrumental	in	creating	a	space	for	the	discussion	of	new																																																									534	Hourani,	Arabic	Thought	in	the	Liberal	Age,	132.		
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political	ideas	and	the	creation	of	proto-national	and	ethno-linguistic	consciousness	in	much	of	the	Arab	world	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries.	The	press	was	the	means	through	which	the	normalization	of	certain	ideas	about	modernization	and	scientific	knowledge	was	achieved	among	the	segments	of	the	population	that	consumed	these	publications.535	The	prevailing	belief	among	those	figures	that	made	up	the	bulk	of	the	intelligensia	in	the	Arab	world	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	was	that	both	were	necessary	preconditions	to	the	advancement	of	their	nations.		For	Hourani	the	emergence	of	the	independent	political	newspapers	in	the	Arabic	language	in	the	1870s	were	instrumental	in	creating	a	substantial	audience	for	the	popular	press	and	the	new	ideas	it	spread	in	the	Arabic	language.536			An	emphasis	on	the	role	of	the	press	is	echoed	in	the	treatment	of	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	the	indigène	press	in	Algeria	and	Tunisia	as	it	is	often	framed	as	an	integral	part	of	the	development	of	national	movements	after	the	First	World	War.537	In	Algeria	and	Tunisia,	however,	the	French	language	was	in	many	ways	a	requirement	to	interact	with	the	colonial	powers.	But	this	thesis	has	shown	that	participation	in	this	French-language	intellectual	environment	was	an	act	of	whose	particular	significance	they	were	well	aware.	For	figures	like	Ismael	Hamet,	his	role	as	as	a	scholar	and	interpreter	of	Algerian	realities	was,	like	many	of	his	Ottoman	contemporaries,	a	fundamental	part	of	his	own	identity	as	an	intellectual.	Writing	in	the	French	language,	I	have	argued,	created	another	spatial	layer	of	intellectual	activity	for	these	individuals	that	could,	and																																																									535	Ibid,	246.		536	Hourani,	245.		537	Zassin,	“Presse	et	journalists	<indigènes>	en	Algérie	coloniale”,	37.		
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frequently	did,	overlap	with	the	spread	of	new	ideas,	but	was	also	often	an	end	in	itself.			Across	the	Middle	East	in	this	period,	the	press,	and	the	printed	word	more	broadly,	provided	a	space	that	was	also	highly	transnational.	Both	Stacy	Farenthold	and	Andrew	Arsan	have	emphasized	that	populations	from	the	Arab	provinces	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	used	the	press	as	a	means	of	connecting	various	diaspora	communities	and	extending	these	networks	beyond	Beirut,	Cairo	and	Alexandria	to	cities	such	as	Paris,	New	York	and	Sao	Paulo.538	These	press	networks	allowed	material	to	circulate	between	geographically	diverse,	but	ethnically	and	linguistically	linked	communities.539	I	have	argued	that	the	French	language	texts	of	these	writers	functioned	in	a	similar	way.	While	there	may	not	have	always	been	direct	communication	between	all	of	the	individuals	covered	in	this	thesis,	they	shared	a	specific	space	and	their	output	reflects	a	definable	phenomenon	of	the	period.			Şerif	Mardin	explored	the	role	of	the	press	among	Young	Ottoman	intellectuals	in	the	nineteenth	century	and	the	continuity	between	the	Young	Ottomans	and	the	Young	Turks	of	the	use	of	press	as	a	vehicle	for	criticizing	the	Sultan	and	advocating	for	change.540	Scholars	such	as	Palmira	Brummet	and	Masami	Arai	have	pointed	to	the	importance	of	the	relaxation	of	censorship	in	the	Ottoman	
																																																								538	Farenthold,	“Transnational	Modes	and	Media,	32,	Arsan,	‘This	age	is	the	age	of	associations’:	committees,	petitions,	and	the	roots	of	interwar	Middle	Eastern	internationalism”,	167.	See	also	Ayalon,	The	Press	in	the	Arab	Middle	East,	21.		539	Khuri-Makdisi,	The	Eastern	Mediterranean	and	the	Making	of	Global	
Radicalism,	10.		540	Mardin,	The	Genesis	of	Young	Ottoman	Thought,	403-404.		
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Empire	after	1908	for	allowing	new	and	hitherto	subversive	ideas	to	reach	a	much	larger	audience	through	the	press.541	By	focusing	on	specific	actors,	I	could	show	that	there	was	substantial	continuity	between	the	pre	and	post-1908	periods:	figures	such	as	Albert	Fua	bridged	the	gap	between	the	Hamidian	period	and	the	Young	Turk	period	and	maintained	their	commitment	to	involvement	in	a	French-language	intellectual	sphere.			Thus	there	is	a	broad	and	deeply	researched	body	of	work	that	positions	the	press	as	a	key	component	of	the	spread	of	new	ideas	and	the	development	of	networks	and	social	and	political	movements	throughout	the	Middle	East	and	among	its	diaspora	communities.	My	work,	however,	has	shown	that	French-language	publishing	demands	analysis	as	its	own	category	of	intellectual	production	in	the	Middle	East	and	in	its	diaspora	centers.	Topics	were	raised	and	discussed	in	the	French	language	not	only	as	a	means	of	familiarizing	audiences	with	them,	but	also	as	a	deliberate	act	of	participation	in	a	particular	milieu.	Like	Mardin	and	Hourani,	this	thesis	acknowledges	the	frequent	lack	of	consistency	among	many	of	the	writers	its	covers,	but	frames	this	as	largely	secondary	to	their	aims.	The	ideas	of	many	of	the	writers	covered	in	this	thesis	can	be	considered	a	part	of	a	broader	corpus	of	Ottoman	and	Algerian	liberal	thought,	but	what	bound	all	of	them	together	was	a	enduring	faith	in	the	publishing	in	the	French	language	as	a	means	of	engagement	and	an	expression	of	modernity.	From	the	newspaper	interview	to	the	pamphlet	to	the	manifesto,	the	act	of	
																																																								541	Brummet,	Palmira.	Image	and	Imperialism	in	the	Ottoman	Revolutionary	Press,	
1908-1911.	Albany	NY:	SUNY	Press,	2000.		
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publishing	in	French	held	specific	significance	for	these	individuals	as	a	modern	or	liberal	act.			In	his	work	on	the	Young	Turks,	Stefano	Taglia	rightly	pointed	out	that	exile	to	Paris	was	not	simply	an	attempt	to	escape	persecution	at	home,	but	rather	provided	an	opportunity	to	fully	participate	in	a	European	intellectual	environment.542	Through	a	wider	analysis	of	French-language	material	I	have	demonstrated	that	this	phenomenon	transcended	the	physical	space	of	France	and	that	this	intellectual	environment	could	be	accessed	from	a	variety	of	locations	and	by	a	variety	of	different	actors.	Algerian	writers	such	as	Ismaël	Hamet	showed	that	a	balance,	albeit	at	times	precarious,	could	be	struck	between	insider	and	outsider	through	his	work	for	the	Revue	du	Monde	
Musulman.	The	topics	that	were	raised	in	the	French	language	by	the	Ottoman	and	North	African	intellectuals	covered	in	this	thesis	reflected	their	sincere	interests.	History,	Islam,	identity	and	reform	were	representative	of	the	preoccupations	of	both	these	writers	and	much	of	their	readership.	This	is	made	clear	by	the	topic	addressed	in	their	work	and	the	spaces	that	they	were	afforded	in	European	publications.			For	Albert	Hourani,	one	of	the	main	tasks	of	the	generation	of	Arab	intellectuals	writing	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	was	reconciling	Islam	with	ideas	that	were	absorbed	from	Europe.543	This	was	inextricably	linked	with	the	question	of	reform	and	these	debates	about	Islam	took	place	primarily	in	Arabic	
																																																								542	Taglia,	Intellectuals	and	Reform	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	264.		543	Hourani,	265.		
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and	in	the	context	of	the	specific	societies	in	which	these	writers	lived.	Şerif	Mardin	too	highlighted	the	centrality	of	Islam	and	its	role	in	Ottoman	society	for	Young	Ottoman	thinkers	such	as	Ali	Suavi	and	Namık	Kemal.544	I	have	argued	that	a	shift	in	focus	to	a	European	audience	and	a	French-language	space	adds	additional	depth	to	the	analysis	of	this	topic.			For	the	figures	addressed	in	this	thesis,	Islam	too	represented,	in	their	eyes,	a	fundamental	difference	between	their	societies	and	Europe.	But	in	French	the	discussion	largely	sought	to	muster	a	defense	of	their	societies	for	their	European	audience.	As	this	thesis	has	demonstrated,	the	structure	and	purpose	of	this	defense	was	remarkably	similar	among	the	religious	and	secular	and	among	Christian,	Muslim	and	Jew.	Unlike	much	of	the	Arabic	writing	on	Islam	coming	out	of	Egypt,	Syria	and	Lebanon,	they	possessed	a	certain	level	of	abstractness.	These	defenses	were	not,	like	those	of	Abduh	and	Lutfi	al-Sayyid,	primarily	concerned	with	a	practical	reonciliation	of	Islam	with	European	modernity	in	the	context	of	their	own	countries,	but	with	a	strong	defense	of	an	aspect	of	identity	to	a	European	audience.545	These	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	positioned	themselves	as	insiders	and	experts	who	could	accurately	present	their	faith	to	a	European	audience.	Participation	as	authorities	on	multiple	topics	in	this	French-language	intellectual	space	gave	their	writings	their	own	significance.			
																																																								544	Mardin,	286,	367.		545	Hourani,	162.		
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In	their	discussions	of	history	and	identity	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	intellectuals	sought	to	reflect	ideas	back	to	their	European	audience	as	they	saw	fit.	Discussions	of	Ottomanism	and	a	broader	Algerian	identity	emphasized	the	unity	of	an	Empire	that	Europe	was	seen	as	constantly	trying	to	divide	and	the	absurdity	of	racial	difference	in	a	colonial	environment	with	strict	hierarchies	of	power.	From	Mechveret	to	Mėcheroutiette	and	in	the	pages	of	Le	Revue	du	Monde	
Musulman,	these	writers	demanded	the	space	to	discuss	their	societies	on	an	equal	footing	with	Europe.	Stefano	Taglio	has	referred	to	the	importance	of	the	‘intellectual	phase’	(1896-1902)	of	the	Young	Turk	movement	and	the	freedom	of	its	members	to	engage	fully	with	European	intellectual	currents.546	This	thesis	makes	clear	that	once	the	frame	of	analysis	is	expanded,	this	intellectual	phase	continued	and	represented	a	specific	mode	of	intellectual	participation	that	would	attract	individuals	from	across	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	North	Africa.			This	particular	form	of	political	and	intellectual	engagement	would	soon	be	overshadowed	by	the	growth	of	nationalism	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	the	wider	Arab	world.	The	impact	of	the	First	World	War	accelerated	the	consolidation	of	national	movements,	both	in	newly	created	station-states	and	those	in	areas	still	under	European	control.	In	Algeria,	Turkey,	and	the	mandate	territories,	newspapers	and	journals	became	even	more	strongly	associated	with	political	movements	and	were	crucial	mouthpieces	for	the	leaders	of	those	movements.	The	impact	of	many	of	the	figures	addressed	in	this	thesis	was,	in	many	ways,	focused	on	a	very	specific	audience.	Some,	like	Ahmed	Rıza,	and	Chérif	Benhabilés,	went	on	to	play	political	roles	in	both	France	and	the	Ottoman																																																									546	Taglia,	266.		
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Empire,	but	most	remained	relative	obscure;	known	primarily	through	the	written	material	they	produced.			But	these	writers	and	intellectuals	represented	a	meaningful	and	useful	snapshot	of	a	mode	of	intellectual	engagement.	The	output	of	these	Ottoman	and	Algerian	writers	coexisted	with,	and	formed	part	of,	their	various	identities	as	opposition	activists,	intellectuals,	colonial	apologists,	Ottomans,	Algerians,	and	Muslims.	In	tracing	this	phenomenon,	this	thesis	has	shown	that	it	is	an	important	aspect	of	the	intellectual	history	of	the	modern	Middle	East	that	transcends,	but	also	reevaluates	the	religious,	national	and	linguistic	boundaries	that	frequently	characterise	the	field.							 									
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